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I 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final alimony, child support and 
marital asset distribution order as part of a divorce entered by 
the Second Judicial District Court. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code § 7 8-2a-3(2)(I)-1 
II 
ISSUES & STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The following is a summary of the issues presented for review 
in Vickie L. Holt's (hereinafter "WIFE") appeal and Dale P. Holt's 
(hereinafter "HUSBAND") cross-appeal, with applicable standards of 
review• Citations to the record, including citations showing that 
these issues were preserved for appeal, are designated "R. ", 
and citations to the transcripts are designated as "Tr. ". 
Standard of Review 
(a) Standard of review in divorce cases* In domestic 
relations cases the Court uses the "clearly erroneous" standard to 
review findings of fact,2 and will disturb findings only where the 
appellant demonstrates a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion, 
manifest injustice, or a clearly unjust result.3 Conclusions of 
law are reviewed for correctness, according no deference to the 
trial court.4 Statements herein that the "court erred" refer to 
portions of Court Orders which resulted in "manifest injustice," 
1
 See also Rules 3 and 4 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
2
 See.Maughan v Maughan. 770 P 2d 156 (Utah Ct App 1989) See also. Weston v Weston. 733 P 2d 408 (Utah Ct 
App 1989) 
3
 Bremholt v Bremholt (Utah Ct App Oct 1995). 905 P 2d 877 at 879 In Shepherd v Shepherd (Utah App 
1994) 876 P 2d 429 at 433 the Court stated that "This court will not disturb the tnal court s decision [concerning 
property division] unless it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of discretion" The Court cited Walters v Walters (Utah 
App 1991),812P2d64at66andSm/r/iv Smif/i (Utah App 1988)751 P 2d 1149 at 1151 See also Watson v 
Watson (Utah App 1992) 837 P 2d l.Rudman v Rudman (Utah App 1991), 812 P 2d 73. Munns v Munns (Utah 
App 1990), 790 P 2d 116 Howellv Howell (Utah App 1991), 806 P 2d 1209,1211, cert denied, 817 P 2d 327 
4
 Bremholt v Bremholt (Utah App Oct 1995), 905 P 2d 877 
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in "clearly unjust results" and/or to errors of law, as 
distinguished from mere abuse of discretion. 
Appeal & cross-appeal 
(a) Husband's cross-appeal. The cross-appeal by Husband 
asserts that no alimony should have been awarded because Wife 
allegedly has no need.5 
(b) Wife's appeal. The issues presented for review in Wife's 
appeal are as follows: 
Distribution of marital estate 
1. Whether the Court abused its discretion and/oi erred by an 
unjust and inequitable distribution of marital assets. Did the 
Court abuse its discretion and/or err in failing to make a just and 
equitable distribution of the marital assets6 because the Court: 
(a) Omitted assets. Failed to consider and to distribute all 
marital assets,7 
(b) Codale valued assets at salvage value. Valued Codale's 
physical assets at depreciated book values, attributed no value to 
Codale's enormous earning capacity, goodwill and going-concern, and 
substantially undervalued Codale as a marital asset,8 
(c) Order required Wife to pay enormous avoidable taxes. 
Failed to adopt an asset distribution plan which would minimize 
income tax liability, and improperly imposed upon Wife all income 
tax liability from distribution of marital assets.9 
5
 R 543 & Husband's Docketing Statement 
6
 R 304-335 [Wife's 11/2/94 memo & computations re undervaluation of Codale]. R 404-513 & 528-531 [Wife's 
2/6/95 memo & computes re Codale undervaluation]. App "B". inci 1485^87. 1 8(d). P 9.113.14,15,16.17 & 18, P 11-44 
7
 R 414. I l l [Oakndge Countrv Club membership] The Court incorrectly held that the Country Club Membership was 
included in Codale's value [R 371, ^ 11 ]. R 438. ^  2(c) [condominium unit omitted in valuing mantal estate], R 438. ^  3 
[computation of additional asset value which should have been awarded to Wife]. ^ 15(1) & 15(n). P 35 ^ 10, P 12-16 
8
 R 414.112. R 424. % 20, R 434.11(d), 1(e), 1(f). R 437 ,1(b)&F9.R 444-451 [Codale valued at salvage 
value (depr. book value) of physical assets, giving no value to $347,200 of intangible assets, to its going goodwill or concern 
value [Ex D-21. P 56 {P # in upper-right corner}], 12. P 3. Appendix ML". "N" & "O" 17(c). P 9 & 10(c) & 10(d), P 14-15 
q
 R 423.^ 18 & F 35 [asset distribution plan proposed b> Wife would have reduced income tax by about $410,000]. 
17(f).P 9, H 15(1). P 33 F 10 P 3, F 147. P 36. 111(c), P 18.15(1). P 33, F 10. P 3. Appendix T 
Appellant's Brief- Holt v Holt-2 
(d) No income-producing assets to Wife. Court failed to 
award any income-producing real property to Wife.10 
(e) Wife denied reasonable interest. Court failed to require 
Husband to pay Wife any interest on the initial $500 thousand even 
though payment was delayed about ten months, and allowed husband 
unreasonably low11 4% interest on the two remaining $422.3 thousand, 
payments of which were delayed one and two more years.12 
Alimony and Child Support 
2. Whether the trial Court abused its discretion and/or erred 
in awarding only two thousand dollars per month alimony,13 and $997 
per month child support.14 The Court erred and/or abused its 
discretion in fixing the small amounts for alimony and child 
support in that: 
(a) Codale corporate income not considered. Whether the 
Court erred and/or abused its discretion by considering only 
Husband's modest discretionary salary from Codale,15 failed to 
10
 Appendix "I", ^  1-2, R 422. ^  18 [Wife requested that income-producing business building be awarded to her Wife's 
proposed plan, which was rejected by the Court, would have minimized contact between the parties, would have eliminated 
all but about $30,000 of the $440,000 income tax liability, would have permitted her to receive income from some mantal assets 
for a limited period, and would have permitted Husband to eventually acquire ownership of the building] 
11
 After income tax Wife's net interest is only 3+% The Court found that Wife could reasonably expect to generate about 
6°/o of tax free income from the assets awarded to her [R 388, f 10]. which should be a minimum interest rate Codale borrows 
money at not less than the prime rate (about 9%) As of 1/31/94 Codale had notes payable of about $950,000 {Ex B to Ex P-20 -
$502.518 + $447.151 = $949,669} The Court erred and/or abused its discretion in giving Husband an additional windfall by 
requiring Wife to loan money to him for less than V2 the rate he is paying to others 
12
 The Divorce was entered June 15,1994 [R 246] The Court didn't require payment of initial $500,000 payment until 
March 11. 1995 [R 367.373. J 17. 557.12] and Husband failed to pay until about May 9.1995, a delay of about 10 months Wife 
was therefore required to give Husband a $500,000 interest free loan Even at the 4% interest rate fixed by the Court, Wife 
should have received about $16,700 for Husband's use of her money beginning June 15,1994 If interest is computed at the 6% 
interest rate, which the Court found Wife could have realized on her money [R 388, f 10] Wife is entitled to be paid about $25,000 in 
lost interest If we use the 8% interest rate used by Husband's expert [Ex 21. P 49,113] Wife should have been awarded 
interest of about $33,000. 
13
 The court found that "in order to equalize the income of the parties and to maintain the parties standard of living 
during the marriage, an award of alimony is appropriate" [285. R 369, % 5 & R 37. f 21 ] (Emphasis added) FN # 14 below 
14
 The Court based child support award on $80,000 discretionary income [R 285. R 269.1f 5 & Ex P-6] which Husband 
elected to receive from Codale during 1992 and 1993. even though Husband's compensation was about $323,700 in 1990. was 
about $282,400 in 1991 [Sch E to Ex 28 & R 484. H 16]], and in arriving at the value of Codale the experts valued Husbands 
services at about $250,000 per year [R 285] 
15
 See footnote # 14 above and R 285, R 356, f 7 The Court found that Husband owned 97 6% of Codale Electric 
Supply. Inc ("CODALE") 
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include Codale's enormous profits,16 and failed to equalize the 
parties' respective post-divorce living standards.17 
(b) Income tax exemptions or some compensatory benefit 
should be awarded to Wife. Whether the Court erred and/or abused 
its discretion by awarding income tax exemptions for the children 
to Husband under circumstances where he would probably receive 
little or no benefit therefrom, with no compensating award to Wife. 
[See discussion in f 22, P.46 below & R. 419, I 16; R. 424, SI 19; R. 457, 1 19]. 
Witness Fees 
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred 
in ordering Wife to pay Husband's expert witness fees and expenses. 
Whether the court misapplied the law and/or abused its discretion 
in ordering Wife to pay Husband's expert witness fees18 of about 
$9.5 thousand.19 
Wife's attorney fees 
4. Whether the Court abused its discretion and/or erred in 
failing to award Wife attorney fees and costs. Whether the Court 
abused its discretion and/or erred by failing to award Defendant 
attorney fees and costs, [R. 75, 458; f 20, p. 45; 1 22, p. 46]. 
Insufficient Findings 
5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred 
in failing to amend and to clarify the findings of fact. Whether 
the Court erred in denying Wife's motions to amend and/or to 
clarify the Court's findings, and/or to make sufficient findings to 
support its conclusions and decree, particularly with respect to 
16
 116(d). 16(e). P 38-40, R 449.110. R 451-456.114-17 Appendix ML". FN 178,179 & 180. P 43 
17
 R 451-457.114-18 Howellv Howell, 806 P 2d 1209 (Utah App 1991) See also,Schaumberg v Schaumberg, 
875 P 2d 598 (Utah App 1994) 115(g), P 32, 1 16(b). 16(c), 16(d). 16(e), P 37^0, 17(a). P 41. 118, UC 30-3-7(a),F 23, 
P 5, UC 30-3-7(d). F 23. P 6 below 
18
 Adams v Adams (Utah App 1979), 593 P 2d 147, Schaumberg v Schaumberg (Utah App 1994), 875 P 2d 598 
Bremholtv Bremholt (Utah App Oct 1995), 905 P 2d 877. FN 21, P 5 
19
 R 375.122. 111(g).P 19. 123.P 46 
Appellant's Brief- Holt v Holt-4 
its conclusion that Codale's goodwill was not a marital asset, how 
it determined the amount of alimony, ordering Wife to pay Husband's 
expert witness fees,20 ordering Wife to pay income tax incurred as 
a result of distributing marital assets, etc., as discussed in f 
25, P. 47 below and elsewhere in this brief. 
Ill 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
6. Authorities. The following Utah statute, Federal statute, 
Federal regulations and income tax treatise, are included in the 
Appendix, rather than being repeated verbatim herein. The Appendix 
is divided into the following sections and numbers: 
Utah statute re attorney and witness fees 
UC 30-3-3 (1) re expert witness fees is set out in the 
footnote.21 
UC 30-3-5(7) re alimony, child support & property dist. 
Appendix A - Includes a copy of Utah Code §30-3-5. A copy of 
30-3-5(7)22 is in the footnote.23 
20
 See 1 3 , P 4 & 1 6 above. J 23. P 46 & F 21 below Also see R 435-461. R 402-403 
21
 UC 30-3-3 reads in part as follows 
In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3,4. or 6, and in any action to establish an order of custody, visitation, child support, 
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness 
fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action The order 
may include provisions for costs of the action (Emphasis added) 
22
 The 1995 amendment to UC 30-3-5. effective 5/1/95, merely codified existing case law by adding sub-sections (7) 
through (9). Accordingly. UC 30-3-5(7) through 30-3-5(9) together with case law. should be applied in the present case Should 
the Court determine that any portion of said amendment changed existing law, then as the California Court held under similar 
circumstances, the amendment should be applied retroactively since it cured an injustice in the former law and advanced the state 
interest in equitable division of the marital partnership 
23
 UC 30-3-5(7) 
(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(l) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse. 
(H) the recipient s earning capacity or ability to produce income, 
(m) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(tv) the length of the marriage 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in determining 
alimony in accordance with Subsection (a) However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and 
may. in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial In marriages of short duration, when no 
children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the 
marriage 
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Comparison of post-divorce property & income 
Appendix B - Affidavit of Paul Shields, CPA summarizes the 
property distribution, alimony and child support awards and 
illustrates the vast difference between Wife and Husband assets. 
A chart (R. 487-488) and bar graph (R. 489) project each party's 
available cash flow during the next 10 years, based upon evidence 
submitted by Husband's expert. 
Income tax from redeeming Codale Stock 
Appendix C - 26 USCS § 1041 - Tax law re transfer of property 
between spouses incident to divorce. 
Appendix D - IRS Temporary income tax Regulation § 1.1041-1T. 
IRS regulations pertaining to 26 USCS § 1041, re transfer of 
property between spouses incident to divorce, including related 
corporate stock redemptions. Included are: (a) 131,701 from CCH, 
Pages 55,278 - 55,285, with an editorial analysis of IRS 
regulations, and (b) a copy of the regulations themselves, Pages 
171 - 179. 
Appendix E - 26 USCS § 301 - IRS statute re tax consequences 
of corporate distributions of property to shareholders and 
redemption of corporate stock. 
Appendix F - 26 CFR 301.1 - IRS regulations re 26 USCS § 301 -
Rules applicable with respect to corporate distributions to 
stockholders of money and other property re divorce. 
Appendix G - Letter opinion from IRS re tax consequences of 
transfer and redemption of stock incident to divorce with a fact 
situation similar to the present case. 
Appendix H - Treatise by August & Schepps from The Journal of 
Corporate Taxation entitled "Recent Cases Complicate Redemption of 
Stock." Discusses the tax consequences of the Court ordered 
transfer and redemption of stock. 
Appendix I - Affidavit of Robert H. Hunter, CPA, re tax 
consequences from Court ordered transfer of h of Codale stock to 
Wife followed by Codale's redemption. 
(Footnote 23 Cont 'd) 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of 
living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of one of the 
spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in 
determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both 
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding 
alimony. (Emphasis added) 
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Utah Legislative History re UC 30-3-5(7) 
Appendix J - Legislative history - Partial transcript of 
statement made on the floor of the Utah House of Representatives by 
the sponsoring legislator, who explained that the legislative 
intent in amending UC 30-3-5 [see FN 23, P. 5] was to codify 
existing case law. Representative Hayman stated as follows: 
REPRESENTATIVE HAYMAN. . . . "The bill has been put 
together on the basis of taking case law that exists in 
the State and codifying it into a formal statement on how 
to handle alimony. Currently under the law right now a 
person can get a ruling on alimony at one end of the 
State and yet have another ruling at the other place. 
So, people cannot, in essence, determine whether they are 
going to get the same conditions, whether they're in 
Provo, or Logan or in Salt Lake City because people use 
certain parts of the code ..." (Emphasis added). 
Underemployment imputed income 
Appendix K - Determination of Gross Income - Imputed Income. 
Copy of Utah Code § 78-45-7.5 [footnote 23, P. 5 and Appendix "K"], 
which, among other things, defines "gross income" as including 
"prospective income from any source," allows deduction only for 
those business expenses which "allow the business to operate at a 
reasonable level," provides that "gross income determined under 
this subsection may differ from the amount of business income 
determined for tax purposes," and provides for imputing income 
where a parent is voluntarily underemployed.24 
Codale's projected income 
Appendix L - Codale's historical and projected net income. 
Copy of bar chart prepared by Husband1s expert which depicts 
Codale's net income for the 10 year period from 1990 through 1999. 
Appendix M -Utah Code § 78-45-7.21 - Award of tax exemptions 
for dependent children. 
Appendix N - Codale projected income statements - 1995-1999. 
Appendix O - Codale capital expenditures, working capital, 
free cash flow and total projected profit - 1995-2004. 
24
 Even though UC 78-45-7 5(7)(a) and (b) [see FN 23, P 5 & Appendix "K"] deal with imputed income for 
child support, the same cntena is applied for alimony, Hall v Hall (Utah App 1993) 858 P 2d 1018 [remanded to 
make careful and explicit findings as to underemployment and whether it was voluntary], Hill v Hill (Utah App 1993) 
869 P 2d 963 [affirmed imputation of income because court had made necessary findings that underemployment was 
voluntary that it was therefore appropnate to impute mcome] 
Appellant's Brief- Holt v Holt-7 
IV - STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case 
7. Nature of the case. This divorce followed a 22 year 
marriage, during which time three minor children were born and the 
parties acquired very substantial assets. Pursuant to stipulation, 
the case was bifurcated and a Divorce Decree dissolving the marital 
relationship was entered at the conclusion of the trial.25 This 
appeal is from the later alimony, child support and property 
distribution orders. This appeal challenges: 
Matters challenged by appeal 
(a) Alimony and child support. Whether the Court erred 
and/or abused its discretion by awarding small amounts of alimony 
and child support;26 failure to award permanent alimony;27 failure 
to hold that Husband is voluntarily underemployed;28 failure to 
include Codale's enormous income;29 failure to include Holt 
Properties income;30 failure to impute reasonable compensation to 
Husband;31 failure to impute dividends and income from Codale;32 and 
failure to award to Wife a reasonable share of Husband's enhanced 
present and future income33 by higher alimony and child support. 
(b) Award of all income-producing property to Husband. 
Whether the business building or any other income-producing 
property should have been awarded to Wife;34 
25
 Divorce granted June 15. 1994 R 245-248, R 355,12 
26
 See discussion in 12 & FN 14, P 3. 116 and FN 149-150, P 36 below 
27
 See discussion in 1 16(0- P 40 below 
28
 See discussion in 12, P 3. 116(a). P 37 below. 115(d). P 29,16(a) & FN 154. P 37, 16(d) & FN 163, P 38-39 
29
 See discussion in 12(a), Appendix WL", 115(d), P 29. 1 16(d). FN 163. P 38-39 
30
 See discussion m 110(b)(2) & FN 65, P 14, 116(e) & FN 165, P 40 below 
31
 See discussion in 1 21. P 45 below Appendix "K'\ UC 78-45-7 5 & F 24. P 7 
32
 See discussion m l 2(a) F 14 & 15. P 3. 116(d), P 38 below See also F 31 above 
33
 See discussion in 116(b). 16(c). 16(d). 16(e) & 17. Pp 37-41 below App "A'\ UC 30-3-5(7) & (8) 
34
 See discussion in f 1(d), 1 6 & Appendix "C", 115(1), P 33, 15(o) & FN 147, P 36 
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(c) Holding that Codale*s goodwill is not a marital asset. 
Whether Codale's Goodwill, going-concern value, and enormous 
earning capacity are personal to Husband or are marital assets,35 
and whether Wife and children are entitled to share therein through 
increased property distribution, alimony and child support;36 
(d) Disproportionate division of assets. Whether the Court 
erred and/or abused its discretion in not dividing the marital 
estate in an equitable manner. The Court could have used more just 
alternatives as: (1) dividing the Codale stock between the parties, 
(2) causing the business assets to be sold to a third-party and 
dividing the proceeds, or (3) fashioning a remedy which would give 
Wife a fair share of the of the business assets and of their 
extraordinary earning capacity. 
(e) Whether sales discount should be applied to Codale. 
Since the Court was dividing the marital estate, and there was no 
sale, whether the Court erred and/or abused its discretion by (I) 
discounting the value of the business assets by 40% as if they were 
being sold to an independent third-party,37 and (ii) whether the 
Court erred and/or abused its discretion by applying a 100% 
discount to Codale's goodwill and going concern value on the theory 
they are not a marital asset, but rather are personal to Husband.38 
(f) Court's failure to minimize income taxes. Whether the 
Court erred or abused its discretion by failing to adopt an asset 
35
 The Court specifically found that "any goodwill in this case is personal to the plaintiff (Husband) and is not subject to 
distribution to the defendant (Wife) as part of the marital estate" R 282 
36
 See discussion in 116 (b). 16(c), 16(d). 16(e), 16(f) and 17, P 37-44 below 
37
 See 110(b) & FN 58 & 60. P 13,110(d) & FN 74, P 15 
38
 See valuation conclusions reached by Husband's expert in Exhibit P-21, Pages 38 & 39, K 7(c), P 9, 10(c), P 14, 
12(a), 12(c). 12(e), P 20-22. 115(e),P 29 
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distribution plan which would minimize the income tax consequences 
from Court ordered redemption of Wife's Codale stock.39 
(g) Disproportionate division of assets by imposing all 
income tax liability upon wife. Whether the Court erred or abused 
its discretion by ordering Wife to pay income tax incurred as a 
result of the court ordering transfer of h of the Codale stock to 
Wife, followed by redemption of that stock by Codale;40 
(h) Wife improperly ordered to indemnify Husband against 
taxes incident to divorce. Whether the Court erred or abused its 
discretion by ordering Wife to indemnify Husband against income tax 
he incurred as a result of the stock redemption;41 
(I) Wife improperly burdened with Husband's expert witness 
fees. Whether the Court erred or abused its discretion by ordering 
Wife to pay $9,500 of Husband's expert witness fees;42 
(j) Husband should have been ordered to pay Wife's attorney 
and expert witness fees. Whether the Court erred or abused its 
discretion by failing to require Husband to pay Wife•s attorney and 
expert witness fees. [See 124, p. 47, F. 42 & uc 30-3-3]. 
(k) Family vehicles should have been awarded to Wife. 
Whether the Court erred in requiring Wife to pay Codale for family 
vehicles awarded to Wife.43 
(1) Children's income tax exemptions. Whether the Court 
erred and/or abused its discretion awarding Husband the children's 
income tax exemptions without a compensating adjustment.44 
39
 Court-ordered asset distribution resulted in income tax of about $440,000, which would have been about $30,000 had 
wuVs plan been adopted awarding her the business building See ^  6 & Appendix U C \ "D'\ WE", T , UG'\ "IT and u r re how 
tax consequences of distribution of marital assets could have been minimized, % 7(e), P 9, ^ 1(d) & FN 10, P 3 above • 
40
 See discussion in 11(c). P I H 15(1). 150). FN 138-139. P 33-34 
41
 See footnote # 40 above 
42
 See discussion in «13. P 4. 123, P 46 
41
 SeeH10(bX5)&FN68.P 14 
44
 See discussion in % 2(b), P 4 and % 22, P 46 
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(m) Other assets. Whether the Court erred and/or abused its 
discretion in failing to award Wife a share of omitted assets, 
including Husband's condominium (title in the name of Codale), and 
the family country club membership also in the name of Codale.45 
Course of proceedings 
8. Proceedings. Following a three day domestic relations 
trial, the Court promptly entered a final divorce decree which 
reserved the financial and other issues for further determination.46 
This appeal challenges the sufficiency and appropriateness of the 
Court's alimony, child support and property distribution orders. 
Most of the trial evidence pertained to financial matters, 
including such things as disposition of the business assets, 
including such things as who should receive the business building, 
the value of Codale, and other martial assets. The Court's rulings 
on the reserved issues,47 including its Findings, Conclusions48 and 
Order and Judgment,49 were challenged by Wife's motions, affidavits, 
exhibits, etc., which were denied by the Court.50 
Disposition in trial Court 
9. Disposition in trial Court. As indicated above, 
immediately after the trial, the Court entered a divorce decree 
which reserved the financial and other issues for later 
A
" 11(a) and FN #7, P 2,110(b)(6), P 14 
46
 The divorce decree was entered June 15,1994 R 245-248 
47
 The Court's initial ruling was made August 3,1995 R 282-286 
48
 The Court's Findings, Conclusions (R 354-366), and the Order and Judgment (R 367-376) are both dated January 4, 
1995 
4Q
 Dec 14,1994. R 367-376 
50
 Defendants' post-trial motions include the following 
Motion re payment of expenses, etc - R 292-296 -11/3/94 
Motion & memorandum to Correct Ruling & Distribute Assets, etc - R 304-345 -1/10/95 
Objections to Proposed Findings. Conclusions and Order & Judgment - R 383-384 -1/11/95 
URCP 59 Motion to Alter or Amend, to distribute additional assets, etc - R 400-502 - 2/6/95 
First Errata to defsURCP 59 Motions -R 510-513, Second errata R 505-509, Third Errata - R 528-531 
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determination.51 The Court's Findings, Conclusions, Order and 
Judgment52 concerning reserved issues were supplemented by rulings 
on Wife's motions.53 As indicated above, the Court awarded only 
minimal alimony and child support to the Wife, awarded all of the 
income-producing property,54 all of the business assets and a 
disproportionately large share of the total marital assets to the 
Husband. This appeal is taken therefrom. 
Relevant facts 
10. Statement of facts relevant to appeal. In addition to 
the facts stated above and elsewhere herein, the following facts 
are relevant to the appeal: 
(a) Length of marriage, number of children. The parties, 
both in their early forties, were married for about twenty-two 
years. Wife worked outside the home until the birth of the first 
child, and has not been employed outside the home for 16 years. 
She has only a high school education, lacks marketable work skills, 
and intends to remain in the home to care for the children.55 The 
June, 1994 divorce granted joint custody of the children, with 
Husband designated as the primary physical custodian of Nicholas 
(age 16), and with Wife designated as the primary physical 
custodian of Lindsay (age 14) and Anthony (age 10).56 
51
 Divorce decree was signed 6/15/94. R 245-248 
52
 The Court"s Findings, Conclusions (R 354-366), and the Order and Judgment (R 367-376) are both dated January 4, 
1995 
5^
 The Court's rulings on reserved issues and post-tnal motions were as follows 
Jan 4. 1995 "Decision. R 377-380 
Jan 4.1995 "Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law," R 354-366 
Jan 4, 1995 "Order & Judgment," R 367-376 
Jan 20.1995 "Ruling on Post Trial Motions." R 386-394 
Mar 21.1995 "Order on Post Trial Motions." R 534-530 
Mar 21.1995 "Order in re Defendant's Motion to Correct Judgment, For a New Trial, etc 
54
 The Court found that the assets awarded to Husband would produce more income in the future than those 
awarded to Wife. R 36,123 & 25 
55
 R 283 
56
 R 355.13 & 23 
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(b) Marital assets. The Court properly found that Wife 
contributed to the financial well-being of the parties, that she is 
entitled to share in the economic success, and should receive one-
half of the marital estate.57 The parties were very successful 
financially, and acquired substantial assets,58 including the 
following: 
(1) Ownership of 97.6% of Codale, the family-owned 
wholesale electric supply business,59 the principal 
marital asset. Codale has been very successful, has 
substantial assets,60 and has earned - and continues to 
earn - enormous profits.61 See Husband's expert's bar 
chart which shows Codale's yearly profits for last 5 and 
next 5 years in App. "L" & 10 year projection in App. 
"O". 
Husband's expert's projections (based upon Codale's 
abnormally low 1994 profit) estimates that Codale's net 
worth will increase about $5 million in the next five 
years, and to about $11.8 million in 10 years.62 
57
 Footnote 125.P 29. R 283.^4. R 360.116. R 3 6 1 . f l 8 . R 363,^23. R 318-320.1 5 &7 
58
 Wife's expert valued the marital estate at $6.2 million [Ex 19]. which included the $5.4 million appraised value 
of Codale stock [Ex #20, P 3] See also R 359-363, K 14-22 Husband's expert valued Codale at $5 1 million even after 
discounting a net of 40% for size, non-trading stock, etc . assume a sale to an independent third-partv [Ex D-21. P 39] 
59
 The parties own 97 6% of Codakfs capital stock R 371, % 13 
60
 Wife's expert valued Codale at $5.4 million [Ex D-20, P 31], As indicated above, Husband's expert 
discounted Codale 40% and reduced its value to $3.8 million, of which only $1 million is goodwill [Ex P-21. P 2] The items 
which make up the $1.6 million difference between the expert's values[$5.4 - $3.8 = $1.6 million difference] is summarized by 
Wife's expert in Ex D-18], which result from the following 
Difference in marketability discount $ 380 thousand 
" officer compensation 420 
" " from selecting different company comparable 60 " 
" remaining - primarily from different earnings base selections 740 " 
Total difference between expert's valuations $ 1 6 million 
61
 See bar chart by Husband's expert which shows Codale's historical and projected profits over the 10 year period from 
1990 through 1999 [Appendix "O"] However those projections are extremely conservative because the expert's projections are 
based on the abnormally low 1994 profit, which resulted from expenses incurred in connection with moving into the new building, 
expanding staff and incurring expenses in anticipation of substantial expansion [Ex #21, P 39] Experts disregard higher earnings in 
pnor years because the effect of the move on profitability had not been established See discussion in % 15(c) and F 121 & 122, P 28 
& 29 Had 1993 profits been considered, the amounts would probably have about doubled 
62
 Codale's free cash flow (next 10 years - Appendix. "O", R 511) $ 7,214,900 
Codale capital expenditures 2,729,700 
Codale additional working capital 2.186.430 
Increase in Codale's net worth $11.839.900 
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Husband will have about $4.6 million more available 
after-tax cash than Wife during the next 10 years [R. 
487]. Wife will have very limited income.63 
Husband's expert estimated Codale's before-tax profit for 
the next 5 years at over $5.9 million, with $892.1 
thousand in profits for 1995, annual profits growing to 
over about $1.5 million by 1999.64 
(2) 90% interest in Holt Properties partnership, whose 
principal asset is a newly-constructed building in which 
Codale does business. Holt Properties also rents space 
to other businesses;65 
(3) Retirement funds;66 
(4) The family residence;67 
(5) Vehicles;68 
(6) Various other property items,69 some of which were 
owned by Codale, but which were not considered by the 
experts in valuing Codale's assets (including vehicles 
and a condominium, ownership of which was not discovered 
by Wife until after the trial).70 
(c) Undervaluation of Codale, and depriving Wife of right to 
benefit from goodwill and going concern. As indicated above, the 
Court awarded the parties' entire 97.6% of Codale to Husband, 
charging him only the $2.8 million71 salvage value of the physical 
61
 See 13 of affidavit of Wife's expert. R 496^87. R 498.16 and 7 Appendix "I". 
64
 Ex P-21. P 47 under "Earnings Before Tax " 
65
 The Court appropriately charged Husband $360,488 for awarding to him the 90% marital share of Holt Partnership 
[R 361.1 17] See discussion and computation R 309-312,12(a) and 2(b) 
66
 Wife was awarded retirement funds $10 thousand of IRA and $223 thousand of retirement funds [R 361.117] 
67
 Wife was awarded family residence with stipulated value of $ 153 thousand [R 361. ^ 17] 
68
 Wife was required to pay Codale $8,775 for the family's 1988 Ford Bronco and to pay Codale $19,250 for the family's 
1987 BMW M6. title to which was vested in Codale Wife paid a total of $28,025 for the family automobiles Proceeds from selling 
the 1979 MGB automobile (which was in storage) was divided [R 374, T 19] 
69
 R 307-318. R 358-363 
70
 Shield's affidavit states that $2 8 million Codale value should be increased by $135 thousand by reason of 
omission of the condominium. R 477. ^  2(a) See also R 312-313, % 2(c) re value of omitted condominium The Court denied 
Wife's motion to divide the omitted assets 
71
 The Court used depreciated book value and charged Husband only $2,782 million for the entire 97.6% of 
Codale owned by the parties. R 282-283. R 371, ^ 13 & 15 For tax purposes assets are generally depreciated to values well 
below their full marital value 
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assets, held that Codale's goodwill was personal to Husband, and 
denied Wife the right to Codale*s goodwill and going concern value. 
Trial evidence fixed Codale's going concern value at $11 million, 
$9 million and $5.4 million [R. 282], based upon discounted values 
for sale to a third-party, which are well below full marital value. 
(d) Undervaluation of Codale by discounting as if being sold 
to third-party. Even after basing projections on Codale's 
unusually low 1994 profit [Ex. 21, P. 39], and after deducting 40% 
for factors such as small size, lack of marketability, etc.,73 
Husband's expert's Codale "market value" was still $5.1 million.74 
(e) Incorrect computation of amount awarded to each party as 
H of marital assets. The Court held that each party should receive 
h of the marital assets, or $1.7 million [R. 372, 1 16]. However, 
in computing that amount the Court failed to factor into its 
computation the reduction in Wife's share resulting from its order 
that Wife pay about $426 thousand75 in income taxes incurred in 
connection with the Court-ordered transfer of h of the Codale stock 
to Wife, followed by redemption of Wife's stock by Codale.76 
Immediately after the Court's asset distribution, Wife's net worth 
was about $1.3 million, while Husband's net worth was about $1.7 
million - or Husband's net worth was about $435.977 thousand higher 
72
 Ex P-21, P 56. where Husband's expert computes the $2 8 million liquidation value of Codale physical assets 
73
 Wife's expert concluded that the control premium approximately offset the discounts for lack of marketability, 
etc. and that a discount should not be applied [Ex D-10, Pages 20-22] 
74
 Husband's expert deducted 25% because of Codale's small size as compared to other companies, deducted 35% 
for lack of marketability of Codale's stock and added a 25% premium for control of Codale. which he rounded to a net 
discount of 40% [Ex P-21 J* 39], and Husband's expert then arrived at a Codale "market value estimated of $5,114.600 " 
75
 Wife's expert estimates those taxes as about $440,000. including about $162238 for 1995 and about $263,769 for 
1996 and 1997 [R 485 & R 498,1 5] [App. MBM], App "F . including 11-2, F 147, P. 36 
76
 R 373,117 & 18, R 387,1)4 & 5. R 499 [Appendix "I"] 
77
 Net assigned value of assets distributed (R 477, ^  2 and footnote #1) [Appendix "B"] 
To Husband $1,740 729 
To Wife 1.304.848 
Excess distributed to Husband $ 435.881 
Appellant's Brief - Holt v Holt -15 
than Wife's. If Wife is to receive h of the marital assets (as 
the Court determined was her right), she must be awarded an 
additional $217.9 thousand.79 
(f) Court recognized need to equalize income. The Court 
appropriately recognized that, since Husband was awarded the 
income-producing property,80 alimony is necessary to egualize the 
parties• income: 
The plaintiff is extremely talented and successful. And, 
although he should not be punished economically for 
either his talent or success, the defendant has also made 
important contributions to the parties' financial well 
being. She too, should share in the economic success. 
Even though both parties will be awarded substantial 
material assets, plaintiff's assets are income producing 
and will continue to grow. On the other hand, the assets 
received by the defendant are less capable of producing 
substantial income. By awarding the plaintiff the 
business, his ability to produce income is enhanced. As 
such, the plaintiff is in a position to provide support 
to the defendant. 
. . . To find that either side is in economic "need" of 
alimony, given their material assets, is difficult. 
However, to award the plaintiff the greater income 
producing property and then not equalize incomes to a 
certain extent seems extremely unfair. 
Without assistance from the plaintiff, the 
defendant will not be able to maintain her same standard 
of living. The defendant is in some need of assistance. 
In order to equalize the income of the parties and 
to maintain the parties standard of living during the 
marriage, an award of alimony is appropriate. The Court 
awards $2,000 per month permanent alimony to the 
defendant. It is subject to termination upon the 
defendant's remarriage or co-habitation. It is subject 
to modification only upon a material change of 
circumstances by either party. (Emphasis added). 
78
 Shields affidavit, R 477 U 2(a) and FN # 1 See also balance sheets of both Husband and Wife attached to affidavit of 
Wife s expert R 485 and bar chart which illustrates the excess assets distributed to Husband R 486 [Appendix "B"] 
79
 One-half (V*) of $435,881 =$217,941 
80
 R 284-285 UC 30-3-5(7) and 30-3-5(7Xd), Appendix "A" See % 18 P 44 below 
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V SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
11. Financial orders failed to follow appellate guidelines. 
The Court erred when it failed to follow applicable law, 
abused its discretion and, although the Court held that Wife was 
entitled to h of the marital estate, the Court order failed to 
accomplish this, and gave most of the marital estate and income to 
Husband, without a compensating benefit to Wife. The property 
division, alimony and child support were unjust, did not follow 
guidelines set by the appellate courts, constituted an abuse of 
discretion and/or error of law.81 Among other things: 
(a) Fairness test. The alimony, child support and property 
distribution fail the fairness test, are unjust and/or contrary to 
law. Prior to the divorce, the family owned Codale, an extremely 
profitable electrical equipment business, owned a new business 
building, a home, vehicles, other assets, and enjoyed a very 
comfortable standard of living. Many family expenses were paid by 
Codale, including such things as family use of Codale vehicles, 
Codale1s payment of country club membership and expenses, vacations 
and many other perks. Wife should be awarded a compensating amount 
for loss of the family's Codale perks, the right to share in its 
substantial income, and should be awarded h of the true value of 
the marital assets and income. Unfair and/or improper provisions 
of the order include the following: 
(b) Remand should award h of the full, true value of the 
marital assets and income to each party. The Court should reverse 
the trial Court's: (1) award to Husband of Codale, and its very 
substantial income; (2) award to Husband of the business building, 
and all other income-producing assets; (3) holding that Codale's 
81
 In Shepherd v Shepherd (Utah App 1994) 876 P 2d 429 at 433 the Court stated that "This court will not disturb the 
trial court's decision [concerning property division] unless it is clearl) unjust or a clear abuse of discretion " The Court cited 
Walters v Walters (Utah App 1991). 812 P 2d 64 at 66 and Smith v Smith (Utah App 1988) 751 P 2d 1149 at 1151 
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goodwill and going concern value are personal to Husband and are 
not marital assets; and (4) holding that Husband is to be charged 
only salvage value for Codale. The court should remand with 
instructions that the business building shall be awarded to Wife; 
that each party shall receive \ of the marital estate and income; 
that if Husband is awarded Codale he should be required to 
compensate Wife for its value as a marital asset - without discount 
for a hypothetical sale to a third-party, and without discounting 
goodwill or going concern value based upon Husband's spurious claim 
that it is personal to him and is allegedly not a marital asset; 
that the Court fashion a remedy which will give Wife h of the full 
value of the marital estate, and will reasonably compensate her for 
h of the full value of Codale's very substantial income* 
(c) Remand should relieve Wife of income tax burden resulting 
from Husband's benefit. The case should be remanded with 
instructions that Wife is entitled to h of the marital estate, that 
Husband should pay all of the resulting income tax because it was 
incurred for his convenience, and because the tax could have been 
reduced to about $30,000, had the Court adopted a less costly asset 
distribution method such as those suggested by Wife, or at a 
minimum, the taxes and related expenses should be shared. 
(d) Alimony and child support should be increased based upon 
Husband's actual and imputed income, and permanent alimony should 
be awarded. The case should be remanded with instructions: that 
the Court increase alimony and child support based upon Husband's 
historical income of about $300,000 for 1990 and 1991; and/or 
based upon his expert's $250 thousand salary used to arrive at the 
appraised value of Codale; based upon constructive dividends from 
Codale and Holt Properties; and to consider the needs of Wife and 
of the children. The Court should make an equitable adjustment in 
alimony, child support and property distribution to compensate Wife 
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for the more valuable assets and substantially more income awarded 
to Husband, and should direct the Court to award permanent 
reasonable alimony to Wife. 
(e) Wife should be awarded h of omitted assets. The case 
should be remanded with instructions to award Wife h of the value 
of the condominium which Husband owned in the name of Codale, which 
was kept secret, was unknown to appraisers, and not considered by 
them; to award the family vehicles to Wife without requiring 
payment to Codale; to award Wife h of the value of the country club 
membership, of Codale's intangible assets, and of other assets 
owned in Codale's name, but not included by the appraisers. 
(f) Husband should pay market interest rates to Wife. The 
case should be remanded with instructions to order Husband to pay 
interest on the unpaid balances owed Wife at the same rate would 
pay to borrow money from other people or lending institutions, from 
June 15, 1994 until the date of each payment. Wife was improperly 
required to extend an interest-free loan to Husband by being denied 
about 10 months interest on her share of the marital estate, and 
was denied reasonable interest on about 2/3 of her share payable 
over two additional years at a mere 4% interest - at a time when 
Husband was borrowing money from others at twice that rate. 
Husband should be ordered to pay Wife the market rate of interest. 
(g) Husband should pay own expert witness fees. The Court 
should reverse the trial court's order requiring Wife to pay about 
$9.5 thousand of Husband's expert witness fees. 
(h) Wife should be awarded her fees. The Court should remand 
with directions to award Wife her attorney and expert witness fees. 
(i) Wife should be compensated for childrens' tax exemptions. 
Case should be remanded with instructions to require Husband to pay 
Wife a compensating amount for the income tax benefit he receives 
from the children's income tax exemptions, and to award exemptions 
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to Wife during years when, because of his high income, Husband 
receives little or no benefit therefrom. 
VI 
ARGUMENT 
Marshaling of evidence 
12. Marshaling of evidence. To challenge findings, Wife must 
first marshal all the evidence supporting the findings, demonstrate 
that the Court erred or that the findings are not supported by 
legally competent evidence. However, such marshaling is not 
required, where the findings are legally insufficient, such as if 
they contain insufficient detail to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.82 The 
following is Wife's marshaling and discussion of the plaintiffs 
evidence adduced in support of the Court's findings:83 
Value of Codale 
(a) Codale*s goodwill not personal to Husband. The evidence 
in support of the Court's finding that Codale's $1 million of 
goodwill was personal to Husband, and not a marital asset, is 
legally insufficient. The Appellate Court's definition of a 
marital asset in the recent Jefferies84 case clearly requires 
inclusion of the goodwill and going concern value of a commercial 
business as a marital asset. Jefferies held in part as follows: 
Accordingly, two principles are clear from the law of 
this state. First, all assets acquired by the parties 
during marriage are to be considered by the trial court 
when making an equitable distribution, unless the law 
specifically prevents the court from considering a 
particular asset. Second, a marital asset is defined 
functionally as any right that has accrued during the 
marriage to a present or future benefit (Emphasis added). 
82
 Bremholtv Bremholt (Utah App Oct 1995). 905 P 2d 877, Campbell v Campbell (Utah App 1995) 896 P 2d 635 
83
 Other portions of the bnef also marshal and discuss the evidence adduced in support of the Court's Findings 
84
 Jefferies v Jefferies (Utah App 1995), 895 P 2d 835 at 837 
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(b) Value of Codale's Goodwill. In attempting to determine 
market value based upon sale to a third-party, Husband's expert 
reduced Codale's value by a net of 40%, after discount for its 
smaller size, lack of marketability of its stock, etc. and adding 
a premium for control, and still concluded that its value was $5.4 
million.85 Based upon information from Husband, the expert 
concluded Codale's goodwill and going concern value were not 
marital assets, were personal to Husband, and as a marital asset 
Codale was worth only the salvage value of its physical assets. 
(c) Court held Codale*s goodwill was not a marital asset. 
The Court agreed, held that Codale's goodwill and going concern 
value were not marital assets, and computed the marital estate 
based upon Codale's salvage value. As a result, Husband received 
the parties' entire 97.6% of Codale, was charged only the 
liquidation salvage value of Codale's physical assets, and received 
Codale's assets and enormous earning capacity for pennies on the 
dollar, instead of being charged its full marital estate value. 
(d) Codale's valuable goodwill demonstrated by its free cash 
flow. Husband's expert's projection of over $800,000 of free cash 
flow per year,86 even based upon 1994's abnormally low profit, and 
after paying all business expenses, income taxes, and providing 
funds for expansion, new equipment, etc.87 demonstrates goodwill. 
(e) Husband's evidence re goodwill not being a marital asset. 
The evidence adduced by Husband in support of his claim that 
85
 See discussion in 110(b) & FN 57, P 13,«I10(b)(1) & FN 58 & 60 
86
 After deducting Husband's imputed compensation of $250,00 [R. 478, % 2(b)(2)], using Husband's expert's 
comparable, Codale's available cash from business operations, after paying all expenses and income tax, was about $870,000 
per year during the years 1991-1993. R 323, F 37 Also see bottom line of P 2 to exhibits to Wife's expert's valuation report. 
Ex 20, Ex 25, &Ex 25A Husband's projected available cash after providing additional working capital, new equipment, etc . 
for each vear through the vear 2000 from the chart on R 487, Appendix WB", UL", "N" & aO"; also see 117(b), F 175, P 42 
Codale's historical and projected profits for each of the 10 vears from 1995 through 1999, according to Husband's expert, are shown 
in Appendix "L", "N" & "O". 
87
 Husband's projected 5 year before tax earnings is $8.5 million according to Husband's expert [R 323, ^ 10 & 
footnotes 37 and 38]. See also Appendix "N". 
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Codale's goodwill is personal to him, is summarized and marshaled 
as follows: 
(1) Husband could be replaced with another employee. 
Husband testified that he could be replaced by a new manager for an 
annual salary of $140 thousand88 and that Codale plans to expand and 
to double its work force to about 130 employees by 1995.89 
(2) Bar code inventory control and sales methods. That 
the major component of Codale's goodwill was its bar-coded computer 
inventory control business system, similar to those used by 
grocers,90 its business program of "one-on-one communication between 
manufacturers' representatives and Codale Electric Supply's 12 
member outside sales force," its limiting the number of merchandise 
lines carried, its careful selection of suppliers, and Husband's 
personal relationship with suppliers and customers [Ex. D-22, P. 
36]. Husband's claim that Codale's goodwill is personal to him 
appears to be based upon his conclusion that, because he is a "good 
boss," if he were to leave Codale, competitors would raid the 
company, taking the trained employees, and that Codale might lose 
some of its suppliers and/or customers. However, purchasing and 
inventory control are handled by Husband's brother rather than 
Husband.91 Husband not only does not claim such business methods 
are secret, but he described those methods fully in the industry 
trade magazine, as well as in a Codale brochure.92 Husband also 
acknowledged there have been Codale personnel changes, which 
challenges Husband's claim that retention of the same employees is 
88
 Tr 614 & 621 
89
 Ex P-23,P 3 
90
 Ex P-22 & P-23 - See descriptions of business system in magazine article which describes Codale" s inventory control 
system and Husband's summary of Codale. its business, expansion plans, etc 
91
 Ex P-21.P 7 
92
 Ex P-22 & Ex 23 
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a key factor in Codale's goodwill.93 Trained computer operators and 
salesmen are readily available in the market. The bar code 
computer system, learning of sales methods, acquisition of 
suppliers, customers, etc., were designed and developed by Codale 
employees, on company time. Codale is the owner of any resulting 
goodwill. Since Codale is buying and selling merchandise, not the 
personal services of Husband, whether the suppliers or customers 
continued to do business with Codale would depend primarily upon 
the continuing efficiency of Codale employees who regularly 
interact with them. The Court erred in holding that Codale's 
goodwill is not a marital asset. 
(3) Husband's hard work. Husband claims that his hard 
work is a primary source of Codale's goodwill.94 While Husband's 
hard work is commendable, it falls far short of proving Codale's 
goodwill is personal to Husband, or that Codale has no other 
goodwill. Codale could replace Husband with another hard working 
employee or, if necessary, with two or more employees. The fact 
that Husband has worked hard as a part of the marital partnership 
does not mean that Wife should not share in the fruits of that 
labor. Husband acknowledges that Wife has also worked hard 
performing her marital partnership duties [Tr. 615]. Codale's 
goodwill is a marital asset in which Wife is entitled to share. 
(4) Husband competing with Codale. Husband claims the 
personal nature of Codale's goodwill is demonstrated by his 
assertion that he could substantially damage Codale's goodwill by 
tortious conduct, such as opening a competing company, hiring 
Codale's key employees, interfering with Codale's relationships 
Tr 609-611. Tr 622,623 
Tr 614-615 
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 r Ml'-n52. Also see discussion in T 15(h), P. 32 below, 
' 1 lusband s 1992 income was $83,672 [R. 34 & Ex. D-31, Col. #2] and his 1993 income was $158.< *jf •' ^ - Col. 
-" * j -A met- included about $63,500 from Holt Properties {building rent} and some capital gains. 
See preceding footnote #96. 
*
K
 Husband's income for 1990 was $340,239 and for 1991 was $309,347 [See line 23 of Holts1' 1990 and 1991 income 
ins, copies of which are in the Court's file. R. 34 
See bai eraph of Codale's 1990-1999 income pei HUMUMU s e\pe- \\>\> « f 
I -sing \cr\ conservative projections by Husbands expert See 1* ,jt> :mu i .•« \ this page • 
if;i
 As owner of 97.6° o of Codale Ilusband can cause it to pa\ dividends from Pie "free cash 
''• See charts in Appendix "N" & "O"; discussion in 1i 17(b). P. 42 below - ' i "»nwth-
footnote «62 V 13 al* 
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:
 Tr. 649-652. Also see discussion m *; U U P .. ,«,,. ,, 
96
 Husband's 1992 income was S83.672 [R 34 & kx. I>? i - C ol "2-. and tm I-^ * income was $158,653 [Ex. 1X3 L Col. 
#3]. which included about $63,500 from Holt Properties {building rentf and some capital gam^ 
97
 See preceding footnote #96, 
98
 H u s b a n d ' s i ncome for 1990 w a s $ 3 4 0 2 3 9 and for 1991 w a s $ 3 0 9 3 4 7 [See line 2 3 ot I Join. I W i iiinl I '>w i m i m n 
tax returns, copies of which are in the Court's file, R. 34. 
99
 See bar graph of Codale's 1990-1999 income per Husband's expert, App." i.", R; Ei. 21, P. 55; & App "O". 
100
 Using very conservative projections by Husband's expert. See F, 99 and 102 (this page), 
101
 As owner of 97.6% of Codale Husband can cause it to pay dividends from the "free cash," 
102
 See charts in Appendix "N" & "Ow; discussion in % 17(b). P. 42 below and footnote n 175, and 1 ! 0(b)(l) and 
footnote #62 P. 13 aboi T:, 
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Division of marital assets 
13, Division of property. After a 22 year marriage, with 
three minor children, the Court correctly held that Wife was 
entitled to h of the marital property.103 The major marital assets 
were Codale and a new business Building104 ("BUSINESS ASSETS"). 
Valuation of Codale, and disposition of the Business Assets, are 
the primary disputes involved in this appeal. If the Court had 
followed Wife's suggestion, and had simply given her h of the 
Codale Stock, h of the business building, and divided the other 
assets, Wife would have received a fair share. The Court rejected 
her alternative suggestions that the business be sold and the 
proceeds divided, that she be given the building, etc.,105 and gave 
the Business Assets to Husband at a fraction of their value. 
14. Business Assets awarded to the Husband. Husband refused 
to permit Wife to be a Codale stockholder, or to be the owner of 
the building,106 threatened to loot Codale, and to destroy its value 
by opening a competing company,107 appropriating Codale's key 
employees, and by interfering with Codale's relationships with its 
m
 R 372 % 16 of the Court's Order and Judgment states that each of the parties is receive V2 of the marital assets or 
$1,740,639 The Court found the value ofthemantal estate as $3,481 278 ($1,740,639 X 2 = $3,481 278) InDunnv Dunn 
(Utah App 1990). 802 P 2d 1314 the court held that marriage is an economic partnership and that the parties, while carrying out 
different roles, each contribute to the partnership which entitled them to an equitable division of the partnership assets. 
104
 The value of the business building is $3 1 million, less debt leaves an equity of about $400 thousand, of which 
Husband owns 90° o which means that Husband has a $360 thousand net equity 
105
 Wife's argument that Husband devalued Codale by threatening to loot the company of its key employees, to form a 
new company to compete with Codale. to interfere with Codale's relationships with its suppliers, etc , and her alternative suggestions 
re Wife retaining !/2 ownership in Codale.. etc are discussed in detail at R 416-426 The Court's rejection of Wife's suggestions is 
found at R 360, % 16 of the Court's Findings of Fact 
106
 Under similar circumstances where the experts testified to widely different corporate values (from $900 thousand to $4 
million) and. as true in our case, income tax consequences were a major consideration, the trial court properly resolved the dispute by 
awarding 40% of the corporate stock to the wife While joint-ownership of Codale might result in some friction, such an arrange-
ment is far better than to give all of the Business Assets and income to Husband without a compensating benefit to Wife. 
107
 Husband devalued potential sale of the company bv refusing to sign a non-compete agreement [Tr 621 ] By 
threatening to compete with Codale Husband successfully appropriated to himself all of the goodwill and going-concern without 
permitting Wife to share therein 
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suppliers and customers Husband successfully argued that, because 
he probably h.-ir.l NIP pwwr'r Lu cause major harm " ri Codaler Codale's 
goodwill and going - concei n value wcsre. pciiisoric. " ' . "i ni., -unci not 
marital assets in which Wife was entitled to shaie | i-, WMt • u'*11!, f| 
15] 'VI ouii: valued Codale at only $2,8 * . .. :L , *\ <•:» i I >« 
Business Assets to Husband at liquidation salvage vaiuef10e and gave 
Mi» : ncome-producing asset 3 or compensating benefit "I'll1 «•! 
issf^ *.-\: * J4 "v" "iispute resulted from u n u t t v a ^ u i n g C o d a l e , 
:..» iTiet hocl that would m i n i m i z e income 
a.< .... * • , !„he mat itril estate L»v li'nposiny nl I 
!
 * * a x .. a i. 1 i n g t o a 1,11 n 1 \I i I r• r n a s o n a, h 1 e 
interest on deferred payments, awarding Husband the income Lux 
x lull I ions tor the children, refusal to award Wife her attorney and 
expert witness ieeL. requiring Wife to pay Husband's expert witness 
fees, requiring Wife to purchase family automobiles from Codale, 
failuit.1 1:n i y'ct i ell I I j I p
 (-i sha1! e of I lie v a l u e ml ci c o n d o m - . ,m 
sec r e 11 y o w r i e d b \ \ 111 s 1; \ a i i i "I 111 <"" i,»d a I e " b I i a H i c, •, o i < ii t.-111 i I •" : i e 
County Club membership which was used extensively by the larni 1 y, 
which was In Codale's name, etc, Although the Court is allowed 
considerable discretion in distributing marital assets, I Ihu'it 
discretion must be exercised within I h l:»ou IH.II t in I under t he 
standards, set by the Appellate Courts ,im and will he disturbed 
when jiLi li'i-'L €«, t h e r e iu J „" Leoi iirii'i il | i H j u d i c i a I iii ii1 it 
d i s c .ret ion , m a n i f e s t i n j u s t i c e , o r where t h e r e ,i s. a c l e a r l y uniuist 
r e s u l t u o The Cuurl. ' B property division meets <n I J three t e s t s , ciiiy 
one of which is sufficient to require reversal »f the trial rrmrt " f 
property distr ibution, alimony and child support awards. 
108
 R. 362,118 of the Court's Findings of Fact., 
10<>
 tidy v. Udy (Utah App. 1995) 893 P.2d 1 M~ 
1,0
 See discussion in 1(c) and accompam tootnou • , .above. 
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15. Abuse of discretion, manifest injustice and unjust 
result. The Court's abuse of discretion resulted in manifest 
injustice to Wife, who received an unreasonably small part of the 
marital estate, as demonstrated by the following: 
(a) The asset distribution, alimony, support, etc. fail the 
fairness test. The alimony, child support and property 
distribution orders fail the "clearly unjust" test, constitute an 
"abuse of discretion,"111 and should be vacated and remanded with 
instructions to award Wife a fair share of the marital assets, 
substantially more alimony, child support, etc. As discussed 
above,112 prior to the divorce Husband and Wife owned Codale, an 
extremely profitable electrical equipment business113 which paid 
much of the family's household and living expenses, provided 
vehicles, vacations, country club memberships, perks, and they 
owned a new business building,114 a home,115 vehicles,116 and other 
assets, and enjoyed a very comfortable standard of living. 
(b) Codale stock should have been divided or sold. As 
equitable owner of Codale stock, Wife should have been awarded h of 
the stock, or it should have been sold and the proceeds divided, in 
order to avoid unfairness, and to give Wife a fair share of the 
marital assets. In Savage,117 a case strikingly similar to this 
111
 See cases cited and discussion ^ 1(c) and related footnote # 4, P 1 above 
112
 See discussions in 11(b), 2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,7 and 12(a) above, 110(d), 10(e) and 10(f), Pp 15-16 above 
111
 See discussions m 110(bXl) P 13 and 17(b) P 42 and footnote #175. P 42. Ex P-21, pages 5-7 of appraisal by 
Husband's expert. Ex D-20. pages 13-22. also Appendix "L", "N" & "O". 
114
 The building is owned bv Holt Properties, a partnership which is 90% owned by Husband Wife does not challenge 
the $360,488 value placed on the building by the Court See discussion in % 10(b) (2) and accompanying footnote See discussion re 
value of Holt Properties. R 309-312.12(a) and 2(b) 
115
 The parties stipulated and the Court found that the value of the residence was $ 153.00 (R 372, % 15 & 17) The 
residence was appropriately awarded to Wife 
116
 Title to the family vehicles was held in the name of Codale The Court inappropriately required Wife to purchase the 
family vehicles from Codale for $28,025 R 374. [^19 
117
 Savage v Savage (Utah 1993). 658 P 2d 1201 
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^ a s e . t h e ^ x n f - r ^ e - - i . f f e - ^ w i i e l y as ! >rpora+-^ *h. ,^s ' ron. 
r-o - - j es 
v/er *j , « .t-j rt" :. * . - * 1 
c o u r t • c r p o i a :t „-K ^ Jas 
aff irmec. : * IJ*~ . Lcti ipi erne ^oui* ~t ^JQL ' o m , owner ^iiip- : -i 
b u s m e s f r* ox- spoases r a \ e<uLt . r ^ T. *• i ^ ion , t h a t v e ^ . . s 
i r : : r t .Tep ta r j i " ,. Wife t h a n t. J-; . e c e i v , ! i o i M 
s a l v a q e ^ a ' ue 118 ^oria.- • loodwi J , -o r^e^r x*^  'J* and 
[T,i) a T ^ r
 f e n ? r : 
benef:i t t W. i f< s fIR 359 3 60 I 1 5] Hi isband rece. i ved all Il • ::)f the 
business assets and the i i: e i: y substantia] income, 12° and » s as 
charged only a fracti on of their actua ] va] ue. 
i(/ : ) Husband's scheme to reduce Codale* s value. Codale * s tei i 
year profit (App """L ) i s i 1 ] ustrated :i n the graph bel ow left. 
Reduction i n the ] 99 4 profit of over $1 m 1 11 ion was a resu.lt of the 
" £ new bu :i Id i iig a substant i al increase in personi leJ , 
adverti si ng , and other expenses, :i n \ rtiat appeal: s to 
have been par t • ::)f a p] ai I and scheme to minimize 
current prof its and va1ues f or pur poses o£ the 
divorce,121 and to posture the company for 
substantia] expansion and h i gher future earnings at 
the expense of Wife. Husband1s expert"s appraisal 
d i sregarded Coda 1 e' s 1 993 pi: c f i t: of o v er $1 in i ] ] :ii on, 
as he based hi s appra :i sa ] on tl: le abnor ma ] ] } J c "w 1 994 
H'oTOHlOU AND PROJECTED NET lUPOMc 
PMCAiVCA* 
I B NMInoyns) 
118
 See discussion in R. 3 2 5 . % 13 - Wife ' s post-trial motion to correct ruling. 
119
 See t 7(b) & 7(c). P. 3-9 and footnote # 29. P. 8 above., 
120
 See 11 (b), 10(b)( 1) and footnote # 60.61 and 62, P. 13 atx n e. 1 I/i isband testified that Ci «:Iat« : i p • fit i , thro ti; les 
the industry average Tr. 6 1 4 . 
111
 Codale s 10 year historical and projected profit (1990 through I i>iiu • as computed by Wife's expert, is depicted ii i a 
bar graph in Ex. P-21 P. 5.5, a copy of which is included herewith as appends 
Appcllanl > Hnc1 titw -
earnings of only about $487.1 thousand,122 and then reduced Codale's 
value by another 40% as an alleged adjustment for its small size, 
its stock's lack of marketability, risk, etc. Nevertheless, even 
using 1994's lower earnings, and after reducing Codale's value by 
the 40% net discount, Husband's expert still fixed Codale's going 
concern Market Value at $5.1 million.123 
(d) Discount for sale to third-party. A discount for sale to 
a third-party should not be applied in this case, since no such 
sale has taken place, nor is planned, and no third-party buyer 
which might be entitled to such discounts, exists. Instead, we are 
merely attempting to divide an egual share of the marital estate to 
each party.124 If the Court were to adopt Husband's "market value" 
approach, and even after reducing Codale's "market value" by the 
40% discount, Wife would receive substantially less than h of the 
full value of the marital estate, while the Husband would gain a 
$1.7 million windfall.125 
(e) Codale's goodwill is not personal to plaintiff. Goodwill 
of a commercial enterprise is not personal to its corporate officer 
or stockholder. As discussed in f 15(c), P. 28 above, based even 
on a low 1994 income, Wife's expert valued Codale's "market value" 
at $5.1 million, including goodwill of $2.6 million. Husband's 
expert then applied other discounts, which might be appropriate 
1993 Codale income was over $1 million [Ex. D-30], which was reduced to a little less than $500 thousand in 
1994. The 1994 income was abnormally low as a result of Codale having incurred substantial expenses in connection with its 
move to the new building and having increased its work force in anticipation of expansion [P-22. P 36-37] Although 1994 
sales increased by 12 4%, expenses increased dramatically Some of the more significant expense increases were as follows Salaries 
up 34 8%. rents up 107 7% depreciation up 76 6% and advertising up 101% 
m
 See 110(d) and F 74, P 15 above Ex P-21,P 39, Also F 58, P 13 If the 1993 earnings were used to compute 
Codale"s value its appraised market value would be more than double that amount, or about $10 2 million 
124
 The Court held Husband and Wife are each entitled to receive $1,740,639 as H of the marital assets {R 361.118, 
283,14, R 360,^16, R 318-320,15 &7 
125
 If as computed by Husband s expert, the "market value of Codale is $5,114.600" after a 40% discount [see 110(d) & 
F 74, P 15 above], then Codale's full marital estate value is $8 5 million [60% of 8 5 = $5 1] This means we must increase the $5 1 
"market value" by $3 4 million [Wife's * 2 = $1 7 million to arrive at Codale's $8 5 million marital estate value Wife is entitled to 
$8 5 million or $4 25 million as her W of Codale [$8 5 - 2 = $4 25] 
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were Codale being sold to a l.hird-party, and valued Codale at $3,8 
nil 1J i ji „ ' ' i "J u c j i i n ) I.J(N i I M L I I i ih i rh Husband '" s expert conservatively 
va 1 ued d L !•> I mi 1 J ;i on , The Con t: I adopted Husband '" s expert"" s rion-
goodwill sals age value of $2 . R in i llion Husband's expert valued 
Codale ' s goodwill as $2 . 6 million , a difference of $ I , U mi 1 1 ion . L26 
Some expert evidence allocated 4 9% of Codale's goodwill to Husband, 
and 1>1* to Codale,12, Tin? Court held thai 100% of Codale's goodwill 
was personal to Husband, and that Codale*s goodwill was no! o 
ma r i t a J asse f | I -" , I I \ 1 I "' i | ,] I .m m i nimurn, ?:> 11 o r $ 51 0 t hou s a rid 
of the "'i 1 mi I lion quoilwi I I in HI tcxta I e duel miaiilal asset, rind Wi Le 
should be awarded S ot that amount, oi: an additional $255 thousand, 
(e) Codale's goodwill strikingly different from goodwill ">f 
a professional Counsel for Husband successfully argued to the 
Court that, like the license or degree of a professional; Codale's 
goodwill is personal to Husband, diid as such the goodwill is not a 
mar i 1 H 1 a s s ei t. 17B " II" II11 iJ I  1 A J O e cJ s i, mi 1 a r i t y j s d i f f i c u 11 I 11 
comprehend ifhl i \\< I In qo"»!Jvi I I aiul «L.J«ii«»111ij1 concern value of a 
commercial business, which t osui ts Li oni h i qher than aver aqe 
earnings from the sale of merchandise, a professional's goodwill is 
his professional skill and reputation which cannot be divided.129 
Although professional goodwill cannot be awarded to a spouse, the 
court should make a compensating adjustment in dividing the ma r 11, a J 
property, an..J 11. J warding alimony.130 eral - - in a professional 
practi rn „ i u - mi I y nun i nes«'i , - v ~~y :pment and 
126
 See explanation oi*items and amounts which UIUKC up the 5»: •> MS I * *C* . * i • * i n } \ and accompanying 
footnote #60, P. 13abo\ e. 
127
 R 434; see also Husband's expert's computation triai . . - . 
128
 Wife's counsel successfully argued that Codale s gun* , i * 
( 21 839 P.2d 774; see Tr. 650-653. 
:
' Johnson v. Johnson (Utah App. 1993), 855 P.2d 250. 
130
 See discussion in 1 16(c) P. 38 below; Kerr v Kerr (Utah 1980), 610 P.2d 1380; Tremayne v. Tremayne (I Jtah 
1949)211 P.2d 452. 
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accounts receivable, which have only modest value, as compared with 
the enhanced professional earning capacity, so a compensating 
equitable adjustment is ordinarily made to avoid unfairness.131 Our 
fact situation is strikingly different. Even if Codale's goodwill 
is not a marital assets (which Wife denies), there are still ample 
marital asset and income to permit an equitable adjustment to be 
made to arrive at a just result. The trial Court's failure to make 
an equitable adjustment is an error of law which this Court may re-
examine, giving no deference to the trial Court's decision. 
(f) Utah partnership law should be applied. In Dunn,122 which 
involved the divorce of a physician, the Court held that marriage 
is an economic partnership, and that while carrying out different 
roles, each party contributed to the partnership, entitling each of 
them to an equitable division of the partnership assets. The Court 
held [P. 1222] that it did not matter which marital partner was 
more economically productive during the marriage, and that such was 
not a factor to be considered in dividing the marital property. 
Doing so ignores contributions of love, encouragement and 
companionship, which elude monetary valuation, and "also gives 
short shrift to spouses who contribute homemaking skills and child 
care." The Dunn Court awarded the wife an "equitable distribution" 
of income from the physician's professional corporation, including 
royalties from development by the physician of medical devices. In 
a like manner, the Wife in this case is entitled to a share of the 
future income from the Codale business methods and procedures 
131
 UC § 30-3-5(e), a copy of which is attached as Appendix "A". That statute merely codified existing case law See 
Appendix "JT and 16 , P 7 above 115 (f), 15(g). 15(h), Pp 31 -33 below, 116-18, Pp 36-44 below Jeffenes v Jefferies (Utah 
App 1995) 895 P 2d 835. 837 Bremholt v Bremholt (Utah App 1995) 905 P 2d 877 at 880-881 
132
 Dunn v Dunn (Utah App 1990) 802 P 2d 1314 
Appellant's Brief - Holt v Holt - 31 
developed by Husband and Codale during the marriage. Ii :i E'j: >i 133 t :he 
Hawai i Coin: t: applied the coniiiercia J i i :i ] es i n their Par tnersh :i p 
M c » 11 <•• •' .1 1: : :;1 j = !: :i : i b i 11: « = I: h € a s s e 1: s o f t h e m a :i : :i f , a ] p a rt n e r s h i p 
( J) I £ goodwill lie t a mar ii I: a ] asset ,  compensating ad j ustment 
shorn mi II • fil be made If 1 Ike a pr of essional degree, Codale ' s goodwi 1 1 
is not a maritaJ asset, then as with a professional, the Coi irt 
should make a compensating adjustment to both the property divisi on 
and '-he alimony award, as necessary to make the ultimate decision 
equiu,u 
i i III i l l II mi 1 I I I i n 11 mi 1 11 mi iiiiiiiiii 11 in mi ni l i , s i II J i i i.l mi in mi (::::: 1 t : : i s 
app .;. uctJiiq J up*' bin id i in) i ncui t J uq mc • u» ing and 
startup c\. iecessar^ 1 n ifodale* s planned expansion, Hi isband 
minimized Codale 'I income, and thereby substantially reduced 
the appraised value 1 Codale/ 1 llii banu! « experts disregarded 
Codale " s h I gher previous year * s pi of its , l ih and base :i their 
appraisals on the I o w n I 'Ml 1 profit , because ut uncertainty as to 
t h e e f £ e c t :: f C o d a I c I I a 11 q <•»11 I i u b i m * b s i > p e i a t i«> n s B y s o - d o :i n g, 
Husband has appropi id ted 1 u Imnsell i ubstantiaJ ly •* N of the 
marital assets for a fraction of t h e n value 1:" 
While Husband's relationship with suppliers and customers - av 
give Codale some competitive advantages, Coddle Is ,v>:: selling a 
personal service where personality is important, out is merely 
selling electrical equipment 1 hat in qenei a I I y avr v; *. ~r-
marketplace Husband nnqhl. In iihli In r»iih>f jei ;. * -
Coda ] e j £ he 1 eft and procfpried In h I I lit i niiipany • -*->*^ 
133
 Ept v. Ept (Hawaii App. Oct. 1995) 905 P.2d 54. 
134
 See Justice Zimmerman • s concurring opinion in Maratinez v. Maratinez (Utah 1991) 818 P.2d 538 at 543. Also see 
discussion in j^ 16(b) and 16(c), Pp. 37-38 below, 
13:5
 Husband's expert: used lower 1994 earning as the basis of his projections of future income. [Ex. #21, P 39]. 
m
 See prior year profits depicted in bar chart on P 28 above and Appendix "L" hereto. 
137
 1 15(b) & 15(c), P. 27-29 above: Discussion, in 111 pages 17-18 of defendant's 11/3/94 memorandum, R. 450. 
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with its relationship with suppliers, key employees, etc. However, 
if he were to do so, Husband would probably incur liability to 
Codale for breach of his fiduciary duty. That claim would be an 
asset of Codale, which would probably be equal to, or in excess of, 
the goodwill and going concern value of Codale, h of which should 
be awarded to Wife. In any event, the Court is dividing the 
marital estate as it exists, not as they might have existed if 
Husband intentionally caused harm to Codale. If, as threatened, 
Husband had left Codale immediately before the divorce, and had 
misappropriated many of its suppliers, employees and customers, 
while establishing a competing business, the marital estate to be 
divided would consist of whatever value remained in Codale (which 
would likely be the salvage value found by the Court to be its 
value), together with the value of the new business established by 
Husband. Liquidation value is not an appropriate measure of value 
[I 5-13, R. 318-325]. Wife is entitled to receive a fair share of 
the marital estate, and Husband should not be permitted to profit 
from his threatened tortious misconduct. 
(I) Partial liquidation plan adopted by Court unfairly 
reduced Wife's share due to tax burden. The modest value of the 
essentially non-income producing property (the home, retirement 
funds, cash, etc.) awarded to Wife was further reduced by about 
$440 thousand in income tax, of which $410 thousand was 
unnecessary.138 The Court erred in structuring distribution from 
Codale to Wife as a taxable transaction, and in requiring her to 
pay the tax, which substantially reduced her net share of the 
marital estate [R. 495-496, 5 1]. As a result, even if the Court's 
valuation of Codale were correct (which Wife disputes), Wife still 
138
 See discussions in ^  7(0 & F 39. P 9.10(e) & F 77, P 15, and summary by Wife's expert of tax consequences of 
Court's method of distributing assets found in Appendix I hereto See also 116, F 147, P 36 below 
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r e c e i v e d abom $4ir> fi thousand l e s s ui I IIP m a r i t a l e s t a t e thi-m 
Husband '' iiln 1 «n i mini rpadi ly have been reduced t o abim! id 
1 houtii LUCI by f i imp 1 v dWcirdniq flic b u i l d l n q In Wife ,'1" I In1 ("unit I I if 11 
g r o s s l y abuse-l i t s d i s c r e t i o n by o r d e n n q Wife U \my dli r e s u l t mq 
t a x e s , and t o Indemnify Husband if he i n c u r r e d t a x | I*" Sb i , l"i|| 
111
 i s l i k e l y * hal p l a i n t i f f w i l l never pay income t a x on t h e Coda le 
s t o c k which lit r e t a i n e d Because t h e l .axable t r a n s a c t i o n was 
s t r u c t u r e d t o s a t i s f y Husband ' s d e s i r e t o a c q u i r e W i f e ' s s h a r e * £ 
i iuJdh ijinl l In bus inesB bu i Id i iii|, it fay l i t i q a t i o n a n d / o r income 
t ax 1 lafai 111 ^ i in r i i i r e i i in -ill l i i j i n e s s Husband sliuulnl IN 
I ("quired t o Oear t h e J i l i q a l x o n cuu ib , HI in in pny I he I ii* lni,» i.» 
f a i r and equj t a b l e in view of W i f e ' s modest income, at; compared In 
Husband s e s t i m a t e d , it » niLl i ion income over t h e IIHL xl f i ve \ MI 
y e a r s [ R . 4 8 / - 4 B' i Appendix ' li In I I || 
i li Cour t d in hot. d i v i d e u\ estate evenly. Assuming 
ditjut'ijdu Ltitill wt ii i b i eqardecl f hm qnoblwill I'lHiiinq c a p a c i t y , arid 
l o j n q - o n c e 1 1 issuers, md < oi iMdei Unl , ' !oddb s t n l v i q t v a l u e , 
I 111 in i »ri L a t e l y a f t e r d i s t r i b u t i o n Husband ' s net wutfh was (jbniil '. Il 
m i l l i o n , (jrni W i f e ' s n e t wor th was o n l y about '^I .J m i l l i o n due l o 
t h e C o u r t - i m p o s i n g t a x l i a b i l i t y on Wi le , "Hie Lour t s t a t e d i t was 
d i v i d i n g t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e e q u a l l y [K, i t /2, 1 l b ] , bu t t h e Cour t 
a c t u a l l y gave Wife $415,'I thousand l e s s t han i t gave Husband,1'12" i; 
a minimum, s i n c e t he lax . N i h i l i t y was Incur red fo r d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
m a r i t a l asse t i i I IMIIJIH In I I in ' |m I Inn1' m a r i t a l e s t a t e 
iJV
 Net assigned value of assets distributed (R. 477, ^ 2 and footnote #1): 
To Husband $ 1,740.729 
'U «v-.;c 1304.848 
-^  distributed to Husband S 435.881 
140
 See affidavit of Wife's expert wherein he discussed how income tax froi nt Codale asset disti iibi ltioi i to i" ' ifc com lid I: z 
minimized. R. 495-502,1 1 and 2; R. 4 9 7 , 1 3 ; R. 500; Appendix U F . 
141
 See discussion, in % 5 .6 and 7 of Wife's expert:'s affidavit. R 498; Appendix "T" 
vppendijt B R 4X i -4<>3 Sec $ II, hereto. The financial statements of Husband and Wife in Appendix B, R. 485 
show the S43.S.881 dificience t^ nc-: H-m-- ., hich is illustrated in the bar graph at R 486. 
Appellant's Brief-1 loit v. Holt 34 
prior to division, thereby more nearly equalizing the share of the 
marital estate received by each party. 
(k) No interest for 10 months, followed by low (4%) interest 
to Wife, an abuse of discretion. The Court abused its discretion 
by ordering Wife to make a $500 thousand interest-free, 10 month 
loan to Husband, and one and two year $422.3 thousand loans to 
Husband at an unreasonably low 4% interest rate.143 
(1) Wife denied share of Codale*s intangible assets. 
Codale's assets include $347.2 thousand of intangible assets to 
which Husband's expert assigned no value under his liquidation 
value method [Ex. P-21, P. 56]. Husband received Codale, and 
enjoyed the benefit of the intangible assets without paying for 
them. Wife is entitled to h of that amount, or an additional 
$173.6 thousand. The Court abused its discretion. 
(m) Wife improperly charged for family vehicles. The Court 
abused its discretion by requiring Wife to pay Codale $28.1 
thousand for family vehicles awarded to her.144 The fact that title 
to the family vehicles was in Codale should have been disregarded 
where, as here, Husband owned 97.6% of the corporate stock, paid 
many family expenses from corporate assets, and where injustice and 
inequity would result if the corporate form were strictly 
observed.145 
(n) Court failed to divide other assets. Husband secretly 
owned a $135 thousand condominium, title to which was in Codale, 
and the existence of which was not discovered until after trial 
14
 See 11 (e) above and related footnote # 12 page 3 above 
144
 See 110(b)(5) and accompam footnote #68, P 14 above 
145
 Watson v Watson (Utah App 1992) 837 P 2d 1 at 5, where under similar circumstances the Court held that an 
automobile was subject to equitable distribution to the wife even though title was held in the name of husband's corporation. 
See also Jeffenes v Jeffenes (Utah App 1995), 895 P 2d 835, 837, where the Court stated that proceedings in regard to the 
family are equitable in a high degree and that the court may take into consideration all of the circumstances and every asset 
of every nature possessed by the parties. 
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when Husband moved into the condominium. The existence of the 
condominium was not disclosed to experts, and was not included in 
Codale's appraised value.146 Like the family automobiles discussed 
above, the value of the family country club membership should be 
divided, even though title was in Codale. Wife is entitled to \ of 
the value of the condominium and country club membership. 
(o) Wife was not given income-producing assets. The Court 
abused its discretion by refusing to award the income-producing 
business building to Wife. The plan proposed by Wife would have 
substantially reduced the tax consequences, would have permitted 
her to realize rental income from the building with minimum contact 
between the parties (by employing a third person to manage the 
building), and would have permitted Husband to have eventually 
acquired ownership of the building.147 
Alimony and child support 
16. Court's $80 thousand historical income used to set 
Alimony and child support is contrary to the evidence. Alimony148 
and child support149 were fixed at unreasonably low amounts, based 
upon Husband's modest 1994 salary of $80 thousand.150 The Court 
incorrectly held, which is an error in law and can be re-examined 
by the Court with no deference to the decision of the trial 
court,151 that Husband's 1994 $80 thousand salary was "consistent 
with the parties' historical yearly income" [R. 285], and used that 
146
 See affidavit of Wife's expert, R 477,11, R 480-481,11 Appendix aBw . 
147
 R 422. \ 18 [Wife requested that income-producing business building be awarded to her Wife's proposed plan, 
which was rejected by the Court, would have minimized contact between the parties, would have eliminated all but about 
$30,000 of the $440,000 income tax liability, would have permitted her to receive some income from marital assets for a limited 
period, and would have permitted Husband to have eventually acquired ownership of the building] 
148
 $2,000 per month terminable alimony 
149
 $997 per month for 2 children R 285, R 269 See discussion in \ 2 and footnote # 14 above 
150
 See child support worksheet R 194. which shows Husband's monthly gross income as $6,583 [$6,583 X 12 = 
$79,996 - rounded equals $80,000] 
151
 Bremholt v Breinholt (Utah App 1995) 905 P 2d 877 
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amount to fix alimony and child support. That finding is not 
supported by the evidence: 
(a) Husband's historical income much higher than $80 thousand 
1994 salary used to compute alimony and child support. Husband's 
historical yearly income was much higher than the $80 thousand used 
by the Court to determine alimony and child support.152 His 
compensation averaged $223 thousand for the prior three years.153 
Husband obviously reduced his salary in contemplation of the 
divorce, and was voluntarily underemployed.154 Husband's appraisers 
imputed income of $250 thousand to Husband in appraising the value 
of Codale.155 To be consistent, the same imputed salary of not less 
than the $250,000 per year should also have been used to determine 
appropriate alimony and child support amounts.156 
(b) Equitable adjustment in fixing alimony and child support. 
It is clear from the testimony Husband and the experts that Husband 
is on the threshold of a major increase in income [Appendix. "L" -
115(c), P. 28 above]. Wife and children are entitled to share in 
that increased income by way of alimony and child support under UC 
30-3-5(7 )(e) [Appendix "A"] and Utah case law.157 Justice 
152
 See footnote # 150. P 36 above 
153
 In 1990 Husbands income was over $340 thousand, m 1991 it was over $309 thousand, in 1992 it was about $83 7 
thousand and in 1993 his income was about $158 7 Also see discussion in heading of 1 2 and related footnote # 14, P 3 above Ex 
D-31 See discussion in 112(d) and footnote 86, P 21 above R 331,119 & footnote #53 The $80,000 Husband salarv used by 
the Court to compute child support [R 331.118] was also too low because it failed to include the $27,500 accrued Husband's 
bonus from Codale [P 1.1994 column of App A to Ex P-21 -14 of $55,000 accrued officer bonus], [R 484,1 16] 
154
 Utah Code 78-45-7 5(7Xa), a copv of which is in Appendix "K", states that income may be imputed based on 
"probable earnings s derived from work history, occupational qualifications and prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds m the communitv'' Both Husband's work history (about $300 thousand) and/or ($250 thousand) prevailing wage in the 
industrv as found bv Husband s appraiser require that a higher wage be imputed 
155
 In connection with appraising the value of Codale the experts had fixed the market value of Husband's services at 
about $250,000 per year which the Court found he could readilv increase [R 285] 
156
 See discussion in 12(a) and footnote 14, P 3 above. 110(0, P 16 above. 111(d). P 18 above, 116(d) &F 160, P 
38, 121 , P 45. Appendix "B".R 482 See also Hallv Hall (Utah App 1993) 858 P 2d 1018 at 1023. UC 78-45-7 5, Htllv 
Hill (Utah App 1994) 869 P 2d 963 Cox v Cox (Utah App 1994) 877 P 2d 1262. Breinholt v Bremholt (Utah App 1995) 905 
P 2d 877 
157
 UCA 30-3-5(3). quoted in 16 above A copy of UCA 30-3-5(3) is found in Appendix "A." Sorensen v Sorensen 
(Utah 1992), 839 P 2d 774 at 776 Also see discussion in 117 and 18 P 41^4 above 
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Zimmerman's concurring opinion in Martinez summarized the majority 
opinion of the court as follows: 
The majority opinion also makes it clear that 
the trial court can make such compensating 
adjustments to both the property division and 
the alimony award as it deems necessary to 
make the ultimate decision equitable. 
If one spouse's earning capacity has been 
greatly enhanced through the efforts of both 
spouses during the marriage, it may be 
appropriate for the trial court to make a 
compensating adjustment in dividing the 
marital property and awarding alimony. 
(Emphasis added). 
(c) Failure to make a compensating adjustment. Although the 
Court acknowledged that because Husband was receiving the business 
assets he would be receiving more income than Wife, and that the 
income of the parties should be equalized,158 the Court erred and/or 
abused its discretion in failing to make a compensating adjustment 
by either distributing more assets to Wife, or by awarding 
additional alimony and child support or both. The Court also 
failed to make the required finding as to Husband's post-divorce 
income.159 
(d) Dividend income should have been imputed from Codale's 
profits and/or "free cash." The Court erred and/or abused its 
discretion by failing to impute Codale's profits and/or dividends 
to Husband.160 As 97.6% owner of Codale, Husband is free to cause 
Codale to distribute its profits to himself as dividends or as 
salary. Codale's income is a marital asset under Jefferies161 as a 
158
 R 284-285 See discussion \2 above & footnote #13, P 3 re ahmonv AlsoR 185, R 369*1 5 &R 37,1(21 
159
 Johnson v Johnson (Utah App 1989) 771 P 2d 696 at 700, Bremholt v Breinholt (Utah App 1995) 905 P 2d 877 
160
 Jones v Jones (Utah 1985) 700 P 2d 1072 [quoted below], Chnstensen v Christensen (Utah 1983) 667 P 2d 592 
[court may consider both his individual income and the corporations income for alimony purposes where husband has a wholly-owned 
corporation cs {Husband's 97 6% of Codale is substantially tcwholly-owned"}] See disc in 1 11(b). P 17. 11(d). P 18. 12(d). P 
21,12(0, P 24, and 15(c), P 28 
161
 See 110(b)( 1). P 13 above and Jeffenes v Jeffenes (Utah App 1995), 895 P 2d 835 at 837 Appendix "O". 
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"right that has accrued during the marriage in a present or future 
benefit" marital asset. Utah Code 78-45-7.5( 1) (a) [Appendix T ] 
states that "gross income includes prospective income from any 
source" and subsection (b) lists "dividends" as one of the income 
sources to be included. Since alimony is deductible to Husband, 
and taxable to Wife, it is appropriate to use bef ore-tax income to 
set alimony. After taxes, Codale's increase in net worth over the 
next 10 years will exceed $11.8 million.162 Even if funds are 
deducted for expansion, new equipment, additional working capital, 
etc., as suggested by Husband's expert, Codale's "free cash" 
available for dividends is not less than $7.2 million.163 The $11.8 
million amount should be used for alimony and child support, since 
deduction of the suggested $2.7 million for capital expenditures 
and $2.2 million for additional working capital is not appropriate 
under Utah Law. Whatever the appropriate amount, Codale income 
should be imputed to Husband for alimony and child support 
purposes. In Jones1**, at P. 1076, the Supreme Court held: 
The apportionment of income between personal and business 
uses is quite properly a matter left to the discretion of 
the husband as owner of the pharmacy and gift shop. 
However, how he chooses to allocate that profit is not 
binding on the court in determining his ability to pay 
alimony to his ex-spouse. The full profit produced by 
the business, adjusted by the reasonable needs of the 
business for additional capital, should have been used as 
the basis for assessing the husband's ability to provide 
for his spouse. In making this analysis, the trial 
court should not permit all claims of need for capital on 
the part of the business to take precedence over the 
support needs of the wife. If those capital needs are a 
result of discretionary decisions of the husband to 
expand and improve the business, rather than to maintain 
162
 See 110(b)(1). P 13 and footnote #62, P 13 and Appendix "O" 
163
 See discussion in 110(b)(1) and footnotes # 61 & 62, P 13, and 12(a), P 3,117(b) & F 175-179, P 42-43 below. 
D-21,P47&51 Ex.D-21,P47&51. Appendix"O". 
164
 Jones v Jones (Utah 1985) 700 P 2d 1072 at 1076 The holding in Jones was quoted with approval in Breinholt v 
Bremholt (Utah App Oct 1995)276 Utah Adv Rep 38 at 39^40 
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it in its present condition, then to permit him to divert 
income into the business at the expense of his ex-
spouse's support needs would be to permit him to enrich 
himself at her expense. (Emphasis added). 
(e) Holt Properties income. The Court erred and/or abused 
its discretion in fixing the amount of alimony and child support by 
failing to consider Husband's Holt Properties rental income on the 
business building.165 
(f) Permanent alimony. Facts to be considered in fixing 
alimony include: (1) needs of wife, (2) ability of wife to produce 
income, and (3) ability of husband to provide support.166 
Terminable alimony may be appropriate in the usual case where its 
purpose is rehabilitation, to prevent the spouse from becoming a 
public charge, is based upon need, ability to pay, equalization of 
income, etc. However, in the present case, a major factor not 
considered in fixing the amount of alimony is Husband's income and 
ability to pay. UC 30-3-5(8) also allows permanent alimony: 
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically 
provides otherwise, any order of the court 
that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
automatically terminates upon the remarriage 
of that former spouse. (Emphasis added). 
In Paffel161 the Utah Supreme Court approved a permanent alimony 
award. In Johnson162 the Utah Supreme Court rejected an attempt to 
grant a share in a professional degree through permanent alimony, 
but, relying on UC 30-3-5(5) [now 30-3-5(8) - Appendix "A"] at P. 
252 states: 
165
 Ex D-31, which shows that Holt Properties income for 1993 was $63 5 thousand See discussion in % 12(f) and 
footnote #96. P 24 and in 10(b)(2) and footnote #65. P 14 above Codale's rent paid to Holt Properties has been deducted as a 
business expense in determining Codale's profit Part of the building is also rented to other businesses Wife is entitled to share 
166
 Boyle v Boyle (Utah App 1987) 735 P 2d 669, Martinez v Martinez (Utah App 1988) 754 P 2d 69 
167
 Paffel v Paffel (Utah 1988) 732 P 2d 96 
168
 Johnson v Johnson (Utah App 1993) 855 P 2d 250 
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The trial court therefore has the discretion 
to make an award of alimony that will survive 
the remarriage of the receiving spouse. 
(Emphasis added). 
The appellate courts have affirmed non-terminable alimony in 
several Utah cases, including Martinez169 and Burt.110 In Burt the 
Court affirmed the award of a future income stream, not as alimony, 
but as a non-terminable property award. This is an appropriate 
case to award permanent alimony and/or alimony as a non-terminable 
property award from Husband's future income stream.171 Wife's right 
to share in Codale's large profit through alimony should not be 
made to depend upon whether she leads a celibate life. Since 
alimony is deductible to Husband and taxable to wife, permanent 
alimony meets the needs of Wife without an undue burden on Husband. 
17. Court recognized it should use alimony to equalize 
income, but failed to do so. The Court held that it should use 
alimony to equalize the parties incomes but, as discussed above, it 
failed to do so.172 
(a) Court ruled that post-divorce income should be equalized. 
The Court's ruling includes the following statements, wherein the 
Court acknowledged that the parties' post-divorce incomes should be 
equalized, however the Court failed to do so and failed to make the 
required finding as to Husband's post-divorce income:173 
"By awarding the plaintiff the businesses, his 
ability to produce income is enhanced" 
169
 Martinez v Martinez (Utah App 1988)754 P.2d 69 
170
 Burt v Burt (Utah App 1990) 799 P 2d 1166 
171
 See discussion re tax advantages and dangers of calling future payments as satisfaction of a marital property disposition 
or alimony in Rayburn v Rayburn (Utah App 1987) 738 P 2d 238 
172
 See discussion in 117(a). P 41 Equalizing post-divorce income is directed by UC 30-3-5(7Xa), (c), (d) and (e). F 23. 
P 5 & Appendix "A" 
173
 Johnson v Johnson (Utah App 1989) 771 P 2d 696,700 
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"to award plaintiff the greater income 
producing property and then not equalize 
incomes to a certain extent seems extremely 
unfair," and 
that alimony should be awarded "to maintain 
the parties standard of living during the 
marriage" and "to equalize the income of the 
parties.174 (Emphasis added). 
(b) Alimony should be increased to better equalize each 
party's available cash. A very substantial increase in alimony 
would be required to even begin to approach equalizing the parties 
post-divorce income. Using even Husband's expert's ultra-
conservative computations, Husband's annual free cash flow will 
exceed $400 thousand in 1995, and $900 thousand by 2004.175 During 
this same period, Wife's annual free cash flow remains quite 
constant, from about $66 thousand in 1995 to about $75 thousand by 
2004.176 Projecting Codale's operations for 10 years shows, based 
upon Husband's expert's computations, that Husband will receive 
$7.2 million free cash flow, and over $11.8 million which should be 
174
 See discussion by the Court in its Ruling R 284-285 Also see discussion in ^ | 10(f)« P 16 above 
175
 R 478. R 482 Also see Appendix "B", R 487 - Under "Dale Holt" see line called "taxable income." where Wife's 
expert estimates that Husband's before tax income for 1995 as $634,554 and for 2002 $1294,458 Those estimates are based upon 
data furnished by Husband's own expert [R 488. Note 1 - which is part of Appendix WB" Husband's expert's computations of 
Codale's for 1995-1999 reserves for capital expenditures and increase in working capital to arrive at the "free cash flow to 
shareholders" [Ex P-21, P 47] is summarized as follows 
Free cash flow [Ex 21 P 47] 
Add Capital expenditures 
Working capital 
Increase in Codale Assets 
1995 
418 6 
2044 
163 7 
$786 7 
1996 
490 8 
218 7 
175 2 
$884 7 
1997 
569 2 
234 0 
J874 
$990 6 
1998 
654 5 
250 4 
200 5 
$1.1054 
1999 
747 1 
267 9 
2146 
$1229 6 
Totals 
2 880 2 
1 175 4 
9414 
$4.997. 
Thousand 
Thousand 
Thousand 
Million 
* This means that Codale's free cash flow will be about $5 million over the next five years, of which Husband's expert estimates 
$2,880 2 million will be surplus cash available for dividends, $1,175 4 million will be available for capital expenditures such as new 
equipment and about $941 4 thousand will be retain in the bank as additional working capital The foregoing is based on Husband's 
expert's conservative approach 
176
 Free cash flow is the net cash available to Husband from Codale after providing funds for expansion, including such 
things as buving new equipment, proving additional working capital, etc R 478. K 2(b)( 1) [Appendix u B"] See chart showing 
Husband's available cash flow-bottom half of P R 487 [Appendix "B"] 
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considered for purposes of fixing the amount of alimony.177 Even 
under Husband's Expert's conservative approach, Codale's net worth 
will increase by $11.8 million over the next 10 years [Appendix 
"O" ], in addition to the $2.5 million of salary based upon his 
market value salary approach. The vast difference between the 
parties' available cash flow is illustrated by a chart and bar 
chart, copies attached as part of Appendix B, at R. 487-489. 
During the next 10 years, Wife's available free cash flow will 
remain fixed at below $75 thousand per year, and her purchasing 
power will decrease as a result of inflation, while Husband's free 
cash flow will increase to over $700 thousand per year, which 
vastly exceeds inflation [R. 488, note #2 - Appendix "B"]. Wife's 
after-tax cash in the next 10 years will be about $738 thousand, 
while Husband's income will be about $5.4 million dollars - over 
$4.6 million more than Wife's [Appendix "B", R. 487 ].178 (Said 
chart is summarized in the footnote.)179 
As said chart180 illustrates, Husband will have about $5.4 
million over the next ten years after taxes, and even after setting 
177
 R 511 See discussion in ^ 10(b) and footnotes 61 & 62), P 13 above 
178
 From Appendix "B", based upon conservative estimates by Husband's expert 
179
 Comparison of after tax funds available to Wife & Husband during next 10 years 
year 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Totals 
Rounded to 
funds avail 
Wife 
$ 66,221 $ 
71,543 
74,978 
74,978 
74,978 
74,978 
74,978 
74,978 
74,978 
74.978 
$ 737.588 
$ 738 thousand 
after taxes 
Husband 
337,749 
383,381 
432,684 
486,053 
543,720 
572,128 
601,957 
633,278 
666,165 
700.696 
$5,357,811 
$5 4 million 
Husband's 
addt funds 
$271,528 
311,838 
357,706 
411,075 
468,742 
497,150 
526,979 
558,300 
591,187 
625,718 
$4 620.223 
$4 6 million 
The chart in the previous footnote is based upon estimates made by Husband's expert 
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aside funds to provide for the purchase of new equipment, for 
expansion, additional working capital, etc., Husband will have over 
$4.6 million more than Wife.181 The Court abused its discretion in 
failing to equalize the parties' post-divorce status and income. 
18. Utah statute requires the Court to attempt to equalize 
the parties' post-divorce living standards. UC 30-3-5(7 )182 
addresses equalizing the parties' post-divorce income as follows: 
UC 30-3-7(a) requires the Court to consider 
"the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support," and 
UC 30-3-7(d) permits the court, "under 
appropriate circumstances, to attempt to 
equalize the parties respective standards of 
living." (Emphasis added). 
It would be difficult to imagine any "circumstances" where it would 
be more "appropriate" to "equalize the parties respective standards 
of living" than under the facts in the present case. Before the 
divorce both parties were multi-millionaires, and Codale was 
producing enormous marital income. After the divorce, Husband had 
substantially all of the income and assets. The Court's holding 
that Codale's goodwill was not a marital asset, giving it to 
Husband without a compensating award to Wife, and paying her only 
h of the salvage value of the business assets, constituted error, 
"manifest injustice," is a "clearly unjust result," and/or was a 
"prejudicial abuse of discretion"183 and should be reversed. 
19. The Court failed to make sufficient findings as to the 
parties' standard of living, how alimony determined, etc. The 
181
 See discussion by Wife's expert as to the reasons for this difference, § II, R 480-482 [Appendix "B"] 
182
 A copy of UC 30-3-5(7) is attached as Appendix "A." Relevant portions are set forth in 16A, P 5 above The 1995 
amendment which added sub-section (7) merely codified existing case law See discussion in footnote #22, P 5 with respect to the 
propriety of applying the amendment which added sub-section (7) to the present case Also see legislative history in Appendix "J" 
quoted in f 6(j), P 7 above, where the sponsorer of the amendment introduced the bill adding sub-section (7) by stating that the bill is 
"taking case law that exists in the State and codifying it into a formal statement on how to handle alimony " 
183
 See1(a),P 1 above 
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Court acknowledged that it was required to consider the parties 
standard of living [R. 285]: 
"in looking at the ability of the defendant to 
provide support for herself, the Court must 
consider, among other factors, the standard of 
living the parties acquired during the 
marriage. (Emphasis added). 
However, the Court failed to make the required findings necessary 
to permit the Appellate Court to determine the standard of living 
acquired by the parties during the marriage, particularly with 
respect to family expenses paid by Codale. The Court also failed 
to make findings which explained the method by which it arrived at 
$2 thousand per month as the appropriate amount of alimony. 
20. Court failed to include a finding as to Husband*s post-
divorce income. The Court found that Wife could probably earn 6% 
after taxes on the funds awarded her [R. 364, i 25; R. 388,SI IO] , but 
failed to make the required finding of the income Husband would 
probably earn from the assets awarded him.184 
21. The same compensation should be used to determine alimony 
as was used to value Codale. Husband's expert imputed a $250 
thousand salary to Husband to arrive at his $2.8 million Codale 
value [R. 478, i 2(b)(2) - Appendix "B"]. The $24 thousand annual alimony 
is about 30% of Husband's $80 thousand annual salary used by the 
Court to determine alimony and child support [R. 482, Appendix "B"] . If 
the Court were correct in fixing alimony as 30% of Husband's 
imputed salary, then alimony should be a minimum of $75 thousand 
per year, [R. 478-479, i 2(b)(2) - Appendix "B"], plus an appropriate 
184
 Johnson v Johnson (Utah App 1989). 771 P 2d 696,700 Also see Johnson v Johnson (Utah App 1993) 855 P 2d 
250.253 this Court stated that where. as here, "a future change in circumstances [substantial increase in Husband's income] is 
contemplated bv the trial court in the divorce decree, the fulfillment of that future change will not constitute a matenal change of 
circumstances sufficient to modify the award" and that are "required to make adequate findings on all matenal issues of alimony to 
reveal the reasoning followed in making the award" and "should make findings as to whether such additional income will affect the 
alimony award'% The trial court failed to make adequate findings with respect to the possible effect of Husband's future income on 
the alimony award See Breinholt v Breinholt (Utah App 1995) 905 P.2d 877. 879 
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additional amount for Codale's enormous income [Appendix "L"], to 
better equalize the parties' post-divorce income.185 
22. Tax exemptions for children. The already insufficient 
child support186 was further-reduced by awarding Husband the income 
tax exemptions for two minor children in Wife's care [R. 369, 5 6]. 
Based child support on Husband's modest $80 thousand per year 
salary, awarding Husband the tax exemptions saves Husband about 
$3.2 thousand per year of income tax.187 Wife should receive a 
compensating award. If Husband increases his salary above $111.8 
thousand per year, which would still be below the fair market value 
of his salary,188 he would receive little or no tax benefit from the 
exemptions.189 At a minimum, in years when Husband receives no tax 
benefit, the exemptions should be awarded to Wife as required by 
Utah Code 78-45-7.21(4), Appendix "M". 
Fees 
23. Expert witness fees. The Court misapplied the law. The 
award of expert's fees may be authorized by UC 30-3-3(1), but the 
party seeking fees must first show that he has a financial need,190 
which Husband did not, and cannot, do. The trial court made no 
finding that Husband has a financial need, and no such need 
exists.191 In Stevens,192 the Appellate Court ruled that appraisal 
185
 Bremholt v Breinholt (Utah Ct App Oct 1995) 905 P.2d 877 [considering income in addition to basic salary for 
purpose of alimony is consistent with 44the goal of equalizing the parties' post divorce status.], citing Howell v Howell (Utah App 
1991), 806 P 2d 1209,1212, cert denied 817 P 2d 327 (Utah 1991) 
186
 Child support was based upon $80,000 Husband Codale salary [R 356. \ 7] without considering his bonus, 
the $250,000 fair market value of husband's compensation as fixed by his expert See footnote # 150, P 36 above 
187
 R 331.119, footnote #53 
188
 Husband's expert imputed to Husband a fair market value salary of about $183,000 [P 1,1994 col of App A 
to Ex P-21 {l/i of $$365,800 fair market value of officers compensation}] 
189
 R 331-332,19 & FN 54, 26 USCS § 151(d) & 994 U S Master Tax Guide 1133. P 88 
190
 R 458-560,120-22 Peterson v Peterson (Utah App 1991), 818 P 2d 1305 at 1310 
191
 Husband's expert projects his next 5 years before tax earnings at about $8,500,000 [Ex 21. P 47 {P number is 
m upper-right corner} ] Also see summary in R 449. % 10 and footnote 38] 
192
 Stevens v Stevens (Utah App 1988), 754 P 2d 952 
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expenses incurred by wife during divorce proceedings to learn the 
value of husband's business interests were not "costs" within the 
meaning of the statute, which would allow her recovery of those 
expenses from husband. In a like manner, Husband cannot recover 
appraisal expenses from Wife. Wife should be awarded her fees. 
24. Attorney fees. UC 30-3-3 allows the Court to order a 
party to pay the attorney fees and costs of the other party to 
enable the other party to defend an action. Wife is entitled to be 
awarded attorney fees required to defend against Husbands claims. 
Insufficient Findings 
25. Insufficient findings. It is an indispensable requisite 
to fulfilling the Court's responsibility that the court make a 
determination of all questions of fact upon which there is a 
dispute.193 Findings are adequate only if they are sufficiently 
detailed, and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps 
by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached.194 Clarity of findings of fact is necessary to fulfill 
that responsibility. Various Findings were insufficient to meet 
that requirement, including those mentioned above, together with 
the following: (a) Computation of child support, including August 
1995 support [R. 356, 1 7 & R. 369, 15; R. 390, fl3]; (b) Tax 
exemptions [R. 356, 18 & R. 369, 1 6 ] ; (c) Oakridge Country Club 
membership and the finding that its value has been included in 
value of Codale [R. 358, 1 13 & R. 370, 1 11]; (d) Value of 
Codale, ownership of its goodwill and its award to Husband and 
legitimate and reasonable need of Codale for valuation and alimony 
purposes195 [R. 360,1 15; R. 61, 1 17; R. 361, 118; R. 371, 1 13; 
See, LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 420 P.2d 424 (1966). 
Campbell v Campbell (Utah App 1995), 896 P.2d 635 at 638-639. 
BreinhoU v. BreinhoU (Utah App. 1995) 905 P. 2d 877 at 882 
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R. 372, 1 15]; (e) Wife retaining h of Codale stock [R. 360, I 16]; 
(f) denying Wife's request that the business building be awarded to 
her, and award of Holt Properties (business building) to Husband 
[R. 362, f 18; R. 387, 16]; (g) transfer and redemption of Codale 
stock as taxable transaction [R. 362, 119 & 20; R. 373, 1 17]; (h) 
imposition of tax liability and indemnification of Husband against 
taxes upon Wife [R. 362, 1 20; R. 373, 1 18; R. 387, 1 5]; (i) 
ordering Wife to pay Codale for family vehicles [R. 363, 1 21; R. 
374, 1119]; (j) family expense computation [R. 364, 1 24; R. 388, 
19]; (k) failure to make a finding as to Husband's post-divorce 
earnings [R. 364, 1 25; R. 388, 1 10]; (1) how the amount and 
payment period for alimony was determined [R. 364, 1 26; R. 21; R. 
388, 1 8 ] ; (m) failure to award Wife her attorney fees [R. 365, 1 
27; R. 375, 1 22; R. 388, 1 11]; (o) value of marital estate [R. 
372, 116]; (p) failure to allow wife market rate interest for 
entire time between trial and payment [R. 373, 1 17; R. 387, 17]; 
(q) ordering Wife to pay Husband's expert witness fees [R. 375, 1 
22]; and (r) other findings discussed elsewhere herein. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse and remand with instructions as 
requested above, including instructions to award Wife h of Codale's 
marital going concern value, without reductions for size, 
marketability, etc., since the parties are dividing the martial 
estate, not selling Codale to a third-party; to hold that Codale*s 
goodwill is a marital asset in which Wife is entitled to share; to 
require Husband to pay all of the income tax resulting from 
distribution of assets from Codale, and/or tax which could have 
been saved by awarding building to Wife, or order the tax paid from 
the marital estate before distribution; to award additional child 
support and alimony and to equalize their post-divorce income; to 
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income tax savings from children's exemptions being awarded to 
Husband and to award exemptions to Wife in years when Husband 
receives minimal or no tax benefit therefrom; to award family 
vehicles to Wife without Wife being required to pay Codale 
therefor; to award Wife h the value of the Country Club 
membership; to reverse order requiring wife to pay Husband's 
expert witness fee; to award Wife her attorney fees and expert 
witness fees; to require Husband to pay market rate interest on 
amounts owed to Wife from date of divorce trial until payment; 
awarding the business building to Wife; remand with instructions 
for trial court to determine the full value of the marital estate 
based upon guidelines from this Court, and to award h to wife; and 
for other relief discussed herein, or which the Court deems proper. 
Dated February 7, 1996. 
'Ronald C~. Barker, co-counsel for Wife, 
Vickie Holt 
David Paul Wnite, co-counsel for Wife, 
Vickie Holt 
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30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Division of 
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — 
Custody and visitation — Determination of ali-
mony — Nonmeritorious petition for modifica-
tion. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and 
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, 
and dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
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(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of 
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabili-
ties and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and 
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after 
January 1, 1994, that are subject to income withholding, an order 
assessing against the obligor an additional $7 per month check processing 
fee to be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of 
Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services for the 
purposes of income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, 
Parts 4 and 5. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for 
debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best 
interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer 
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation 
schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to 
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a 
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if 
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or 
defended against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by 
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to 
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the 
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual 
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the 
other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation. 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
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(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining 
alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, 
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance 
with Subsection (a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts 
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the 
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equal-
ize the parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a 
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective 
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital 
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's 
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both 
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating 
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, 
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the 
court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at 
the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive 
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial 
material change in circumstances not forseeable at the time of the 
divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for 
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time 
the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circum-
stances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse 
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this 
subsection. 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial 
ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse 
if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that 
consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number 
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination 
of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the 
payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is 
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the 
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights 
are determined. 
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
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History: R.S. 1898 & OL. 1907, 9 1212; L. 
1909, ch. 109, 9 4; CX. 1917, 9 3000; R.S. 
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, 9 3; 
1975, ch. 81, 9 l;1979,ch,110,9 l;1984,ch. 
13, 9 1; 1985, ch. 72, 9 1; 1985, ch. 100, 9 1; 
1991, ch. 257, 9 4; 1993, ch. 152, 9 1; 1993, 
ch. 261,9 1; 1994, ch. 284,9 1; 1995, ch. 330, 
9 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1,1995, deleted a provision 
from Subsection (3) for support and mainte-
nance orders; deleted former Subsections (5) 
and (6), providing that alimony terminates 
upon remarriage, or cohabitation with a mem-
ber of the opposite sex, by the payee; added 
Subsections (7) to (9); renumbered former Sub-
sections (7) and (8) as (5) and (6); and made 
stylistic changes. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1995, ch. 330, 
which amended this section, provides in 9 2 
that the Legislature does not intend that ter-
mination of alimony based on cohabitation, in 
accordance with Subsection (9), "be interpreted 
in any way to condone such a relationship for 
any purpose." 
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AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL SHIELDS 
DALE P. HOLT, ) IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
Plaintiff, ) FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, ORDER 
AND JUDGMENT AND ORDER ON POST 
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TRIAL 
) 
VICKIE L. HOLT, 
) Civil No. 934700554 DA 
Defendant. 
) Judge W. Brent West 
ooOoo 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
County of Salt Lake) 
Attached hereto is Paul Shield's of Neilson Elggren Drukin & co ("NED") verified letter of 
February 1, 1995, which is filed in support of defendant's URCP 59 Motions toalter or amend 
findings, conclusions, order and judgment, order on past trial motions to distribute additional assets 
or for a new trial, which is summarized as follows 
1 Condominium - The $135,000 condominium unit was not considered by either expert 
in arriving at the value of the marital estate See explanation in § II, page -1-2 of Shields letter, 
which includes the following conclusions 
(a) Increase in NED'S valuation - That the $5,400,000 valuation should be increased by 
$135,000 as a result of omission of the condominium to a new value of $5,535,000 
(b) Increase in Dorton's valuation - That the $2,800,000 valuation by David Dorton 
("DORTON") should be increased by $135,000 as a result of omission of the condominium, to a 
new valuation of $2,935,000 
2 Inequity of marital asset distribution - Excluding goodwill, going concern value and 
other assets awarded solely to plaintiff, the Court's distribution of marital assets is inequitable 
because 
(a) Plaintiffs net worth is $436,000 higher than defendant's - The Court's distribution 
of assets results in plaintiffs net worth being $435,881 higher than defendant's net worth l The net 
worth of each party is summarized in the financial statements, Ex "B", and is illustrated in the chart, 
Ex "C" to Shields letter 
(b) Plaintiffs earnings are much higher than defendant's - Plaintiffs prospective 
earnings after distribution are much higher than defendants because 
1
 On page 2 Shields summarizes the net worth following the Court's distribution of assets 
as follows 
Plaintiff $ 1,740,729 
Defendant 1.304.848 
Excess amount to plaintiff $ 435.881 
2 
(1) Plaintiffs free cash flow - Using Dorton's conservative computations, even 
after providing funds for expansion, including such things as buying new equipment, providing 
additional working capital, etc for Codale, plaintiffs free cash flow will exceed $400,000 in 1995 
and $900,000 by the year 20042 Even if defendant were to invest her assets less secure investments 
and were able to earn a return of 19% (which is unlikely, but since Dorton used a 19% rate of return, 
to make the figures comparable Ex "D" also uses that rate of return), defendant's income will be 
substantially less than plaintiffs Ex "D" projects the earnings by defendant (Vickie)3 and plaintiff 
(Dale)4 for each of the next 10 years, through the year 2004, and shows the difference in their 
earnings 5 Ex "E" illustrates graphically (I) plaintiffs projected earnings for each of the next 
10 years (large shaded bars above the 0 line), (II) defendants projected earnings (small black bars 
above the 0 line), and (III) the excess of plaintiff s earnings over defendant's earnings (shaded bars 
that are below the 0 line) 
(2) Plaintiffs personal compensation - Dorton used an imputed an annual salary 
to plaintiff of $250,000 to arrive at his $2,800,000 value for Codale However, the Court plaintiffs 
2
 See 3rd full f on page 3 of Shield's letter 
3
 The dollar amount of defendant's projected earnings for each of the next 10 years is shown 
on the line entitled "Annual available Earnings after Tax", which is the bottom line in the section 
of Ex "D" entitled "Vickie Holt" 
4
 The dollar amount of plaintiff s projected earnings for each of the next 10 years is shown 
on the line entitled "Annual Available Earnings After Tax," which is the bottom line in the section 
of Ex "D" entitled "Dale Holt" 
5
 The excess of plaintiff s projected earnings over defendant's projected earnings for each 
of the next 10 years is shown on the line entitled "Vickie Holt's Available Earnings Deficiency 
Relative to Dale Holt's Available Earnings," which is the bottom line on Ex "D" 
3 
current annual salary of only $80,000 to arrive at the amount of alimony and child support 
payments.6 Alimony of $24,000, which means that defendant is to receive about 30% of plaintiff s 
salary in alimony. If the Court considered the $250,000 imputed salary the 30% alimony would be 
$75,000. 
See attached verified Paul Shilds' letter and exhibits thereto. 
6
 The amount of salary drawn by plaintiff from Codale is discretionary. In 1991 plaintiff 
drew a salary of $300,000. 
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February 1, 1995 
Mr. Ronald C. Barker, Esq, 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Re: Holt v . Holt 
Dear Ron: 
RECEIVED 
^ 1 j 19S5 
R0WAL0C BAAKER 
ATTYATLAW 
At your request, I am preparing this correspondence in order 
to transmit the draft narrative for my affidavit. Robert Hunter 
will prepare a separate affidavit which will respond to issues 
relating to tax minimization. 
I. Exclusion of Condominium as a Personal Asset 
At Neilson, Elggren, Durkin & Company's ("NED") request, 
Ronald C. Barker prepared correspondence dated March 22, 1994 
wherein a request for documentation needed to prepare NED's 
valuation report was made. Item no. 16. in this correspondence 
states the following: 
"Summary of and support for total compensation; including 
personal benefits and perks, etc., for officers of Codale 
Electric Supply, Inc., Holt Properties Partnership, and 
Threecom Partnership ("Subject Companies") from FYs 1990 
through 1994. Personal benefits may include, but are not 
limited to, travel, entertainment, meals, transportation, and 
recreation." 
In response to that question we received the document located 
at Exhibit A. Item 16 listed on the schedule is Dale Holt's 
representation of all personal benefits and perks. The only items 
listed are wages, auto expense and health insurance. 
After the trial, we were informed that Dale Holt was living in 
a condominium that was owned by Codale Electric Supply, Inc. 
("Codale") at the time of the trial. It is difficult to envision 
how the condominium represents a valid business asset, and the 
depreciation on this asset a valid business expense. 
If the condominium represents a personal assets from which 
Dale Holt receives personal benefit, as it appears he does, Dale 
did not disclose this information even though it was specifically 
requested by NED. 
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If the condominium represents a personal asset and that 
information would have been disclosed by Dale Holt, the property 
would have been treated as a non-operating asset of the business 
and our appraisal of the business would have been increased by the 
fair market value of the condominium. Defendant's counsel has 
represented to us that the fair market value of the condominium is 
$135,000. Consequently, the NED valuation of $5,400,000 would have 
been increased by $135,000. 
The court has relied on the valuation of plaintiff's expert. 
Plaintiff's expert testified that the value of the business was 
$3,800,000 including goodwill and $2,800,000 excluding goodwill 
(orderly liquidation value). If plaintiff's expert had been aware 
of the condominium and had properly treated this non-operating 
asset in his valuation, the $3,800,000 valuation would also have 
been increased by $135,000 (the fair market value of the 
condominium). 
The $2,800,000 valuation would have been increased by 
$101,000, the difference between the $135,000 fair market value of 
the condominium and the $34,000 orderly liquidation value estimate 
made by the plaintiff's expert. 
II. Inequity of Asset Division and Earnings Stream 
Ordering the defendant to bear 100% of the tax liability 
resulting from the Codale stock redemption creates an inequitable 
division of marital assets. We have illustrated the inequity with 
figures utilized by plaintiff's experts in their proposal to the 
court. 
Exhibit B shows our calculation of the inequity of the marital 
asset division based on the plaintiff's proposal and court ruling. 
Exhibit C is a graphic illustration of the disparity in net worth. 
As can be seen from these exhibits, having to bear the entire tax 
burden resulting from the Codale stock redemption results in 
significantly lower net worth for Vickie Holt ($1,304,848) than for 
Dale Holt ($1,740,729). The affidavit of Robert Hunter outlines 
arguments as to the inequity of Vickie Holt bearing 100% of the tax 
liability. 
More importantly, however, dividing the assets as proposed by 
the court creates significant disparity between the available 
earnings of Vickie and Dale Holt. 
Exhibit D illustrates the disparity in Dale and Vickie Holt's 
available earnings based on figures contained in the plaintiff's 
proposal to the court and the court's rulings. Exhibit E 
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graphically illustrates this same information. The assumptions of 
Exhibit D are detailed on the second page of said exhibit. 
One could argue that the reason Dale Holt has more available 
earnings is because he assumes more risk. Specifically, Dale 
retains the stock of Codale (and the earnings to be generated 
through ownership of this stock), and Vickie invests her earnings 
at a less risky after-tax return of 6%. 
We do not recommend that Vickie Holt assume more risk when 
investing the proceeds she receives from the redemption of Codale 
stock. However, for illustrative purposes, we assume in Exhibit F 
that Vickie receives a 19% rate of return (the same rate of return 
utilized by plaintiff's expert), and then pays a combined federal 
and state tax rate of 35% (the tax rate is higher in this exhibit 
than in Exhibit D because of the assumed higher earnings and the 
progressive tax structure). As can been seen, Vickie still 
receives available earnings which are significantly less than those 
of Dale Holt. The disparity of the second scenario is illustrated 
at Exhibit G. 
This disparity is created for two reasons. First, Vickie has 
not been allowed to share in the available corporate earnings (or 
in this instance, free cash flow) of Codale. These earnings, based 
on the valuation of plaintiff's expert, exceed $400,000 in 1995 and 
$900,000 in the year 2004. Dale receives 100% of these earnings 
because the goodwill has been deemed personal to Dale Holt. It 
should be noted that the earnings figures stated in this paragraph 
represent available earnings after deducting reasonable officer 
compensation. 
Second, the court has found that Dale Holt's annual salary 
from the corporation was $80,000. Of the $80,000, Vickie Holt is 
to receive $24,000, or 30% ($24,000/$80,000) , in the form of 
alimony. However, plaintiff's expert testified that a reasonable 
replacement salary for Dale Holt was approximately $250,000, and 
deducted this amount before establishing the value of Codale stock. 
Consequently, Vickie Holt only receives 9.6% ($24,000/$250,000) of 
the salary which the plaintiff's own expert testified was deducted 
before arriving at the available corporate earnings which were 
discounted in establishing the value of the business including 
goodwill. It should be noted that Dale Holt drew a salary of 
approximately $300,000 in 1991. 
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If you have any questions regarding this analysis, please 
call. 
Sincerely, 
Paul Shields 
enclosures 
cc: Vickie Holt 
. / > > 
SUPPORT FOR AND EXPLANATION OF CODALE'S KEY MAN INSURANCE POLICY 
INCLUDING TYPE OF POUCY, INDIVIDUALS COVERED. BENEFICIARIES, PREMIUMS PAID, 
CASH VALUE. AND SETTLEMENTS FOR FY'S 1990 - 1994 
Individual 
Bushman, John 
Cottrefl, Uoyd 
Earl, Richard 
Fcrrara, Allen 
Holt, Dale 
Holt, Date 
Holt Dale 
Holt, Jay R 
Holt, Jay R 
Pratt, David 
Rosvu.1, Hal 
Wiggins, Steve 
Holt, Dale P 
Holt, Jay R 
Wiggins, Steve 
Type of 
Policy 
Whole Life 
Whole Ufe 
Whole Life 
Whole Ufe 
Whole Life 
Whole Life 
Whole Life 
Whole Ufe 
Whole Ufe 
Whole Ufe 
Whole Ufe 
Whole Ufe 
Whole Ufe 
Whole Ufe 
Whole Ufe 
Policy # 
9236307B 
92363022 
9236293W 
9236317H 
9217405R 
9224920L 
9226201B 
9231506V 
9231510Z 
9236296H 
9236314W 
9231514H 
7525883 
7658075 
7658059 
Premiums Paid 
1/31/91 
$1,282.40 
$788 55 
$1,499 40 
$761.95 
$29,119.16 
$2,922 48 
$14,726.16 
$3,562.74 
$1,152.45 
$723.95 
$2,827.30 
$1,283.76 
$26,630.88 
$2,764.56 
$3,739.80 
Premiums Paid 
1/31/92 
$2,198.40 
$1,351.80 
$2,570 40 
$1,258.20 
$87,357.48 
$2,922.48 
$14,72616 
$4,750.32 
$1,536 60 
$1,258.20 
$4,846 80 
$1,711.68 
$26,630.88 
$2,764.56 
$3,739.80 
Premiums Paid 
1/31/93 
$2,198 40 
$1,351 80 
$2,570 40 
$1,258 20 
$87,357 48 
$2,922 48 
$14,726 16 
$4,750.32 
$1,536 60 
$1,258 20 
$4,346 80 
$1,711 68 
$26,630 88 
$2,764 56 
$3,739 80 
Premiums Paid 
1/31/94 
$2,198 40 
$0 00 
$2,570 40 
$1,258 20 
$87,357 48 
$2,922.48 
$14,72616 
$4,750 32 
$1,536 60 
$1,258.20 
$4 846 80 
$1,711.68 
$26,630 88 
$2,764 56 
$3,739.80 
Cash Value 
3/31/94 
$87,459 00 
$5,601 76 
$8,386.70 
Beneficsanes 
Codaie Eiectnc 
Codale Eiectnc 
Codaie EJectnc 
CodaJe Eiectnc 
D Holt Fam Trust* 
Codale Eiectnc 
CodaieBectnc 
Codaie Eiectnc 
Codale Eiectnc 
Codale Eiectnc 
Codale Eiectnc 
Codaie Eiectnc 
Codale Eiectnc 
Codale Eiectnc 
Codaie Eiectnc 
CODALES' CONTRIBUTIONS TO OFFICERS' PROFIT SHARING PLAN AND 
401 (k) PLAN FOR FTS 1990 -1994. CURRENT BALANCE OF OFFICERS 
PROFIT SHARING PLAN AND 401 (k) PLAN 
ProraSharir>9 Pian^ 
^?« i ia^ l t^«5W^§! 
Dale P. Holt 
Jay R. Holt 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$QM&£Mgl3 sss 
Dale P. Holt 
Jay R. Holt 
$7,979.00 
$4,700.00 
$8,475.00 
$8,475.00 
$5,307.53 
$5,393.94 
$5,359.69 
$4,738.42 
SUMMARY OF AND SUPPORT FOR TOTAL COMPENSATION: INCLUDING PERSONAL BENEFITS 
PERKS, ETC., FOR OFFICERS OF CODALE ELECTRIC SUPPLY, INC., HOLT PROPERTIES 
FROM FY 1990 -1994 ! S S « 8 M i S £ ^ 
Dale P Holt • 12/31/90 
12/31/91 
12/31/92 
12/31/93 
Wages Auto Exp ** Health Insurance 
$323,704.00 $3,540.00 
$282,397.74 $17,668.00 $5,130.00 
$79,730.86 $5,587.50 $5,130.00 
$80,334.17 $10,161.00 $5,130.00 
& 
HOLTv HOLT 
Division of Mantal Assets Based on Court Ruling & Plaintiff's Proposal 
VICKIE HOLT 
Description 
ASSETS 
Cash 
Note receivable • Codaie Electric 
Vehicles 
Personal residence - Bountiful Utah 
Individual retirement account 
401 (k) retirement account 
Retirement plan 
Total Assets 
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY 
income taxes payable - current 
Income taxes payable - deferred 
Total Liabilities 
Vickie Holt net worth 
Total Liabilities and Net Worth 
Amount 
$500 000 
815 634 
19.000 
153.000 
20 323 
89.789 
133.109 
$1 730 855 
$162 238 
263 769 
426.007 
1.304 848 
$1 730 855 
DALE HOLT 
Descnption 
ASSETS 
Investment in Codaie Electric stock 
Investment in Hoit ProDerties 
Note receivable - Holt Properties 
Total Assets 
UABILITIES AND EQUITY 
Income taxes payable - current 
Total Liabilities 
Dale Holt net worth 
Total Liabilities and Net Worth 
Amount 
$1 387 491 
360.488 
16 000 
$1 763.979 
$23 250 
23.250 
1 740 729 
$1 763,979 
Prepared by Neiison Elggren Durking & Co (division wq1) Page 1 of 1 
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HOLT v. HOLT 
Plaintiff's Division of Marital Assets 
Vickie's Net Worth Dale's Net Worth 
tX 
HOLT v HOLT 
Division of Marital Assets 
Based on Court Ruling and Plaintiff's Proposal 
Description 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
VICKIE HOLT 
Annual alimony 
Earnings on note receivable - Codale 
Taxable Income 
Let t Income taxes 
Plus Annual return on tax-free Investment 
Annual Available Earnings After Tax (note 2) 
$24,000 
31.719 
$24,000 
15,225 
$24,000 $24,000 $24,000 $24,000 $24,000 $24,000 $24,000 $24,0 
55,719 
(11.144) 
21,645 
$66,221 
39.225 
(5.884) 
38.201 
$71,543 
24,000 
(2.400) 
53,378 
$74,978 
i 
24,000 
(2,400) 
53,378 
^74,978 
24,000 
(2,400) 
53,378 
$74^978 
24,000 
(2.400) 
53,378 
$74,978 
24,000 
(2,400) 
53,378 
$74,978 
1
 - >'• ' • ' • ' ' ' " 
24,000 
(2.400) 
53,378 
$74,978 
24,000 
(2.400) 
53.378 
$74,978 
24,0( 
(2.4v 
53,31 
$74,97 
DALE HOLT 
Dale Holt salary (note 1) 
Alimony payment 
Dale Holt's 97 6% pro rata share of 
Codale after tax free cash flow (note 1) 
Taxable Income 
Less Income taxes 
Less Non deductible expenses (child support) 
$250,000 
(24,000) 
$262,500 
(24,000) 
$275,625 
(24,000) 
$289,406 
(24,000) 
$303,877 
(24.000) 
$319,070 
(24,000) 
$335,024 
(24,000) 
$351,775 
(24,000) 
$369,364 
(24,000) 
$387,83 
(24,00 
408,554 
634,554 
(285.549) 
(11,256) 
479,021 
717,521 
(322,884) 
(11.256) 
555.539 
807,164 
(363,224) 
(11.256) 
638,792 
904,198 
(406,889) 
(11.256) 
729,170 
1,009,047 
(454,071) 
(11,256) 
765,628 
1,060,698 
(477,314) 
(11,256) 
803,909 
1,114,933 
(501.720) 
(11,256) 
844,105 
1,171,880 
(527,346) 
(11.256) 
886,310 
1,231,674 
(554,253) 
(11,256) 
930,62 
1,294,45 
(582,5' 
< 1 U 
Annual Available Earnings After Tax (note 2) $337,749 $383,381 $432,684 $486.053 $543.720 $572,128 $601,957 $633,278 $666,165 $700,69 
Vickie Holt's Available Earnings Deficiency 
Relative to Dale Holt's Avaiable Earnings ($271,528) ($311,838) ($357,707) ($411,075) ($468,742) ($497,150) ($528,979) ($558,300) ($591,187) ($625,711 
dT-
• > 
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HOLTv HOLT 
Division of Marital Assets 
Based on Court Ruling and Plaintiff's Proposal 
Description 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
ASSUMPTIONS 
(note 4) 
1994 
Vickie Holt tax rate 
Dale Holt tax rate 
Vickie Holt annual return on investment 
Interest rate on note receivable Codale 
Dale Holt salary growth rate 
Redemption prooeedft to Vickie Holt 
Balance on note receivable - Codale 
Date remption payment begins 12/2/94 (note 3) 
$337,702 
20 00% 
45 00% 
6 00% 
4 00% 
5 00% 
$275,933 
$815,634 
15 00% 
45 00% 
6 00% 
4 00% 
5 00% 
$275,933 
$407,817 
10 00% 
45 00% 
6 00% 
5 00% 
10 00% 
45 00% 
6 00% 
5 00% 
10 00% 
45 00% 
6 00% 
5 00% 
10 00% 
45 00% 
6 00% 
5 00% 
10 00% 
45 00% 
6 00% 
5 00% 
10 00% 
45 00% 
6 00% 
5 00% 
10 00% 
45 00% 
6 00% 
5 00% 
10 OC 
45 0C 
6 0C 
5 
NOTES 
Dale Holt's salary and Codale after tax free cash flow are based on David Dorton's valuation report and trial testimony The figure has been reduced to reflect 
Dale Holt's 97 6% ownership in Codale It should be noted that this figure, which is significantly lower than Codale's projected net income, represents actual 
cash which, as the plaintiff s expert represented, is available for distribution to shareholders While we do not recommend nor anticipate that Codale will 
dividend all net free cash flow in the year it becomes available, we have assumed dividends equal to net free cash flow to shareholders in order to illustrate 
that, even under this unfavorable scenario from a tax standpoint, Dale Holt has available earnings which far exceed Vickie Holt's available earnings 
As this analysis illustrates, Vickie Holt's available earnings remain fixed for years beyond 1997 Consequently, the purchasing power of her available earnings 
will reduce each year due to inflation The only exception to this is the retirement account earnings which become available to Vickie once she reaches 59 
and one half years of age However, these earnings will only have a nominal impact in equalizing the disparity in available earnings between the parties 
On the other hand, Dale Holt's available earnings increase dramatically each year Consequently, Dale Holt will suffer no lost purchasing power due to the fact 
that his availble earnings will, at a minimum, keep pace with inflation 
While the December 2, 1994 date has passed, we have decided to use the same assumptions utilized by plaintiff's experts since rolling the dates forward would not 
materially impact the analysis 
All assumptions are taken from the valuation and proposals submitted by plaintiff's experts, and from findings of facts and orders filed by the court The only 
exception is the tax rates for Vickie and Dale Holt The tax rates are only estimates made from limited information, and actual tax rates may vary 
significantly from the estimates Factors such as the nature of the income (e g capital gains or ordinary income), availability of deductions and exemptions, 
and future changes in tax laws will impact the amount of tax actual paid 
^ 
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H O L T v HOLT 
Division of Marital Assets 
Based on Court Ruling and Plaintiff's Proposal 
Description 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 200 
VICKIE HOLT 
Annual al imony 
Earnings on note receivable Codale 
Annual return on investment 
Taxable Income 
Less Income Taxes 
$24,000 $24,000 
31,719 15,225 
(43.492) 
$24,000 $24,000 $24,000 $24,000 $24,000 $24,000 
(56.069) (67,560) (67.560) (67,560) (67,560) (87,560) (67,560) 
$24,000 
(67,560) 
$24 
68.544 
124.263 
120,971 
160,196 
169,029 
193,029 
169,029 
193,029 
169,029 
193,029 
169,029 
193,029 
169,029 
193,029 
169,029 
193,029 
169,029 
193,029 
169 
193 
(67 
Annual Available Earnings After Tax (note 2) $80,771 $104,128 $125,489 $125,489 $125,489 $125,469 $125.469 $125.469 $125,489 $125 
DALE HOLT 
Dale Holt salary (note 1) 
Al imony payment 
Dale Holt 's 97 6% pro rata share of 
Coda le after tax free cash flow (note 1) 
Taxable Income 
Less Income taxes 
Less Non deductible expenses (child support) 
$250,000 $262,500 $275,625 $289,406 $303,877 $319,070 $335,024 $351,775 $369,364 $387 
(24,000) (24,000) (24,000) (24,000) (24,000) (24,000) (24,000) (24,000) (24,000) (24 
408,554 
634,554 
(285,549) 
(11,256) 
479,021 
717,521 
(322,884) 
(11_1256) 
555,539 
807,164 
(363,224) 
(11,256) 
638,792 
904,198 
(406,889) 
(11,256) 
729,170 
1,009,047 
(454,071) 
(11,256) 
765,628 
1,060,698 
(477,314) 
(11,256) 
803,909 
1,114,933 
(501,720) 
(11,256) 
844,105 
1,171,880 
(527,346) 
(11,256) 
886,310 
1,231,674 
(554,253) 
(11,256) 
930 
1,294 
(582 
Annual Available Earnings After Tax (note 2) $337,749 $383.381 $432,684 $486,053 $543,720 $572,128 $601,957 $633,278 $666,165 $700 
Vickie Holt 's Available Earnings Deficiency 
Relative to Dale Holt's Avaiable Earnings ($256,978) ($279,253) ($307,215) ($360.584) ($418,251) ($446.859) ($476.488) ($507,609) ($540,896) ($575 
P, 9o 
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HOLTv HOLT 
Division of Marital Assets 
Based on Court Ruling and Plaintiff s Proposal 
Description 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 20P 
ASSUMPTIONS 
(note 4) 
Vickie Holt tax rate 
Dale Holt tax rate 
Vickie Holt annual return on investment 
Interest rate on note receivable Codale 
Dale Holt Earnings Growth Rate 
Redemption proceeds to Vickie Holt 
Balance on note receivable Codale 
Date remption payment begins 12/2/94 (note 3) 
1994 
$337,762 
35 00% 
45 00% 
19 00% 
4 00% 
5 00% 
$275,933 
$815,634 
35 00% 
45 00% 
19 00% 
4 00% 
5 00% 
$275,933 
$407,817 
35 00% 
45 00% 
19 00% 
5 00% 
35 00% 
45 00% 
19 00% 
5 00% 
35 00% 
45 00% 
19 00% 
5 00% 
35 00% 
45 00% 
19 00% 
5 00% 
35 00% 
45 00% 
19 00% 
5 00% 
35 00% 
45 00% 
19 00% 
5 00% 
35 00% 
45 00% 
19 00% 
5 00% 
35 
45 
19 
5 
NOTES 
Dale Holt's salary and Codale after tax free cash flow are based on David Dorton's valuation report and trial testimony The figure has been reduced to reflect 
Dale Holt s 97 6% ownership in Codale It should be noted that this figure, which is significantly lower than Codale's projected net income, represents actual 
cash which as the plaintiff s expert represented, is available for distribution to shareholders While we do not recommend nor anticipate that Codale will 
dividend all net free cash flow in the year it becomes available, we have assumed dividends equal to net free cash flow to shareholders in order to illustrate 
that, even under this unfavorable scenario from a tax standpoint, Dale Holt has available earnings which far exceed Vickie Holt's available earnings 
As this analysis illustrates, Vickie Holt s available earnings remain fixed for years beyond 1997 Consequently, the purchasing power of her available earnings 
will reduce each year due to inflation The only exception to this is the retirement account earnings which become available to Vickie once she reaches 59 
and one half years of age However, these earnings will only have a nominal impact in equalizing the disparity in available earnings between the parties 
On the other hand Dale Holt s available earnings increase dramatically each year Consequently, Dale Holt will suffer no lost purchasing power due to the fact 
that his availble earnings will at a minimum, keep pace with inflation 
While the December 2, 1994 date has passed, we have decided to use the same assumptions utilized by plaintiff's experts since rolling the dates forward would not 
materially impact the analysis 
All assumptions are taken from the valuation and proposals submitted by plaintiff's experts, and from findings of facts and orders filed by the court The only 
exception is the tax rates for Vickie and Dale Holt The tax rates are only estimates made from limited information, and actual tax rates may vary 
significantly from the estimates Factors such as the nature of the income (e g capital gains or ordinary income), availability of deductions and exemptions, 
and future changes in tax laws will impact the amount of tax actual paid 
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Paul Shields being first duly sworn, on his oath deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. That he is a CPA, employed with Neilson, Elggren, Durkin 
and Co. ; that he testified in the trial of the above-entitled 
matter; and that he is competent to testify as to the matters 
stated herein. 
2. That he has read the foregoing and is familiar with each 
of the statements contained therein; that each of said statements 
are true; except for statements made on information and belief, and 
as to each such statement he believes it to be true. 
DATED this 1st day of February, 1995. 
Paul Shields, CPA 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, a notary public residing in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah by Paul Shields, who is personally 
known to me, this 1st day of February, 1995. 
* - ™"""™ ~ 0 ^ W PUBLIC"8* " L f) s~) /)* Q 
CONNIE CALLRED D L^v^vuc^ (J , ^ £ £ W ( 
Neilson, Elggren, Durkin & Co. . u ^ ^ a > - „ D n K i \ r* X 
77west200south \ N o t a r y P u b l i c 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 . 
My Commission Expires 11/25/98 I 
•-% J—» 
TabC 
EXCLUDED AS NOT MATERIAL TO WRIT 
TabD 
EXCLUDED AS NOT MATERIAL TO WRIT 
TabE 
EXCLUDED AS NOT MATERIAL TO WRIT 
TabF 
EXCLUDED AS NOT MATERIAL TO WRIT 
TabG 
EXCLUDED AS NOT MATERIAL TO WRIT 
TabH 
EXCLUDED AS NOT MATERIAL TO WRIT 
Tab I 
EXCLUDED AS NOT MATERIAL TO WRIT 
Tab J 
REPRESENTATIVE HAYMAN. Thank you Mr. Speaker. Fellow members of the 
House, it is a pleasure to stand before you and present House Bill 36, which is a bill thai 
was the outgrowth of the three (3) year taskforce on divorce, child custody and visitation. 
And the bill was written and passed this body last year. And was not able tc get out of the 
Senate on the last night at five (5) minuets to twelve (12). The Bill really has been put 
together on the basis of taking case law that exists in the Stare and codifying it into a 
formal statement on how to handle alimony. Currently under the law right now a person 
can get a ruling on alimony at one end of the State and yet have another ruling at another 
place. So, people cannot, in essence, determine whether they are going to get the same 
conditions, whether they're in Provo, or Logan or in Salf Lake because people use certain 
parts of the code .. (summary of provisions) 
Now those are the main issues that have been codified into the Bill Now I say to 
you that depending upon where you are in the State some or all of those could be acted 
upon by the Judge This provides that all of them are in one place so the rules are set in 
handling alimony. The taskforce that dealt with this issue, put as its priority was to 
establish a way to help children And this Bill, bills dealing with child support, bills dealing 
with education of those divorcing, were trying to reduce the negativeness that enters into 
divorce and to spare children from the impact. This here formalizes the alimony process 
and people going m know pretty well what there going to get prior to going to the court, 
where today they don't know and it depends on who got the... (recording interrupted) 
SPEAKER* Where arc you9 Apparently your time expired. 
REPRESENTATIVE HAYMAN Thank you. That's my summery. 
APPENDIX "J" 
TabK 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.4, enacted by L. ment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "base 
1989, ch. 214, i 6; 1994, ch. 118, § 6. combined child support obligation" for "child 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- support award." 
78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed in-
come. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, 
except under Subsection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, 
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, 
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, 
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment 
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from 
"nonmeans-tested" government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one 
full-time job. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training 
Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance; 
and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall 
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employ-
ment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses 
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to 
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to 
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the 
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross 
receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the 
amount of business income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual 
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly 
income. 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each 
parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and 
complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year unless the 
court finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of 
income from records maintained by the Office of Employment Security 
may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax 
returns. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether 
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection 
(7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates 
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, 
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community. 
APPENDIX "K" 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at 
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week To impute a 
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer 
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to 
the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents'minor children 
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can 
earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he 
cannot earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to 
establish basic job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the 
custodial parent's presence in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the 
subject of a child support award nor benefits to a child in the child's own 
right such as Supplemental Security Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a 
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning 
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation 
of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered as 
income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
History: C. 195S, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, i 5; 1994, ment, effective July 1,1994, rewrote Subsection 
ch. 118, § 7. (5)(b). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Deductible expenses 
Findings by court. 
Imputed income 
Soaal Security benefits 
Cited 
Deductible expenses. 
The allocation of expenses cannot be dealt 
with as a matter of lav, under this section, the 
deductibility of particular expenses poses a 
question of fact, turning on whether such ex-
penses are necessary and, if so, whether they 
exceed those required for the business'6 opera-
tion at a reasonable level Bingham v 
Bingham, 872 P2d 1065 (Utah Ct App 1994) 
Findings by court. 
Although a tnal court entered findings re-
quired b> Subsection 7(b), since the trial court 
failed to enter an} findings required under 
Subsection (7Xa), the findings on the whole 
*ere insufficient Hall \ Hall, 858 P2d 1018 
(Utah Ct App 1993) 
Imputed income. 
Even though the court's findings of fact did 
not mclude a specific finding that ex-husband 
was underemployed, because he had acquiesced 
to the imputation of income at the tnal level 
and because his job history and current employ-
ment options inarguabi} supported this impu-
tation, the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in imputing income in an amount greater 
than the ex-husband'6 current salarj Hill v 
Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah Ct App 1993) 
Social Security benefits. 
A trial court may, in its discretion, consider a 
child's receipt of Soaal Security benefits 
against the parent's child support obligation 
However, a tnal court ma> not order that those 
Social Secunty benefits be subject to legal pro-
cess Nunle} \ Brooks, 881 P2d 955 (Utah Ct 
App 1994) 
Cited in Cummings v Cummings, 821 P2d 
472 (Utah Ct App 1991) 
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TabM 
78-45-7.21. Award of tax exemption for dependent chil-
dren. 
(1) No presumption exists as to which parent should be awarded the right to 
claim a child or children as exemptions for federal and state income tax 
purposes. Unless the parties otherwise stipulate in writing, the court or 
administrative agency shall award in any final order the exemption on a 
case-by-case basis. 
(2) In awarding the exemption, the court or administrative agency shall 
consider: 
(a) as the primary factor, the relative contribution of each parent to the 
cost of raising the child; and 
(b) among other factors, the relative tax benefit to each parent. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), the court or administrative agency may 
not award any exemption to the noncustodial parent if that parent is not 
current in his child support obligation, in which case the court or administra-
tive agency may award an exemption to the custodial parent. 
(4) An exemption may not be awarded to a parent unless the award will 
result in a tax benefit to that parent. 
History: C. 195S, 78-45-7.21, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 118,6 23 
1994, ch. 118, ( 22. makes the act effective on July 1,1994. 
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EXHIBITS 
CODALE ELECTRIC 
PROJECTED INCOME STATEMENTS 
(in SOOO'S) 
For Year Encing January 31: 
SALES 
COST OF SALES 
GROSS PROFIT 
OPERATING EXPENSES: 
Officers' Compensation ~ 
Rent Expense 
Other General & Administrative Expense 
Selling Expense 
Warehouse Expense 
Delivery Expense 
Data Processing Expense 
Bad Debt Expense 
Depreciation 
Amortization 
TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES 
INCOME FROM OPERATIONS 
INTEREST EXPENSE 
RETIREMENT PLAN CONTRIBUTIONS 
OTHER INCOME 
EARNINGS BEFORE TAX r>°v? " 
INCOME TAX =- ,* -: 
NET INCOME 
1995 
35,583.9 
29,107.6 
6,476.3 
384.1 
336.0 
633.6 
2,562.0 
700.5 
28^.7 
308.3 
71.2 
177.9 
69.4 
5,527.6 
948.7 
76.0 
84.5 
104.0 
892.1 
332.8 
559.4 
1S96 
38.074.S 
31,145.2 
6.929.6 
403.3 
336.0 
665.2 
2,741.4 
735.5 
304.6 
323.7 
76.1 
190.4 
69.4 
5,845.6 
1,084.0 
76.0 
88.8 
109.1 
1,028.4 
383.6 
644.8 
1997 
40,740.0 
33,325.3 
7,414.7 
423.5 
336.0 
698.5 
772.3 
325.9 
339.9 
81.5 
203.7 
69.4 
6,183.9 
1,230.8 
76.0 
93.2 
114.6 
1,176.2 
438.7 
737.5 
1998 
43,591.8 
35,658.1 
7,933.7 
444.6 
336.0 
733.4 
3.138.6 
810.9 
348.7 
356.9 
87.2 
218.0 
69.4 
6,543.7 
1,390.0 
76.0 
97.8 
120.3 
1,336.5 
498.5 
838.0 
1999 
46.643.3 
36.154.2 
8.489.1 
466.9 
336.0 
770.1 
3.356.3 
851.4 
373.1 
374.7 
223.2 
69 4 
6,926.5 
1.562.6 
76.0 
102.7 
126.4 
1,510.2 
563.2 
946.9 
ADJUSTMENTS TO ARRIVE AT NET 
FREE CASH FLOW TO SHAREHOLDERS: 
Add: Depreciation 
Adc: Amortization 
Subtract: Capital Expenditures 
Subtract Noncompete Payments 
Subtract. WorKing Capital Requirements '* 
TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS 
NET FREE CASH FLOW ~ " r ' -
177.9 
69 4 
(204.4) 
(20.0) 
(163.7) 
(140.8) 
418.6 
190.4 
69.4 
(218.7) 
(20.0) 
(175.2) 
(154.1) 
490.8 
203.7 
69.4 
(234.0) 
(20.0) 
(187.4) 
(168.3) 
569.2 
218.0 
69.4 
(250.4) 
(20.0) 
(200.5) 
(183.5) 
654.5 
232.2 
69 4 
(267.9' 
(20 0 
(214 c 
(199.9: 
747.1 
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EXHIBITS 
(continued) 
CODALE ELECTRIC 
ASSUMPTIONS TO PROJECTED INCOME STATEMENTS 
1. Sales are assumed to grow at a compound annual rate of7 0% from the fiscal 1994 figure 
of $33,256,000 This projected growth is consistent with the average compound annual 
sales growth rate projected by Value Line Investment Survey for a group of 21 publicly 
traded electrical equipment manufacturers, as well as for a smaller group of six electrical 
equipment distributors. 
2. Cost of sales is assumed to remain constant at the adjusted fiscal 1994 figure of 82 09c 
of sales Adjusted cost of sales has been determined by adding to actual cost of sales an 
amount to adjust LIFO inventory cost of sales to FIFO cost of sale* It should be noted 
that the Company's adjusted cost of sales as a percent of sales increased significant!} over 
the fiscal 1990-94 period (from 79.4% in fiscal 1990 to 81 8% in fiscal 1994), with a 
corresponding decline in gross margin (from 20.6% in 1990 to 18 2% in 1994) 
3. Officers' compensation is assumed to grow at a compound annual rate of 5.0% from the 
fiscal 1994 adjusted figure of $365,800. 
4. Rent expense is assumed to remain constant at a rate of $28,000 per month (or $336,000 
per year), in accordance with the lease agreement on the Company's operating facilities 
with Holt Properties. 
5. Other general and administrative expenses are assumed to grow at a compound annual rate 
of 5.0% from the fiscal 1994 adjusted figure of $603,400 (den\ed b> subtracting key-man 
insurance premiums of $87,400 from unadjusted other general and administrative expenses 
of $690,800) 
6. Selling expenses are assumed to remain constant at the fiscal 1994 figure of 7.2% of 
sales. 
7. Warehouse expense is assumed to grow at a compound annuJ rate of 5.0% from the 
fiscal 1994 figure of 5667,100. 
8. Deliver} expense is assumed to remain constant at 0.8% of bak^ This figure is consistent 
with that experienced by the Company in each of the fiscal \ears 19^3 and 1994. as well 
as with the average figure experienced over the entire 1990-9- period 
9. Data processing expense is assumed to grow at a compound annual rate of 5 0% from the 
fiscal 1994 ftglire of $293,600 
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EXHIBIT 3 
(continued) 
CODALE ELECTRIC 
ASSUMPTIONS TO PROJECTED INCOME STATEMENTS 
10. Bad debt expense is assumed to remain constant at the fiscal 1990-94 average figure of 
0.27c of sales. 
11. Depreciation expense is assumed to remain constant at 0.57c of sales. This figure is 
consistent with that experienced by the Company in each of the fiscal years 1991 through 
1993, as well as with the average figure experienced over the entire 1990-94 period. 
12. Amortization expense is assumed to be $69,400 in each of the five fiscal years 1995 
through 1999. Goodwill has been almost completely amortized, with only $5,800 
remaining on the books as of January 31, 1994. Consequently, the only unamortized asset 
remaining is the covenant not to compete, which will be amortized over the next fi\e 
years in the amount of 569,400 per year. 
13. Interest expense is assumed to remain constant at an average cost of debt (interest rate) 
of 8.07c of total interest-bearing debt as of January 31, 1994 of $949,700. This 
assumption implicitly assumes that the Company's debt load will remain constant over 
the forecast period at the January 31, 1994 figure of $949,700 (e.g., it assumes that the 
Company will neither increase or retire any interest-bearing debt, but will refinance or 
rollover existing debt when it becomes due at the same rate of 8.07c. 
14. Retirement plan contributions are assumed to grow at a compound annual rate of 5.07c 
from the fiscal 1994 figure of 580,500. 
15. Other income is assumed to grow at a compound annual rate of 5.0*3: from the fiscal 1994 
figure of 599.000. 
16. Projected before-tax earnings are assumed taxable at a combined corporate federal and 
state income tax rate of 37.37c. 
17. Depreciation and amortization expense, being non-cash expenditures, are added back to 
projected net income in each year in arriving at net free cash flow available to be paid 
out as dividend* to shareholders. 
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EXHIBIT 3 
(continued) 
CODALE ELECTRIC 
ASSUMPTIONS TO PROJECTED INCOME STATEMENTS 
18. Capital expenditures are assumed to grow at a compound annual rate of 7.0% from the 
fiscal 1993 figure of $191,000 This growth rate is consistent with the projected growth 
rate of sales The fiscal 1994 capital expenditure figure of $552,800 was inordinately 
high because of the unusually large equipment and furniture purchases made by the 
Company as a result of its relocation to its new operating facilmes, coupled with an 
upgrade of the Company's computer system: consequently, the fiscal 1993 figure was 
deemed to be more representative as a normalized base figure. For informational 
purposes, capital expenditures were $190,000 in fiscal 1990, $111,600 in fiscal 1991, and 
$173,600 in fiscal 1992. Projected capital expenditures are subtracted from projected net 
income in each year in arriving at net free cash flow available to be paid out as dividends 
to shareholders. 
19. Payments * ill be made on the covenant not to compete in the amount of $20,000 per year 
for each of trie next five years These payments are subtracted from projected net income 
in each year in arriving at net free cash flow available to be paid out as dividends to 
shareholders. 
20. It is assumed that the Company will require additional working capital increases of 7.0% 
per year from the fiscal 1994 combination of accounts receivable, inventory, accounts 
payable, and accrued expenses. In other words, it is assumed that the January 31, 1994 
balances of accounts receivable of $4,711,600, inventories of $2,270,000, accounts payable 
of $3,384,300, and accrued expenses of $1,258,700 will each increase by 1.0% per year. 
The result is an increase of 1.09c per year from the net combination of these four accounts 
of $2,338,600. These required additions to working capital are subtracted from projected 
net income in each year in arriving at net free cash flow available to be paid out as 
dividends to shareholders. 
TabO 
to read as follows (the underscored portions are the changes): 
"Said amounts consider only Codale's excess (available 
cash, which is in addition to the $4,916,100.002 (this 
See Ex #3, page 47 of plaintiffs valuation expert, which is trial exhibit #21, entitled "Codale Electric Projected 
Income Statements" for the years 1995 through 1999 Five lines from the bottom is a line entitled "Subtract Capital 
Expenditures" which shows the amount deducted from Codale"s earnings for each year to provide for purchase of new 
equipment and other capital expenditures and three lines from the bottom is a line entitled "Subtract Working Capital 
Requirements/ which shows the amount deducted from Codale s earnings for each \ ear to provide additional working capital 
to permit Codale to expand Plamtiffs expert proiected those amounts forward 5 years The followmg schedule summarizes 
those projections and includes a projection for 10 years, using plamtiffs method of projection 
Column (1) shows the line number column (2) shows the year, column (3) shows the portion of projected profits set 
aside for capital improvements column (4) shows the portion of the profits set aside for additional workmg capital, column 
(5) shows the free cash flow available to stockholders after providing for Codale's expansion, and column (6) shows the total 
funds available from projected profits, including funds available for expansion and stockholders 
Line (10) shows 10 year totals Line (12) shows plamtiffs 97 6% of Codale's projected increase m net work over 
the next 10 years 
[ Line 
1 J 
2 J 
1 3 1 
1 4 1 
1 5 1 
1 6 1 
[ 7 J 
1 8 
1 9 
J 10 
1 11 
1 12 
1 Year 
1995 J 
1996 J 
1997 J 
1998 J 
1999 J 
2000 1 
J 2001 J 
J 2002 J 
1 2003 
2004 J 
J Total 
J Capital Expenditures 
$204,400 00 
218,700 00 
234,000 00 
250,400 00 
267,900 00 
281,300 00 
295,400 00 
310,100 00 
1 325,600 00 
341,900 00 
$2 729,700 00 
Working Capital 
$163,700 00 
175,200 00 
187,400 00 
200,500 00 
214,600 00 
225,330 00 
236 600 00 
248,400 00 
260,800 00 
273,900 00 
$2 186,430 00 
Free Cash Flow ] 
$418,600 00 1 
490,800 00 1 
569,200 00 J 
654,500 00 J 
747,100 00 J 
784,500 00 J 
823,700 00 J 
864,900 00 1 
908,100 00 J 
953,500 00 
$7,214 900 00 
Total \ 97 6% = Plaintiff s increase in net worth 
Totals 1 
1 $786,700 00 1 
884,700 00 1 
990,600 00 1 
1,105,400 00 J 
1,229,600 00 J 
1,291,130 00 J 
1,355,700 00 J 
1,423,400 00 1 
1,494,500 00 J 
1,569,300 00 J 
1 $12,131,030 00 I 
[ $11 839 900 00 | 
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I. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 
Utah Code §78-2-a-3 (2) (I) as an appeal from a final judgment 
regarding alimony, child support and marital estate distribution in 
a divorce decree entered by the Second Judicial District Court. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Relative to the issues of payment of attorney's fees and 
experts' fees, Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 (as amended, 1993) is 
attached as Exhibit 1. Relative to the issues of alimony, child 
support and division of the marital assets, Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5 
(eff. May 2, 1994) is attached as Exhibit 2. Relative to the issue 
of gross income of a spouse, Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5 (eff. July 
1, 1994) is attached as Exhibit 3. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On April 16, 1993, Dale Holt ("Mr. Holt") filed a 
Complaint for Divorce. (Record. 1-6) ("Record" hereinafter 
referred to as "R."). On May 13, 1993, Vickie L. Holt ("Mrs. 
Holt") filed a Verified Answer and Counterclaim for Divorce. (R. 
8-19). Temporary Orders were entered by the Court regarding 
custody, visitation, and child support in the amount of $1,423.00 
and alimony in the amount of $600.00 by Minute Entry dated June 9, 
1993. (R. 35). Discovery was conducted by the parties. On 
1 
October 27, 1993, additional temporary Orders reducing child 
support from $1,400 to $938 based upon Nicholas Holt, the parties' 
oldest son, residing with Mr. Holt were entered by the Court, with 
a denial of Mrs. Holt's Motion to Increase of Alimony. (R. 111-
113). A pre-trial conference was held January 20, 1994, at which 
time Mrs. Holt's request for $20,000 in temporary attorney's fees 
was denied except in the amount of $3,000 and a three day trial was 
scheduled for June 1, 1994. (R. 210). From June 13 to June 15, 
1994, a trial was held before the Honorable Brent W. West, Second 
District Court Judge presiding; the Court immediately granted Mr. 
Holt a divorce, ruled on custody and visitation and reserved all 
economic issues for further consideration. (R. 240-243). On 
August 3, 1994, the Court entered its Ruling awarding alimony, 
dividing the marital estate, awarding tax exemptions and fees, and 
requesting the parties to present proposed buy-out plans for 50% of 
the Codale Stock awarded to Mrs. Holt. (R. 282-287; attached as 
Exhibit 4). Mr. Holt filed his Motion to Clarify, Supplement 
and/or Reconsider Findings, submitting a plan for redeeming Mrs. 
Holt's Codale Electric stock. (R. 298-99). Mrs. Holt filed a 
Motion to Correct Ruling and to Distribute Additional Assets for 
New Trial. (R. 304-345). Both Motions were heard November 4, 1994 
by the Court. On January 4, 1995, the Court entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the June 13-15, 1994 Trial and 
November 5, 1994 Hearing on Post-Trial Motions (R. 354-66; attached 
2 
as Exhibit 5) and the Order and Judgment (R. 367-376; attached as 
Exhibit 6). On January 20, 1995, the Court entered an Order on 
Post Trial Morions (R. 386-91; attached as Exhibit 7). On February 
2, 1995, Mrs. Holt filed a voluminous Rule 59 Motion and Memorandum 
(100 pages) to Alter, or Amend Findings, Conclusions, Order and 
Judgment, to Distribute Additional Assets or for a New Trial, 
containing multiple Affidavits and Exhibits. (R. 400-513; Motion 
attached as Exhibit 8, without Memorandum in Support). On March 7, 
1995, Mrs. Holt filed her Notice of Appeal. (R. 514-16). On March 
21, 1995, the Court entered its Order on Post Trial Motions denying 
all relief requested by Mrs. Holt. (R. 540-41; attached as Exhibit 
9). On April 7, 1995, Mr. Holt filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal. 
(R. 543). The Court of Appeal entered a dismissal of Mrs. Holt's 
Appeal. (R. 547). On April 20, 1995, Mrs. Holt filed an Amended 
Notice of Appeal. (R. 548). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Dale and Vickie Holt were married on December 2, 
1972, and were separated in February of 1993. ("Transcript" 36, 
hereinafter " T H ) . They are the parents of three minor children, 
the oldest of whom was living with Dale at the time of the trial; 
the two younger children live with Ms. Holt. 
2. Pursuant to the temporary order of the Court, Dale 
Holt paid to the Plaintiff temporary support of $938.00 for child 
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support and $600.00 for alimony. (R. 111-113). Mrs. Holt resided 
in the marital residence which has no mortgage. 
3. Ms. Holt was a homemaker during the marriage, was 
not employed, and no income was imputed to her by the trial court. 
Both parties were in their forties at the time of trial. (Finding 
23) . 
4. Mr. Holt is the president and owner of 97.6 percent 
of the shares of Codale Electric Company ("Codale"). (Finding 15). 
Codale is a distributor of a wide range of electrical products; its 
primary location is Salt Lake City, Utah. Codale had no employment 
or non-compete restriction with Mr. Holt. 
5. The parties stipulated as to the value of all of the 
marital assets, with the exception of an MG automobile and the 
value of their stock in Codale. (Finding 17). 
6. As President of Coddle, Dale Holt had W-2 income 
(including taxable income related to company cars and travel 
awards) of $79,731 in 1992 (T. 76), and $80,334 in 1993 (T. 77). 
He testified that his income in 1994 would be approximately the 
same as the prior year (T. 77). In 1990 and 1991, he withdrew from 
the corporation additional income, which was used to purchase the 
property upon which the office building currently housing Codale 
and which is represented by the value of Holt Properties 
Partnership. (T. 130-131) 
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7. The trial court found that, during the last few 
years of the marriage of the parties, they expended between $3f800 
and $4,200 per month for the entire family of five for all expenses 
including car payments and entertainment; the Court further found 
that the lifestyle of the parties was geared to Mr. Holt's gross 
annual paid income of approximately $80,000 per year (Finding 24). 
Mrs. Holt testified that, during the lengthy period of separation 
during which she was receiving $1,538 per month of temporary 
support, she did not incur any additional debt (T. 524). The 
parties had no marital debt as of the trial. The house in which 
the parties resided was relatively modest, being valued at the 
stipulated amount of $153,000. (Finding 17). 
8. Plaintiff and Defendant each had an expert witness 
testify with regard to the valuation of the stock of Codale 
Electric Supply, Inc. Mr. Paul Shields testified on behalf of 
Vickie Holt and valued the interest of the parties at $5.4 million 
dollars (T. 392). He acknowledged that, after reviewing the 
valuation report of Mr. Dave Dorton, Mr. Holt's expert, that he had 
made an error in his initial calculation in the sum of $500,000 or 
$600,000 (T. 30-31). Mr. Shields testified that his valuation was 
dependent upon the business continuing as it had, with Mr. Holt 
actively involved (T. 387). He acknowledged that the value of 
Codale would be significantly decreased if Mr. Holt did not work 
for the company, or if he did not enter into a non-competition 
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agreement on the sale of the shares (T. 387). He was unable to put 
a value on the company in either of those eventualities. He 
testified that if Mr. Holt were to compete with Codale, an 
appropriate value for Codale would be its net tangible assets (T. 
386-87) . Mr. Shields agreed that the book value of the company was 
$3.3 million dollars, and that figure assumed a sale of all the 
inventory. (T. 18-19). 
9. Mr. Dave Dorton, expert witness for the Defendant, 
testified that the orderly liquidation value of Codale was $3.2 
million dollars. (T. 183). He further testified that the company 
had one million dollars of good will, but that the entire amount of 
good will was personal to Mr. Holt. (T. 198). Mr. Dorton stated 
that Mr. Holt was the key employee, which was also reiterated by 
Mr. Shields. Mr. Dorton testified that in the absence of Dale Holt 
working in the business, liquidation value of the company would be 
the most appropriate measure of value which he stated as $2.8. 
10. Mr. Dorton's testimony was consistent with the 
testimony of Mrs. Holt's expert, Mr. Shields, who also agreed that 
the valuation of the company depended upon the actions of Dale 
Holt. Mr. Shields admitted that, if Mr. Holt left the company, it 
would destroy both the personal and business good will. According 
to Mr. Shields, it could take "forever" to derive $5.4 million 
dollars from the sale of the company without Mr. Holt. (T. 397). 
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He admitted that his valuations never considered the departure of 
Mr. Holt. 
11. Mr. Shields agreed that the best valuation method of 
a company is what a willing buyer would actually be willing to pay 
for the company. (T. 388). The Court received into evidence, 
which was unrefuted, an offer to purchase Codale in the amount of 
$3.3 million dollars, which had been received approximately four 
months prior to the trial. The offer was contingent upon the 
continued association of Dale Holt. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 14; T. 
74-75). 
12. The Court heard testimony regarding the tax 
implication of the distribution of the marital estate. Mr. Robert 
Hunter, a CPA testifying on behalf of Ms. Holt, stated that a 
taxable event would be triggered when the assets were actually 
sold. (T. 313). The only possible way to escape ever having to 
pay capital gains tax on the sale of the Codale stock would be if 
Mr. Holt never sold it, and left it to his children (T. 352). 
13. After trial, the court entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of law (R. 354-66; Ex.5), Order and Judgement (R. 367-
376; Ex. 6) awarding each party 50% of the marital estate, awarding 
Mrs. Holt $2,000 per month alimony terminable on death, remarriage 
or cohabitation and ordering Mr. Holt to pay $997 per month child 
support. 
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ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON CROSS APPEAL 
Did the District Court err, as a matter of law, by 
awarding alimony to the Defendant in the amount of $2,000 per month 
where there is no factual basis for a requisite finding of need. 
Cross-Appellant does not challenge the Findings of Fact of the 
Court with regard to the alimony issue, but rather challenges the 
Court's Conclusion of Law that there is a sufficient legal basis 
for its award of alimony. The trial court's Conclusions of Law in 
civil cases are reviewed for correctness, meaning that no 
particular deference is given to the trial court's ruling on 
questions of law. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); 
Klinger v. Rightly, 791 P.2d 868, 879 (Utah 1990). 
ARGUMENT ON CROSS APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE RECEIVING SPOUSE MUST ESTABLISH NEED IN 
ORDER TO JUSTIFY AN AWARD OF ALIMONY. 
It is well settled law in the State of Utah that the 
purpose of an award of alimony is to provide the receiving spouse 
with financial support to enable that spouse to enjoy, as nearly as 
possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. In 
establishing an award of alimony, the trial court is obligated to 
consider the financial conditions and needs of the receiving 
spouse, his or her ability to support him or herself, and the 
ability of the paying spouse to provide the support. Jones v. 
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Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). Trial courts have a great 
deal of discretion in setting alimony awards, but the trial court's 
conclusion of law with respect to alimony awards is to be reviewed 
for correctness, with no particular difference being accorded to 
the trial court, Brienholt v. Brienholt, 276 Adv. Rpts. 38, 39 
(Utah Ct. App. October, 1995). 
In making the assessment of need and ability to support 
oneself, it is incumbent upon the trial court to take into 
consideration the income that a receiving spouse will receive from 
assets that have been awarded to him or her pursuant to the 
division of the marital estate. Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
POINT II 
VICKIE HOLT CANNOT ESTABLISH THE REQUISITE 
NEED TO SUPPORT AN AWARD OF ALIMONY IN THIS 
CASE. 
The trial court found that the expenses of the entire 
Holt family, when all five members where living together were 
between $3,800 and $4,200 per month, which included various 
benefits received by way of Codale Electric Supply, Inc. These 
factual findings were not challenged by Mrs. Holt. The Court 
ordered Mr. Holt to pay child support of $937, leaving Mrs. Holt 
with a net monthly shortfall at most $3,263, which amount does not 
take into consideration the fact that she is supporting three 
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people, not five. The Court further found that the cash payments 
to be made to Mrs. Holt to purchase her interest in Codale could 
return and income, on a tax free basis, of six percent (6%). The 
first payment of $500,000 was to be received within 60 days after 
the entry of the final order. Even assuming a deduction from the 
half million dollar payment of twenty-eight percent (28%) to pay 
her capital gains liability, she would be left with a net payment 
in the first year of $337,762. As demonstrated by the Plaintiff's 
exhibit number P-6 submitted to the Court in the November, 1994 
hearing, by the end of 1996 Mrs. Holt would have tax free interest 
income and tax free child support totalling over $4,100 per month. 
Clearly, if one were to calculate even a twenty percent (20%) 
reduction in the cost of maintaining the standard of living 
attributable to the absence of Mr. Holt and his teenage son from 
the family (an assumption that is, on its face, extremely 
conservative), the award of $2,000 per month permanent alimony far 
exceeds the actual needs of Mrs. Holt. The trial court's award, 
when judged in the light of the Court's own unchallenged findings, 
was clearly erroneous, and should be set aside. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Mrs. Holt fails to marshall the evidence submitted 
by Mr. Holt at trial and is therefore precluded from challenging 
the Findings of Fact. 
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2. The Trial Court heard extensive testimony from Dale 
Holt's expert, David Dorton and Mrs. Holt's expert, Paul Shields, 
regarding valuation of the 97.6% stock ownership of Codale. Mr. 
Holt testified that Codale has no employment or non-compete 
agreement with him, leaving him free to initiate a competing 
business, and further, that the customers of Codale are loyal to 
him and a product of his hard work and personal service. The Court 
accepted the valuation of Mr. Holt's expert of $2.8 for the Codale 
stock, finding that Codale had no "good will". The Court fairly 
and equitably divided the marital assets by giving fifty percent 
(50%) of all assets to each party, and requiring Codale to redeem 
Mrs. Holt's shares of stock by paying her $1,344,509 in three 
installments over a two year period, incurring interest at the rate 
of four percent (4%) per annum. The Court's factual findings are 
well supported by the trial record and its division of marital 
assets is fair and equitable to the parties. Mrs. Holt's appeal 
simple re-argues factual issues decided by the trial court. 
3. After taking into consideration the significant cash 
and property awards to Mrs. Holt, the Court awarded Mrs. Holt 
$2,000 per month alimony based upon Mr. Holt's historical income 
over a five year period of $80,000 per year. Mr. Holt's income was 
determined from the parties' tax return and testimony offered by 
Mr. Holt regarding the 1991 and 1992 contributions to Holt 
11 
Properties Partnership which was effectively divided fifty percent 
(50%) each to Mr. and Mrs. Holt. The Court entered Findings of 
Fact showing it made consideration of all required factors 
regarding alimony. With $2,000 per month alimony, $938 child 
support, and tax free income from the cash received through 
redemption of the Codale stock, Mrs. Holt will receive monthly 
income substantially in excess of the monthly expenses of the 
entire family during the marriage found by the Court to be between 
$3,800 to $4,200 per month. 
4. The Court found no economic need for Mrs. Holt to be 
awarded attorney's fees in light of the substantial property award 
and alimony award. 
ARGUMENT OF APPWT.T.ira 
Mrs. Holt appeals virtually every ruling by the trial 
court in a shotgun approach that immediately raises the specter of 
frivolity and lack of merit. Mrs. Holt generally re-argues her 
entire case and simply requests the Court of Appeals to substitute 
their judgment for that of the trial court on all factual issues. 
In fact, a very significant portion of Mrs. Holt's Brief relies on 
evidence which cannot be considered by the Court of Appeals in that 
the evidence was not submitted at trial but in support of Mrs. 
Holt's post-trial Rule 59 Motion, which was denied. Mr. Holt has 
moved to strike those portions of Mrs. Holt's Brief which refer to 
or rely upon post-trial evidence, a copy of which is attached as 
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Exhibit 10 and is reiterated and incorporated by reference. Mrs. 
Holt fails to marshall the evidence in support of her position that 
the Findings of Fact should be set aside and the myriad of cases 
submitted often support Mr. Holt's position. This Brief shall show 
that Mrs. Holt's Appeal is totally lacking in merit. 
I. 
Mrs. Holt Fails to Marshall the Evidence 
Section 12 of Mrs. Holt's Brief, pages 20-24, entitled 
"Marshalling of Evidence," fails to examine evidence presented at 
trial by Mr. Holt in support of his legal positions and further 
fails to demonstrate the trial Court's error. As stated in 
Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 432 (Utah App. 1994), this 
Court Held: 
To successfully challenge these findings, 
plaintiff "must marshall the evidence in 
support of the findings and then demonstrate 
that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be 
vagainst the clear weight of the evidence,' 
thus making them sclearly erroneous.'" In re 
Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 
1989) (quoting State v. State, 743 P.2d 191, 
193 (Utah 1987)). "If the appellant fails to 
marshall the evidence, the appellate court 
assumes that the record supports the findings 
of the trial court and proceeds to a review of 
the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions 
of law and the application of that law in the 
case". Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 
(Utah 1991). Plaintiff has not properly 
challenged the findings in the instant case. 
We therefore assume that the record support 
the trial court's findings .... 
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II. 
The Property Distribution is Consistent 
With Principals of Dtah Law 
After assigning values to individual assets, including 
valuing Codale Electric Supply Inc. stock at $2,732,000 (Finding 
15, Ex. 5; R. 360) the Court awarded Dale Holt and Vickie Holt 
fifty percent (50%) each of the marital assets as follows (Finding 
18, Ex. 5; R. 361): 
To the Defendant: 
Personal Residence 
IRA Account 
401(k) Retirement Account 
Retirement Plan 
By-out of Codale Shares 
to equalize assets 
Total: 
To the Plaintiff: 
Codale Electric Supply Stock 
Holt Properties Partnership 
Note: Payable 
Total: $1,740,639 
Mr. Holt owned 97.6 percent interest in Codale which 
leases a building and real property from Holt Properties 
Partnership. Mrs. Holt appeals the valuation of Codale stock by 
the trial court despite the valuation being within the range of 
value testified to by the experts. Mrs. Holt appeals the pay-out 
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Order because of the resulting tax consequences, requiring Codale 
to purchase the stock from Mrs. Holt. The clear reality is that 
the Court's property distribution treats the parties equally and 
fairly and equitably divides the marital estate. 
1. Standards of Utah Law. The general guidelines 
a trial court must follow in property distribution are well stated 
in Newmeyer v. Newmever, 745 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1987): 
In making such order, the trial court is 
permitted broad latitude, and its judgment is 
not to be lightly disturbed, so long as it 
exercises its discretion in accordance with 
the standards set by this court. Jones v. 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 10.74 (Utah 1975); see 
Pusev v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah 1986). 
It is therefore incumbent on the appealing 
party to prove that the trial court's division 
violates those standards, (See, e.g. Jones, 
700 P.2d at 1074) or that the trial court's 
Factual Findings upon which the division is 
grounded are clearly erroneous under Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a). 
In Berry v. Berry, 635 P.2d 68 (Utah 1981) the Utah 
Supreme Court further set forth principals: 
There is no fixed formula which a trial judge 
must follow in making a division of 
properties. Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994 (Utah 
1975). It is the prerogative of the court to 
make whatever disposition of property it deems 
fair, equitable and necessary for the 
protection and welfare of the parties. 
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 562 P.2d 235 (Utah 
1977). This division will not be disturbed on 
appeal unless the record shows that there has 
been an abuse of discretion. Jesperson v. 
Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980). 
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2. The Trial Court's Valuation of Codale Stock is 
Within the Range Established by Expert Testimony. This court has 
established clear guidelines for trial court valuation of marital 
assets. In Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 408 (Utah App. 1989), this 
court stated: 
This court's valuation of stock is a factual 
determination. See Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P. 2d 
468f 471 (Utah 1984). Accordingly we review 
the court's findings regarding the valuation 
of stock under the "clearly erroneous" 
standard of Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Under this standard of 
review, Findings of Fact will be set aside 
only if they are "against the clear weight of 
evidence, or if the Appellant court otherwise 
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made." State v. Walker, 743 
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). Weston at p. 410. 
Citing the Supreme Court decision of Newmeyer v. 
Newmeyer, supra, the Weston Court stated: 
"When acting as a trier of fact, the trial 
judge is entitled to give conflicting opinions 
whatever weight she deems appropriate". 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer at 1278; Weston v. Weston 
at 410. So long as the value is within the 
ranges established by expert testimony, the 
appeals court will not overturn the trial 
court's valuation of assets. Weston v. Weston 
at 410; Newmeyer v. Newmeyer at 1278; see 
Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 564 (Utah App. 
1993) Argvle v. Argyle at 471. 
The trial court determined that the 97.6 % of Codale 
stock acquired by Dale Holt during the course of the marriage 
should be valued at $2,732,000. (Finding 15, Ex. 5; R 371). 
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Codale maintains no employment or non-compete agreement with Dale 
Holt and as a result Mr. Holt could cease providing services to 
Codale at any time or start a competing business. In un rebutted 
testimony, Mr. Holt testified that the customers of Codale are 
loyal to him and are comprised of individuals he has attracted 
through years of hard work and personal service. It is his opinion 
that if he chose to open a competing business to Codale, the 
customers would follow him. As a result, David Dorton, Mr. Holt's 
expert testified that the total value of Codale is $2.8 million, 
the liquidation value of the assets. Mr. Dorton further testified 
that the business did not have "good will" since the customer base 
was contingent on Mr. Holt's being employed by Codale. Vickie 
Holt's expert, Paul Shields, testified that the business is valued 
at $5.4, including good will, but admitted on cross examination 
that the value of Codale would be significantly less if Mr. Holt 
ceased to an active participant in Codale but would not arrive at 
a valuation figure. Mr. Shields agreed the book value of the 
company was $3.3 million. The trial court agreed with Dale Holt's 
expert in the valuation. 
Vickie Holt's disputing the trial court's ruling on 
valuation is nothing more than a request that the Court of Appeal 
re-determine a factual issue heard by the trial court. The Utah 
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Supreme Court aptly addressed a similar argument in Newmeyer v. 
Newmever, at 1278, stating: 
This argument like the one that proceeds it is 
nothing but an attempt to have this Court 
substitute its judgment for the of the trial 
court on a contested factual issue. This we 
cannot do under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 52(a) .•. 
It is elementary that a judge is not bound to 
believe one witness's testimony to the total 
exclusion of that of another witness. When 
acting as a trier of fact, the trial judge is 
entitled to give conflicting opinions whatever 
weight he or she deems appropriate, 
(citations omitted). 
3. Codale has No "Good Will" Associated with the 
Business. This court will uphold as is a trial court's 
determination that an on-going business concern does not have good 
will where the trial court's determination is based on the evidence 
proffered. In Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1988), 
the trial court determined that the Defendant husband's hay-hauling 
business did not have good will consistent with the husband's 
expert valuation. Mrs. Stevens appealed. In the process of 
upholding the trial court's ruling, the Court of Appeals defined 
good will as follows: 
Good will is the advantage or benefit which is 
acquired by an establishment, beyond the mere 
value of the capital, stocks, funds or 
property employed therein, in consequence of 
the general patronage and encouragement which 
it receives from constant or habitual 
customers on account of its location or local 
position or reputation for quality, skill, 
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integrity or punctuality. It is something in 
business which gives reasonable expectancy of 
preference in the race of competition. 
Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 85? 415 
P.2d 667, 670 (Utah 1966); see also 38 C.J.S. 
Goodwill, section 1 (1943) ... 
Where appropriate, the good will value of a 
business enterprise is subject to equitable 
distribution. Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 
1076, 1080 n.l (Utah 1988). There can be no 
good will in a business that is dependant for 
its existence upon the individual who conducts 
the enterprise and would vanish were the 
individual to die, retire or quit work. 
Jackson, 18 Utah 2d at 86, 415 P.2d at 670. 
Stevens v. Stevens, at 956. 
The record supports the trial court agreeing with Dale 
Holt's expert that Codale has no good will. See Finding 15, Ex. 5; 
R. 360. Codale has no long term employment or non-compete 
agreement with Mr. Holt and Mr. Holt testified that the customer 
base of Codale is loyal to him and based upon his hard work and 
personals service. If Mr. Holt were to leave, the customers would 
follow him. 
The trial court appropriately determined Codale has no 
good will to distribute as a marital asset consistent with the 
principal stated in Stevens. Accord Sorenson v. Sorenson, 839 P.2d 
774 (Utah 1992). 
4. The Pay Out Ordered on Assets is Consistent 
With Utah Law. In Weston v. Weston, at 410, this Court stated: 
In dividing the martial estate, the trial 
court can enter such orders concerning 
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property distribution and alimony as are 
equitable. Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5 
(1987). "In making such orders, the trial 
court is permitted broad latitude, and its 
judgment is not to be lightly disturbed, so 
long as it exercised its discretion in 
accordance with the standards set by this 
court." Newmeyer. 745 P.2d at 1277; see also 
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
In exercising its broad discretion, the trial 
court may fashion a variety of methods for 
dividing assets. See Naranio v. Naranio, 751 
P.2d 1144, 1147-48 (Utah 1988) There is no 
fixed formula for the division of marital 
property. Berry v. Berry, 635 P.2d 68, 69 
(Utah 1981). Further, M[i]t is the court's 
duty to make a division of the property and 
income in a divorce procedure so that the 
parties may readjust their lives to the new 
situation as well as possible. 
The principal of disentangling the marital relationship 
with respect to joint stock ownership in a closely held corporation 
was set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Argyle v. Argyle, at 471 
when it reiterated an oft-quoted principal: 
Wherever possible, this Court avoids division 
of marital stock between the parties because 
it forces them to be in a "close economic 
relationship which has every potential for 
further contention, friction and litigation, 
especially when third parties having nothing 
to do with the divorce will also necessarily 
be involved", citing Savage v. Savage, 658 
P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah 1983). 
The trial court awarded Mrs. Holt fifty percent (50%) of 
the parties stock acquired during the course of marriage which was 
valued at $1,344,509 and required Codale to redeem the stock or 
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Dale Holt to purchase the stock with an initial payment of $500,000 
sixty days from the entry of the Decree/ payment of an additional 
$422,254 within one year of the first payment and the final 
$422f254 within two years of the initial payment which would bear 
interest at the rate of four percent (4%) per annum. (Order, para. 
17, Ex. 6; R. 395.) Dale Holt and Vickie Holt were each required 
to pay any tax liability associated with the sale of the stock. 
(Order, para. 18, Ex. 6; R. 378-79). The court further ordered the 
parties to submit a plan to acquire the Defendant's one-half 
interest in the shares to minimize the tax consequences as much as 
possible to the Defendant (Order, para 14, Ex. 6; R. 376-77). 
However, Mrs. Holt did not submit an alternative plan post-trial 
and the trial court accepted the proposal submitted by Dale Holt 
(Order on Post-Trial Motions, para 4 and 5, January 20, 1995, Ex. 
7; R. 387). 
In Weston v. Weston, at 411, the court examined the 
awarding and dividing of stocks in a closely held corporation, 
stating; 
Marital assets consisting of stock in a 
closely held family corporation can be 
distributed in divorce proceedings by several 
alternate means, including division of the 
stock, awarding off-setting property, or cash 
payments over time. Citing Lee v. Lee, 744 
P.2d 1378, 1380-81 (Utah App. 1987). 
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The trial court's awarding Mrs, Holt of fifty percent 
(50%) of the Codale stock and requiring purchase over time is 
consistent with principals established by this court. Likewise, 
requiring Mrs. Holt to pay the tax consequences of the distribution 
is fair and equitable. Mr. Holt, in the event he sells his stock, 
will also be liable for tax consequences of the sale of his stock 
and it would be unfair to require him to also bear the burden of 
paying the taxes on the corporation purchasing her stock. In Mrs. 
Holt's Brief, she repeatedly complains that she has not received 
"income producing asset". She in fact is receiving $1,344,509 cash 
from sale of the stock and it is difficult to understand why she 
complains so loudly. 
Mrs. Holt further complains that requiring Codale to only 
pay four percent (4%) interest on the payments due over a two year 
period is a "abuse of discretion". However, the trial court has 
the latitude to make appropriate adjustments in the relationships 
of the parties and make such orders as are fair and equitable given 
the overall distribution plan ordered by the court. The trial 
court may award no interest or interest as is appropriate under the 
circumstances. (Weston v. Weston, supra: no interest for first four 
years, then interest over fifteen years) 
5. Award of Codale Automobiles. Mrs. Hold was awarded 
a 1988 Ford Bronco valued at $8,775 and a 1987 BMW automobile 
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valued at $19,250, both of which were owned by Codale. (Finding 
19, Ex. 5; R. 374). She was required by the trial court to pay 
Codale for both of these automobiles, since she received fifty 
percent (50%) of the value of the corporation and the automobiles 
were carried on the records of the corporation. Requiring Mrs. 
Holt to pay for the automobiles under the circumstances where she 
is receiving fifty percent (50%) of the value of the corporation is 
consistent with an equitable distribution of marital assets between 
the parties where each party. 
6. Claim of Omitted Assets is Spurious. Vickie Holt 
claims that the Oakridge Country Club membership and a condominium 
owned by Codale were omitted from valuation of the assets. 
However, the court received testimony on the Oakridge Country Club 
membership during trial (T. 596) and it was addressed in the court 
findings (Finding 13). Further, in the event that Mrs. Holt's 
expert did fail to identify and address the Oakridge Country Club 
membership during trial, she cannot now be heard to complain for 
the first time on appeal. Regarding the condominium, Dale Holt 
purchased the condominium as a residence after conclusion of the 
trial since he needed a place to live. The marital estate is 
valued at the time of trial. Beraer v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697 
(Utah 1985). The court cannot continually re-evaluate the marital 
estate for months after the divorce trial unless the claim of fraud 
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or concealment from the trial court is alleged. No such 
allegations can be made against Dale Holt since the condo was not 
purchased until after the trial. 
7. Mr. Holt's Expert Valued "Intangible Assets" at 
Zero. The trial court accepted David Dorton's liquidation value 
for Codale, under which "Intangible Assets" were assigned no value. 
(Exhibit P-21, p. 56). By asserting that this Court should award 
her an additional $173,600 as one-half the value of the intangible 
assets of Codale, Mrs. Holt is requesting this Court to substitute 
its judgment on a factual issue for that of the trial court. 
8. The Trial Court Made a Fair and Equitable Division 
of the Marital Estate. Consistent with sound principals of Utah 
case law, the trial court made a fair and equitable distribution of 
the marital assets between Dale Holt and Vickie Holt. The division 
of the marital property awards each4 party one-half of the marital 
estate. The trial court award of assets accomplished the goal of 
re-adjusting lives to a new situation as well as possible. Arovle 
v. Arqyle, at 471. 
III. 
THE ALIMONY AWARD ENABLES MRS. HOLT TO MAINTAIN 
THE STANDARD OF LIVING DURING THE MARRIAGE 
The trial court award of alimony enables Mrs. Holt to 
maintain, and within two years, significantly exceed the standard 
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of: living to which she was accustomed during her marriage to Dale 
ill'i'i I! I  T l i I i I 11 I in i I II i n n il I liiiiii I ! hi | i i i i" I M; !s I'liniid, b e e n rum if \ LK-'L'I 
twenty-three years and thai Vickie Holt had contributed to the 
business though she is not employed outside the house. (Finding 
,'" I III'1,! „: i ' i ; I I H i t | Il Ill linn I n i t It in I | I  I mi III I j i > i i „ | j e i i i b e ! l : i II i II III i l l i i 
family during tlie marriage were found to be between $3,800 and 
$4 ?Q0 pei month, though Mrs. Holt had for several months lived nn 
t e m p o r a r y snp|, i I. nil! \i I
 (l i III pel moril. In u i ILIioiit iiJitcuj it, JJIH|I • III | 
a d d i t i o n a l d e b t . ( F i n d i n g 24, Ex. 5; IN!" 'II I) Based IJ|I in II ""Ill 
H o l t ' s t e s t i m o n y and t h e y "i net i e s ' I nr ime t a x r e t u r n s , t h e coiiiii I 
toiind oven a lilve y e a r p e r i o d nj III i .s ioi i c a l g r o s s annua l income ot 
$80, 11)00 foi Mi;, H o l t . (Find.i nig , Kx ">; 11 156-57 ]| The c o u r t 
found t h a t t h e $ I HI "Il '509 awarded t o Mrs. Hnl t can ea rn t a x t r e e 
income ol nix pe rcen l (b'A) p e r y e a r ( III11""!, m i l l i III :;j| .,  " i , lllli!!!!1! i " J ; III I i II |i . 
The Cour t awarded Mrs, Ho l t a l imony of $2,000 p e r month t e r n i i i i a b i e 
upon nie a t hi, r e m a r r i a g e o r c o - h a b i t a t i o n . (i ' indixui ?.f>, Ex. b ; R. 
R e q u i r e m e n t s of Utah Law i n Awarding Al imony. The 
g e n e r a l p u r p o s e of a] i mony I s t o p r e v e n t t h e r e c e i v i ng spouse from, 
becomin ::j a pub] i i::1 cha r ge arid t: ::: • ma i n t a i n t ::  • th i ain, I: p< 
s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g en joyed d u r i n g t h e m a r r i a g e . Howe11 v , Howei1, 
8 0 6 P 2 d ] 2 0 9 , 1 2 3 2 (I It ah App Il 9 9 11 ) cei t . c ; P , 21 1 3 2 7 
(Utal: i ] 991 ) In determining whether to award a 1 imony ai id setting 
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the amount the trial court must consider (1) the financial 
conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of 
the receiving spouse to provide for him or herself; and (3) the 
ability of the payor spouse to provide support. English v. 
English, 564 P.2d 409, 411-12 (Utah 1977); Chambers v. Chambers, 
840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah App. 1992). Where a trial court has 
considered these three factors and has supported its rulings with 
adequate findings based upon sufficient evidence, the Court of 
Appeals will not disturb the trial court's determination unless it 
has clearly abused its discretion. Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 
550 (Utah App. 1993); Chambers, supra at 843. 
A. Vickie Holt's Financial Condition and Need. The 
trial court found that Mrs. Holt stayed at home raising the 
parties' children and imputed no income to her. The trial court 
found that the living expenses submitted at trial were "excessive" 
but determined that the household living expenses during the 
marriage were between $3,800 and $4,200 per month. The trial court 
further found that Mrs. Holt and the parties children lived on 
$1,538 per month temporary support and incurred no debt during that 
period. There is no further finding by the trial court on need of 
Vickie Holt to receive alimony. 
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' ' B. A b i l i t y o l Mi, Hol t t o P r o v i d e fo r Himse l f . Mr 
H o l t r e c e i v e d $80,000 p e r y e a r income from t h e c o r p o r a t i o n wh^ch i s 
a d e q u a t e ^o meet h 1 *i n x p e n s e s . 
C, A b i l i t y o t Mi, Hol t t o I iJe Support . The t r i a l 
c o u r t fouinl f ha! Mi H o l t ' s h i s t o r i c a l im'iine d u r i n g t h e f i v e y e a r 
p e r i o d p r i o r t o t r i a l was $80 , 000 pei" "eai lieeq.i i rl j IHI III hi I <« III I I 
:, I.'.UH , " . 1 H 1M i . t en t LuJially al leuipts l.o m i s l e a d t h i s cour t . n 
h e r Br ief at- page 24 by f a i l i n g t o d i s c l o s e t h e e v i d e n c e s u b m i t t e d 
a t t r i a l ^pqarr i inq fh n ill i\i<n|in I i | i M * • > ]i 11 i| ' * -i-*» 
inn in i J i J i e i e m t a c t u a l iiu i vt m u i d i i j i i uy uu.-> i u u r t . Mrs . H o l t 
a s s e r t s t h a t D a l e H o l t ' s t a x r e t u r n s d i s H I ISM I iiiii'i min ill I MO i f 
$ 3 4 0 f 2 3 9 » f i r TV' . 1 ' ' ' I . 
$ l b 8 , b b J w h i c h i i i c l u d n n i a h e d u l e I* i I iiiiiii DIIIH f rom H o l t P r o p e r t i e s 
P a r t n e r s h i p . M. . . . I lol i (a . I s t n ,,.»lr- I I'M I *r IUIM» —4 , , m l a 
t i I r l I ( l l f i p l i X I  I l l . i t 1 I II II I 11111II I II II I I I I I I I I I I II II I I I H U M II I I I U i I . I I II t O 
purchase " lie ground lor I he buildinq . i «lu h (l,lale leases space 
and to pay for Improvements to the buildinq throuqh Holt PropertiMs 
P i i" i II I  ! "ii -I in Il I "H I III
 p 11 t"ei: I hose 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s was l e s s than $80,000 per: year , which i n c l u d e d f r i n g e 
b e n e f i t s . His s a l a r y was $fS S , 000 nor ' ITJI lnij lliis t e s t iiiniii in i . 
i- ' I I , " I ' I , i1 " 1 i If .1 1 ' I . I , L h e 
h o u s e h o l d ill' LJO-f | F u r t h e r , in 1992, the $63,51111 " i iif nine ' 
from Ho l t P r o p e r t i e s p a r t n e r s h i p was i n t a c t r i rl j «.,t r i h i • I i i i i i i * 
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income but paper income since the money was put back into the 
building through Holt Properties Partnership. Mrs. Holt received 
fifty percent (50%) of the value of Holt Properties Partnership, 
which had a total value of $360,000. Further, Mr. Holt testified 
that his income for 1994 at the time of trial was consistent with 
his prior years' income of $80,000. 
D. The Alimony and Child Support Exceed the Family 
Living Expenses. Vickie Holt, during the first sixty days after 
entry of the Decree, received the following monthly income: 
$2,000 Alimony 
$ 975 Child Support 
$2,500 Tax Free Income (6% of $500,000) 
$5,475 TOTAL 
One year and two months after the Decree, Mrs. Holt is 
scheduled to receive $422,000 plus $16,880 interest or $438,880 
which at the rate of six percent (6%) interest per year means she 
will receive an additional $2,194 per year towards her income. One 
year later, she will receive an additional distribution of $438,000 
which will earn her an additional $2,194 per month. At the end of 
the two year and two month period, Mrs. Holt's tax free income 
would be $7,763 (including child support) plus taxable alimony of 
$2,000 per month. This amount far exceeds the monthly living 
expense of the family found by the court to be $3,800 to $4,200 per 
month. Where the trial court has addressed each of the required 
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i in I ^  ••«-•• i»111«- i"t)tie i I nine L i i d l h a s n o t e x p l o r e d a n d c o n s i d e r e d 
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income i s $80,000 on i i i
 Si ,i ,,j i i i , > j o n s i s t e n i w i t n p r i . n c i p a l s 
1
 "l 1 »11 in I I / . Cox al I The n e e d s o f Mrs,, Ho l t a n d h e r 
s t a n d a r d or l i v i n g a r e c l e a r l y met and ric.^crU1.! ". i, .. « ntj she 
A J II r e c e i v e from ,»7.jliP| nl i m n uiu j imioiiy i c k i e Hol t 
i i ,!„ ' n-irte i i i '• i i I,H more mon,
 (, t o l i v e aim i s 
r e a s o n a b y n e c e s s a r y t n meet hei "" !«, hs * . > « > i > II 
c o u r t , t h e e x p e n s e s t o whir l , M"*' !"'" " * " « * r l e d she i n c u r r e d 'seem 
e x c e s s i VH " l|" inn tt , H. IU4 I , rhe CQUJ ..: Appea l s v* '. \ 
n o t second g u e s s t h e (iicLuaL d e t e r m i n a t i o n s ot 
where it is apparent from the record that the trial court has 
appropriately considered all pertinent factors. 
The issue of "underemployment" was not raised at trial 
and cannot now be considered by the Court of Appeals for the first 
time on appeal. Alford v. Utah League of Cities and Towns, 791 
P.2d 201 (Utah App. 1990). 
However, as stated in Cox v. Cox at 1267: 
Imputing income to an unemployed or 
underemployed spouse when setting an alimony 
is conceptually appropriate as part of the 
determination of that spouse's ability to 
produce a sufficient income. Willey v. 
Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 544 (Utah App. 1993). 
However, a court should not impute income for 
child or spousal support until it first 
determines, "as a threshold matter, that 
income should be imputed because the (spouse) 
is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed." 
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1024 (Utah App. 
1993). Also see Utah Code Ann. S 78-45-7.5, 
Ex. 3. 
The trial court made no such threshold determination 
regarding Dale Holt. Mrs. Holt again requests this Court to 
substitute its judgment for the trial court's judgment on a factual 
determination. 
Another legally insufficient position taken by Mrs. Holt 
in her Brief (p. 5, para. 6 and fn 22 and 23; p. 37, subpara. b; p. 
44, para. 18) is stating that the court should retroactively apply 
§ 30-3-5 (7)-(9), effective May 1, 1995 to the trial court's 
determination of alimony. Mrs. Holt fails to establish any legal 
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Annot i j 1 i i I "J I"J8 •• "1 • I p r o v i d e s t h a t ' i n 111 i id i ( f l lie *»•• r e v i s e d 
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import an i ' y , ' U p|«• !.•-••»" ii ' ' ' UI"'"IULI statute could nul have 
been rai.iiid at trial and I lieref ore is raised un appeal for the 
first t i m e , which under settled principals of Ulan M H H I I I nrnir i 
considered h " III m i n i Il i i i p i M l . 
3. The Alimony Award Provides the Standard of Living to 
Which Vickie Holt was Accustomed During Maiiiage, "T"ln< I ml m I 
("(ins i deren n \ i i 111 <-> IJI Liidic 1,a lequired under English v. English when 
i;i'warding Mrs. Holt alimony* Additionally, the award of alimony was 
part the overall plan established try I I in IMIIII I i I I. ."i i" I Uv, p . u I it . 
I I I Ii I lit" i l i v e s , ""I"! trial L U U I L ' B award uf alimony 
should be upheld as consistent, will Ii ill'he record, the income and 
assets of the parties , i m HI ' « ' " 
4 Awarding Dale Holt the Tax Exemptions is Fair and 
Appropriate, The court found good cause for awarding Da3* «--1 the 
i n c o m e t a x e x e m p t i o n s ih;vi r hf ill i in n "linii I nl r t MI I I V I nth ""!,;::" I K . 
Iihi y d i a l e d b) I lie Li i d I c o u r t , " The justification tcr this 
finding includes, but is not limited Lu, Lhe xauu uiai the 
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Plaintiff has a higher income, provides the majority of support of 
the children and can derive greater tax advantage from the use of 
the exemptions." The basis upon which Mrs. Holt asserts that she 
should receive the income tax exemption or some "compensating 
award" is that she projects at some point in the future Mr. Holt 
will receive little or no tax benefit from the exemption because 
his salary will increase (Appellant's Brief, page 46f para. 22). 
This court has previously held that a trial court does err in 
refusing to adjust property distributions because of theoretical 
tax consequences. Howell v. Howell. 806 P.2d 1209, 1213-14 (Utah 
App. 1991) . While the specific facts of the Howell case dealt with 
application of tax consequences, the general proposition that a 
court does not err in dealing with speculative facts applies to the 
proposition stated by Mrs. Holt regarding a speculative increase of 
salary for Mr. Holt. 
5. Award of Indefinite Alimony is Appropriate. Mrs. 
Holt takes the position that the court should have awarded 
permanent non-terminable alimony. Mrs. Holt again urges 
inappropriate application of § 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended 1995, to the facts produced at trial in June, 1994. The 
change in the statute affects a substantive right and therefore 
should not be applied. Further, this position is raised for the 
first time on appeal. 
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IV. 
MRS. HOLT FAILED TO ESTABLISH A NEED FOR ATTORNEYS FEES, 
S30 • 3- 3 Utah Code Annotated (1993) provide? that 
trial court has discretion to award attorney " >-T f* 
1
 i.sion •* i:) award attorrv- v " *''"M- ii""uijti ..uses must be Dased on 
evidFiiii i I i j.nancial nee I reasonableness• isbeind 
Rasband, 152 r .2d 1331 (iJLah App. x*6M I Andersou * . Andersont "r 
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P.2d 476 (Utah App. 1988); Morgan v, Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah 
App. 1990). The trial court specifically found that Mrs. Holt 
could not establish a need for an award of attorney's fees based 
upon assets distributed from the marital estate. (Finding 27, Ex. 
5; R. 364). 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Holt has primarily re-argued the facts of her case 
to this Court, requesting that this Court redetermine all of the 
factual issues previously ruled upon by the trial court. Mrs. Holt 
failed her burden to marshall the evidence when attacking the trial 
court's Findings of Fact. Mrs. Holt attempted to employ as a basis 
for her positions evidence which cannot be considered on Appeal for 
a significant portion of her Brief. Mrs. Holt failed to 
demonstrate how the trial court deviated from established precedent 
in any respect, when ruling on the.% issues of division of martial 
estate, alimony and child support. 
The trial court's Findings of fact, Conclusions of Law, 
Order and Judgment are consistent with Utah statutes and common law 
and should be upheld by this Court in all respects. 
DATED this jA day of May, 1996. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
-M 
By: ANN L. WASSERMANN, Esq. 
E. PAUL WOOD, Esq. 
Attorneys for Dale Holt 
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Tabl 
:io-u-2 HUSBAND A N . 
justifying divorce, 82 A.L.R.3d 725. 
Contract between husband or wife and third 
person promotive of divorce or separation, what 
constitutes, 93 A.L.R.3d 523. 
"Incompatibility" within statute specifying it 
as substantive ground for divorce, what consti-
tutes, 97 A.L.R.3d 989. 
Modern status of views as to validity of 
premarital agreements contemplating divorce 
or separation, 53 A.L.R.4th 22. 
Enforceability of premarital agreements gov-
erning support or property rights upon divorce 
or separation as affected by circumstances sur-
rounding execution — modern status, 53 
A.L.R.4th 85. 
Enforceability of premarital agreements gov-
erning support or property rights upon divorce 
or separation as "affected by fairness or ade-
quacy of those terms — modern status, 53 
A.L.R.4th 161 
522. 
to jury trial in state court divorce 
nps 56 A.L.R.4th 955,, 
.-ns as applicable to suit for separa-
.-. solution of marriage, 65 A,L,R,4th 
'".cor «t\ as defense to divorce or separation 
;o'u I960 cases, 67 A.L.R..4th 277, 
• *p and separation: effect of court order 
. * nu -\ng sale or transfer of property on 
v.h't^ • -i(rht to change 'beneficiary of insurance 
.. •!.- • * A I .R.4th 929. 
Joinder of tort action between spouses with 
proceeding for dissolution of marriage, 4 
AL.R.5th 972. 
Pre-emptive effect of Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) provisions (29 
USC §§ 1056(d)(3), 1144(a), 1144(b)(7)) with 
respect to orders entered in domestic relations 
proceedings, 116A.L.R. Fed. 503. 
Key Numbers. — Divorce «= 12-38, 57 65. 
30-3-2. Right of husband to di i 03 c <E 
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from his wife for the same 
causes and in the same manner as the wife may obtain a divorce from her 
husband. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1.209; 
CX. 1917, § 2997; 1 S 1933 & C 1943., 40-
3-2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
\NAI Y31S 
Both parties at fault. 
Cruel treatment. 
Both parties at fault. 
Marriage may be dissolved by making a 
grant of divorce to each party where each was 
equally at fault. Mullins v. Mullins, 26 Utah 2d 
82, 485 P.2d 663 (1971 ). 
Cruel treatment, 
Acts constituting cruel conduct sufficient to 
cause great mental distress need not be aggra-
vated and more severe when directed toward 
the husband than when directed toward the 
wife. Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Utah 
1975). 
30 3 3 Ward of" costs, a, 
porary alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action 
to establish an order of custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or division 
of property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, 
attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other 
party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order 
may include provision for costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, child support, 
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs 
and attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed 
upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or 
limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or enters 
in. the record the reason, for not awarding fees. 
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DIVORCE 30-3-3 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to 
provide money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and 
maintenance of the other party and of any children in the custody of the other 
party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or 
judgment may be amended during the course of the action or in the final order 
or judgment. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-3, enacted by L. 
1993, ch. 137, § 1. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 
1993, ch. 72, § 10 repeals former § 30-3-3, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, allowing a court to 
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Appeal from order. 
Where there were no findings or evidence in 
record as to attorney's fees, Supreme Court 
remanded issue for disposition by trial court 
but allowed wife's attorney $100 for services 
rendered with reference to husband's appeal 
from judgment modifying divorce decree. Par-
ish v. Parish, 84 Utah 390, 35 P.2d 999 (1934). 
Supreme Court assumed that evidence sup-
ported award of suit money to wife where no 
testimony as to wife's need was before the court 
on appeal on judgment roll from the decree of 
no cause of action in husband and awarding of 
expenses of suit, attorney's fees and temporary 
alimony to wife. Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 
179 P.2d 1005 (1947X 
Court should have made findings regarding 
need for reimbursement and ability to pay 
when one party sought reimbursement of ac-
counting costs that had been incurred in pros-
ecuting the action. Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 
P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Attorney fees. 
Where decree of divorce was obtained by 
order either party to pay for the separate sup-
port and maintenance of the adverse party and 
the children, and enacts the present section, 
effective May 3, 1993. 
mother of minor children against father, who 
was required to pay certain sum periodically for 
support, care, maintenance, and education of 
such children, and he, without sufficient cause, 
refused to comply with decree, as result of 
which mother was compelled to bring proceed-
ings against him, father was required to pay 
counsel fees in such proceedings. Tribe v. Tribe, 
59 Utah 112, 202 P. 213 (1921). 
Court properly awarded attorney's fees to 
wife in subsequent proceeding on application of 
wife for arrears in alimony. Christensen v. 
Christensen, 65 Utah 597, 239 P. 501 (1925). 
While fact that wife is able to pay expenses of 
defending husband's divorce suit or to obtain 
credit therefor should be considered by court in 
determining whether to make award for ex-
penses of suit and amount thereof, such fact 
alone does not show that award is unjustified, 
and consequently fact that award to wife for 
expenses of defending suit was made after 
expenses were paid or credit extended therefor 
did not render award erroneous as showing 
that she had no need therefor. Weiss v. Weiss, 
111 Utah 353, 179 P2d 1005 (1947). 
Although there was no detailed presentation 
of facts establishing the usual requisite factors 
to support an award of attorney's fees, trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 
attorney fees to plaintiff to enable her to pros-
ecute an action to enforce a provision of the 
divorce decree where the facts implicit in the 
proceeding and the evidence necessarily pre-
sented to the trial court, together with the de 
minimis nature of the award, constituted a 
sufficient basis to sustain the exercise of trial 
court's discretion. Beardali v. Beardall, 629 P.2d 
425 (Utah 1981). 
Trial court properly denied wife's request for 
attorney fees in divorce proceeding where she 
offered no evidence at trial to show the nature 
or amount of any attorney fees incurred or any 
need for court-ordered assistance in the pay-
ment of such fees. Warren v. Warren, 655 P.2d 
684 (Utah 1982). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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The decision to award attorney fees in di 
vorce proceedings rests primarily in the sound 
discretion of the trial court. However, the 
award must be based on evidence of both finan-
cial need and reasonableness. "Rasband v. 
Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 19*3 • 
Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476 (Utan O 
App. 1988); Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d r *i 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Attorney fees may be awarded in actions for 
the support and maintenance of children, in-
cluding actions for the modification of child 
custody. The decision to award such fees lies 
within the trial court's discretion. Maughan v. 
Maughan, 770 R2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Either party to a divorce action may be or-
dered to pay the adverse party to prosecute or 
defend the action. This includes attorney fees 
incurred on appeal. Maughan v. Maughan, 770 
P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
In order to award attorney fees, the trial 
court must find the requesting party in need of 
financial assistance and that the fees requested 
are reasonable. Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 
P.2d 1057 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Haumont v. 
Haumont, 793 R2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991), cert, denied, 836 R2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
Because the income to wife was uncertain 
an& ^he "hao. no otaeT souTce oi income ana 
because husband had received a larger portion 
of the marital estate, husband was to pay wife's 
legal fees. Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 
(Utah 1993) 
..-.•«iiu who unsuccessfully appealed 
trial courts ruling on an alimony reduction 
action was required to pay the appeal costs and 
ex-wife's attorney fees for defending on appeal. 
r'ar^er v. Carter, 584 P.2d 904 (Utah 1978). 
iinarily, when fees in a divorce have been 
•led below to the party who then prevails 
on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that 
party on appeal. Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
When allegations of fact supporting a claim 
of attorney fees on appeal are not a matter of 
record and have not been adjudicated by a 
finder of fact, the appellate court will remand 
the claim for determination of whether the 
party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal, and 
if so, the amount of fees to be awarded. 
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 
(Utah Ct. App. 1.994). 
; :o a t t o r n e y not pe rmi t t ed . 
t„ ^aa error for the district court to amend a 
divorce decree to order the payment of attorney 
fees directly to the wife's attorney. McDonald v. 
McDonald, 866 P.2d 1253 (Utah Ct. App 1993). 
-Con te s t i ng pet i t ion for modification, 
A reasonable attorney's fee may be awarded a 
wife who contests a modification petition where 
the custody of children is involved. Anderson v 
Anderson, 13Utab 2a 36, 368P.2d 264 (1962) 
It was d 
award atti 
< dification proceeding where there \w 
" - s t a t i o n of facts establishing her fi" 1 
need for such an award. Kail as v. Kail as r , 
P.2d 641 (Utah 1980). 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
ordei ing each party to pay his or her own 
attorney fees, where neither party reasonably 
had the ability to pay the other party's attorney 
fees. Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah Ct 
App. 1990). 
Wife who did not prevail on any of the issues 
she brought on appeal and did not establish 
financial need on the record was denied attor-
ney fees on appeal. Haumont v. Haumont, 793 
P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
An award of attorney fees must be based on 
evidence of the financial need of the receiving 
spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, 
and the reasonableness of the requested fees. 
Bell v. Bell, 810 R2d 489 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Since the legislature has not placed a prohi-
hitiaix. on considering, a» uaw soAusa's. ta&vaafi. 
when determining whether to award attorney 
fees and costs, a trial court is not precluded as 
a matter of law from considering the income of 
a receiving parent's new spouse when deter-
mining the receiving parent's "need" for costs 
and attorney fees. Crockett v. Crockett, 836 
P.2d 818 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Since the trial court, in awarding attorney 
fees, did not address the reasonableness of the 
fees, and stopped short of finding that each 
party would have the means to pay his own fees 
out of the money being distributed to both, the 
award of attorney fees was an abuse of discre-
tion. Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Because the proffered evidence' of the wife's 
attorney's fees was adequate and entirely un-
disputed, the court abused its discretion in 
reducing the requested amount without a find-
ing that the deduction was warranted by one of 
the established factors upon which a court is 
required to base its award. Muir v. Muir, 841 
P.2d 736 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
When an award of attorney fees is based on 
need, the trial court must support the award 
with adequate findings detailing the reason-
^&£«s& Q£ tfc&. %so&usX *jK*Kdad axid the need 
of the receiving party. Finlayson v. Finlayson, 
874 P.2d 843 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
— Reasonable . 
Allowance of $200 as wife's attorney's fee in 
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divorce proceeding was not inadequate even 
though husband was worth approximately 
$40,000, where proceedings from time of com-
mencement until entry of decree lasted less 
than two months and trial itself was completed 
in less than two days. Blair v. Blair, 40 Utah 
306,121 P. 19, 38 L.R.A. (n.s.) 269,1914D Ann. 
Cas. 989 (1912). 
Fifty dollars was a reasonable fee where wife 
petitioned to require husband to show cause 
why he should not be punished for contempt for 
failure to pay support money and husband filed 
cross-petition for modification of decree and 
where it was shown that wife was without 
means to prosecute the cause or pay counsel. 
Scott v. Scott, 105 Utah 376, 142 R2d 198 
(1943). 
In divorce cases, an award of attorney's fees 
must be supported by evidence which shows 
that the requested award is reasonable and 
which establishes the financial need of the 
party requesting the award; relevant factors of 
reasonableness include the necessity of the 
number of hours dedicated, the reasonableness 
of the rate charged in light of the difficulty of 
the case and the result accomplished, and the 
rates commonly charged for divorce actions in 
the community. Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862 
(Utah 1984); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P. 2d 
1276 (Utah 1987). 
An award of attorney fees to the wife was 
reasonable where the evidence showed that the 
wife needed assistance, the husband had initi-
ated the divorce proceedings, requiring the wife 
to hire an attorney, the husband was very well 
supported by his family, and the wife had 
worked for only four months before the couple 
separated. Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d 387 
(Utah 1985). 
An award of attorney fees was proper where 
the record showed the wife's need based upon 
the fact that her monthly expenses exceeded 
her monthly income and the attorney testified 
to the reasonableness of his fees. Sinclair v. 
Sinclair, 718 P2d 396 (Utah 1986). 
Attorney's l ien on alimony. 
Where wife in divorce action agreed to pay 
fee to attorney who was allowed reasonable fee 
payable by husband, and attorney had order 
entered requiring husband to pay alimony to 
clerk of court to be withdrawn by wife or her 
attorney, and attorney in accordance with his 
claim of lien withdrew balance of his fee from 
alimony paid to clerk, court order requiring him 
to return such money was void, since attorney 
had lien on alimony, and wife was liable for his 
fee even in absence of special agreement. 
Hampton v. Hampton, 85 Utah 338, 39 P.2d 703 
(1935). 
Con tempt p roceed ings . 
In contempt proceeding for failure to comply 
with divorce decree, findings that husband had 
not paid realty taxes and had not paid plaintiff 
amount allowed for attorney's fees were insuf-
ficient to support adjudication of contempt, 
since decree said nothing about taxes and pro-
vided for payment of attorney's fees to attorney. 
Openshaw v. Openshaw, 86 Utah 229, 42 R2d 
191 (1935). 
Costs and expenses on appeal. 
The Supreme Court may determine whether 
additional counsel fees should be allowed, and 
may allow costs of appeal to appellant, such as 
filing fees, printing costs and the like. Dahlberg 
v. Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 P. 214 (1930). 
Upon appeal by defendant husband from 
judgment that he was in arrears of alimony and 
in which he sought modification of decree, wife, 
who was allowed $25 for expense of printing 
brief on appeal, was allowed further sum of 
$100 as costs, including her attorney's fees. 
Hendricks v. Hendricks, 91 Utah 564, 65 P.2d 
642 (1937). 
Wife was entitled to allowance for expenses 
incurred on her appeal from judgment granting 
husband divorce, including reasonable attorney 
fees, where wife was not working, had no 
means of her own and had been partially sup-
ported by her parents for number of years. 
Peterson v. Peterson, 112 Utah 542, 189 P.2d 
961 (1948). 
Discretion of trial cour t . 
Allowance of alimony and expenses of divorce 
trial, including attorneys' fees, are largely mat-
ters within discretion of court which tries case. 
Burtt v. Burtt, 59 Utah 457, 204 P. 91 (1922). 
The reasonableness of the amount of the 
attorney's fee is a matter largely within the 
discretion of the trial court. Openshaw v. 
Openshaw, 80 Utah 9, 12 P.2d 364 (1932). 
Allowance of temporary alimony and suit 
money is based on necessity of recipient, and 
such allowance as well as amount thereof is 
largely matter within sound discretion of trial 
court. Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P.2d 
1005 (1947). 
Former section did not contemplate that 
awards for expenses of suit or for temporary 
alimony should be made only in those cases 
where "adverse party" »usually wife) is desti-
tute or practically so, but contemplated such 
awards when, in sound discretion of court, 
circumstances of parties are such that in fair-
ness to wife she should be given financial assis-
tance by her husband in her prosecution or 
defense of divorce action, and for her support 
during its pendency. Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah 
353, 179 P.2d 1005 (1947). 
Both the decision to award attorney fees and 
the amount of such fees are within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Crouse v. Crouse, 
817 P.2d 836 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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Court should use its sound discretion in de-
termining whether to award costs based on 
need and ability to pay.* Peterson v. Peterson, 
818 P2d 1305 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
It is within court's discretion to define costs 
as those reasonable amounts that are reason-
ably expended to prosecute or defend a divorce 
action. Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Trial court was within its discretion in con-
cluding that the costs of the action included a 
custody evaluation, polygraph examination, ex-
pert witness fees, service fees, and copying 
charges. Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Because court's findings failed to demon-
strate that an award was arrived at after 
proper consideration of the relevant factors for 
determining the reasonableness of attorney fee 
awards, the award was an abuse of discretion. 
Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P2d 260 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). 
Enforcement of order or decree. 
Enforcement, by citation or an order to show 
cause or by contempt proceedings, of orders or 
decrees with respect to payment of monthly or 
other specific periods of alimony and counsel 
fees, for a failure and willful refusal to pay 
same, is one of the inherent equity powers of 
the court. Herzog v. Bramel, 82 Utah 216, 23 
P.2d 345 (1933). 
Jurisdiction. 
Fact that district court had no jurisdiction of 
status of marriage between parties to hus-
band's divorce action, because of noncompli-
ance with residence requirement of § 30-3-1, 
had no effect on and did not preclude award to 
wife for temporary alimony, expenses of suit 
and attorney's fees. Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah 
353, 179 P.2d 1005 (1947). 
Mandamus. 
District court had jurisdiction of petition 
seeking enforcement of payment of alimony and 
counsel fees as required by divorce decree, and 
court's view that it had no jurisdiction until 
determination of validity of alleged settlement 
was improper, so that mandamus issued to 
compel court to proceed with the cause. Herzog 
v. Bramel, 82 Utah 216, 23 P.2d 345 (1933). 
If order to show cause is improperly refused, 
the judge may be required by peremptory writ 
of mandate to issue such order. Mann v. 
Morrison, 102 Utah 282, 130 P.2d 286 (1942). 
Where defendant wife brings a proceeding for 
writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of an 
order to show cause why plaintiff husband 
should not pay temporary alimony, suit money 
and attorney's fees, the Supreme Court may 
make a determination of the sufficiency of the 
allegations to require the order. Anderson v 
Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P.2d 252 (1943). 
Order of court. 
An order directing payment of attorney's fees 
to plaintiffs attorney is void, because it runs in 
favor of the attorney, who is not a party to the 
action or proceeding. Openshaw v. Openshaw 
80 Utah 9, 12 P.2d 364 (1932). 
Upon a proper application, lower court will 
issue an order as a matter of course to plaintiff 
husband to show cause why he should not pay 
temporary alimony, suit money and attorney 
fees. But where motion was denied, Supreme 
Court will not examine affidavits in support of 
motion to see whether a sufficient showing was 
made, at least where there is no showing that 
the refusal to grant the order was prejudicial. 
Anderson v. Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P.2d 
252 (1943). 
Stipulation and effect thereof. 
Where husband, by stipulation prior to trial 
in his divorce action, recognized wife's right to 
temporary alimony and agreed to $50 per 
month or such greater sum as court might fix, 
trial court did not err in awarding temporary 
alimony, at end of trial, in amount of $75 per 
month from commencement of action to entry of 
decree. Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P2d 
1005 (1947). 
Fact that stipulation between parties prior to 
trial in divorce action by husband provided for 
latter to pay $100 as attorney's fees to enable 
wife to defend action did not preclude trial 
court from awarding additional sum therefor, 
even at end of trial after legal services had been 
rendered, since wife did not agree to receive 
stipulated amount as complete and final settle-
ment of all her claims for attorney's fees. Weiss 
v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P.2d 1005 (1947). 
Temporary alimony. 
Trial courts have equitable powers to award 
temporary alimony during the pendency of a 
petition to modify and the trial court erred in 
not considering plaintiff's motion for temporary 
alimony pending the hearing on her petition. 
Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). 
Cited in Hoagland v. Hoagland, 852 P.2d 
1025 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Willey v. Willey, 866 
P.2d 547 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Osguthorpe v. 
Osguthorpe, 872 P.2d 1057 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and tive or anticipated attorneys' fees to enable 
Separation §§ 558-623. parties to maintain or defend divorce suit, 22 
C.J.S. — 27B C.J.S. Divorce §§ 306-368. A.L.R.4th 407. 
AX.R. — Contract, provision thereof, or Adequacy or excessiveness of amount of 
stipulation waiving wife's right to counsel fees money awarded as temporary alimony, 26 
in event of divorce or separation action, 3 A.L.R.4th 1218. 
A.L.R.3d 716. Right to attorneys' fees in proceeding, after 
Necessity and sufficiency of notice and hear- absolute divorce, for modification of child cus-
ing as to allowance of suit money or counsel fees tody or support order, 57 A.L.R.4th 710. 
in divorce or other marital action, 10 A.L.R.3d Power to modify spousal support award for a 
280. limited term, issued in conjunction with di-
Wife's right to award of counsel fees in final vorce, so as to extend the term or make the 
divorce judgment of trial or appellate court as award permanent, 62 A.L.R.4th 180. 
affected by fact that judgment was rendered Death of obligor spouse as affecting alimony, 
against her, 32 A.L.R.3d 1227. 79 A.L.R.4th 10. 
Amount of attorneys' fees in matters involv- Divorce: spouse's right to order that other 
ing domestic relations, 59 A.L.R.3d 152. spouse pay expert witness fees, 4 A.L.R.5th 
Wife's possession of independent means as 403. 
affecting her right to alimony pendente lite, 60 Excessiveness or adequacy of attorneys' fees 
A.L.R.3d 728. in domestic relations cases, 17 A.L.R.5th 366. 
Authority of divorce court to award prospec- Key Numbers. — Divorce «=» 208-229. 
30-3-4. Pleadings — Findings — Decree — Sealing. 
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the plaintiff or 
plaintiffs attorney. 
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default or otherwise 
except upon legal evidence taken in the cause. 
(c) If the plaintiff and the defendant have a child or children and the 
plaintiff has filed an action in the judicial district as defined in Section 
78-1-2.1 where the pilot program shall be administered, a decree of divorce 
may not be granted until both parties have attended a mandatory course 
provided in Section 30-3-11.3 and have presented a certificate of course 
completion to the court. The court may waive this requirement, on its own 
motion or on the motion of one of the parties, if it determines course 
attendance and completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in 
the best interest of the parties. 
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held before the court or 
the court commissioner as provided by Section 78-3-31 and rules of the 
Judicial Council. The court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall 
make and file findings and decree upon the evidence. 
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by order of the court 
upon the motion of either party. The sealed portion of the file is available to the 
public only upon an order of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of 
record or attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office of 
Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied for or is receiving 
public assistance, or the court have full access to the entire record. This sealing 
does not apply to subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1211; L. 1990, ch. 230, § 1; 1991, ch. 5, § 35; 1992, ch. 
1909, ch. 60, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 2999; R.S. 1933 98, § 1; 1992, ch. 290, § 3. 
& C. 1943, 40-3-4; L. 1957, ch. 55, § 1; 1961, Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ch. 59, § 1; 1969, ch. 72, § 2; 1983, ch. 116, ment, effective February 11, 1991, substituted 
§ 1; 1985, ch. 151, § 1; 1989, ch. 104, § 1; "Section 78-3-31" for "Section 78-3-3.1" in the 
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or vice versa, 14 A.L.R.3d 703. Authority of court, upon entering default 
Nunc pro tunc: entering judgment or decree judgment, to make orders for child custody or 
of divorce nunc pro tunc, 19 A.L.R.3d 648. support which were not specifically requested 
Vacating or setting aside divorcfe decree after in pleadings of prevailing party, 5 A.L.R.5th 
remarriage of party, 17 A.L.R.4th 1153. 863. 
Necessity that divorce court value property Key Numbers. — Divorce «=> 88, 152. 
before distributing it, 51 A.L.R.4th 11. 
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 230, § 4 repeals authority, duties, and jurisdiction of court com-
these sections, as last amended by L. 1989, ch. missioners, effective April 23, 1990. 
104, §§ 2 to 5, providing for the appointment, 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Division of 
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — 
Custody and visitation — Termination of ali-
mony — Nonmeritorious petition for modifica-
tion. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and 
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, 
and dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of 
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabili-
ties and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and 
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after 
January 1, 1994, that are subject to income withholding, an order 
assessing against the obligor an additional $7 per month check processing 
fee to be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of 
Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services for the 
purposes of income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, 
Parts 4 and 5. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
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the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the 
distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and 
necessary. 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best 
interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer 
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation 
schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to 
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is 
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the 
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights 
are determined. 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further 
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or associa-
tion is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a 
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if 
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or 
defended against in good faith. 
(8) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by 
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to 
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the 
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual 
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the 
other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L. 
1909, ch. 109, § 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S. 
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3; 
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch. 
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1; 
1991, ch. 257, § 4; 1993, ch. 152, § 1; 1993, 
ch. 261, § 1; 1994, ch. 284, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted "debts 
or obligations" in the introductory paragraph of 
Subsection (1), added Subsection (l)(c), and 
inserted "and obligations for debts" near the 
end of Subsection (3). 
The 1993 amendment by ch. 152, effective 
May 3, 1993, substituted "members of the im-
mediate family" for "relatives" and "best inter-
est" for "welfare" in Subsection (4); substituted 
"shall" for "may" and inserted "or defended 
against" in Subsection (7); added Subsection 
(8); and made stylistic changes. 
The 1993 amendment by ch. 261, effective 
January 1, 1994, inserted "or becomes" in Sub-
section (1Kb), added Subsections (lXd) and 
(l)(e), and made related stylistic changes. 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, 
designated Subsection (4) as (4Xa) and added 
Subsection (4Kb). 
Cro9s-References. — Grandparents' visita-
tion rights, § 30-5-2. 
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, Title 30, 
Chapter 8. 
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78-45-7.5 JUDICIAL CODE 208 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.4, enacted Jby L. ment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "base 
1989, ch. 214, § 6; 1994, ch. 118, § 6. combined child support obligation* for "child 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- support award." 
78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed in-
come. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, 
except under Subsection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, 
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, 
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, 
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment 
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from 
"nonmeans-tested" government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one 
full-time job. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training 
Partnership Act, S.S.L, Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance; 
and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall 
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employ-
ment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses 
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to 
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to 
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the 
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross 
receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the 
amount of business income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual 
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly 
income. 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each 
parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and 
complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year unless the 
court finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of 
income from records maintained by the Office of Employment Security 
may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax 
returns. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether 
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection 
(7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates 
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, 
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community. 
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(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at 
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a 
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer 
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to 
the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children 
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can 
earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he 
cannot earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to 
establish basic job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the 
custodial parent's presence in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the 
subject of a child support award nor benefits to a child in the child's own 
right such as Supplemental Security Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a 
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning 
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation 
of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered as 
income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
History: C. 1963, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5; 1994, ment, effective July 1,1994, rewrote Subsection 
ch. 118, § 7. (5)(b). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Deductible expenses. 
Findings by court. 
Imputed income. 
Social Security benefits. 
Cited. 
Deductible expenses. 
The allocation of expenses cannot be dealt 
with as a matter of law under this section; the 
deductibility of particular expenses poses a 
question of fact, turning on whether such ex-
penses are necessary, and, if so, whether they 
exceed those required for the business's opera-
tion at a reasonable level. Bingham v. 
Bingham, 872 R2d 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Findings by court 
Although a trial court entered findings re-
quired by Subsection 7(b), since the trial court 
failed to enter any findings required under 
Subsection (7Xa), the findings on the whole 
were insufficient. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Imputed income. 
Even though the court's findings of fact did 
not include a specific finding that ex-husband 
was underemployed, because he had acquiesced 
to the imputation of income at the trial level 
and because his job history and current employ-
ment options inarguably supported this impu-
tation, the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in imputing income in an amount greater 
than the ex-husband's current salary. Hill v. 
Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Social Security benefits. 
A trial court may, in its discretion, consider a 
child's receipt of Social Security benefits 
against the parent's child support obligation. 
However, a trial court may not order that those 
Social Security benefits be subject to legal pro-
cess. Nunley v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). 
Cited in Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 
472 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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EN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAHU -* 
JT777_ 
DALE P. HOLT : ^ 
Plaintiff, : RULING 
vs. : Civil No. 934700554 
VICKIE L. HOLT, : 
Defendant. : 
The Court took under advisement several issues. These include 
valuation of the plaintiffs business, alimony, determination of the plaintiffs income 
for purposes of child support, tax exemption awards, attorney's fees and costs. The 
Court will address each issue separately. 
Business Valuation 
The estimates of value on the plaintiffs business were varied. They 
ranged from $2.8 million to $11 million. They included values of $2.8 million, $5.4 
million, $9 million and $11 million. The Court finds the value of the business to be 
$2.8 million. It is the most reasonable determination of the fair market value of the 
business. In addition, the Court finds that any goodwill in this case is personal to the 
plaintiff and is not subject to distribution to the defendant as part of the marital estate. 
Quite frankly, it doesn't make any sense to sell the business. It has 
been extremely successful. Both parties would be better off financially if the business 
were maintained. It also doesn't make much sense to require the plaintiff and 
defendant to become business partners after their divorce, since they weren't business 
partners during their marriage. The plaintiff is awarded the business. The defendant 
is awarded $1.4 million as her half of the business. 
The best approach is for the plaintiff to buy the defendant's share of the 
business. The plaintiff has submitted a proposed buy-out plan. (See Exhibit P8) 
Unfortunately, the plan submitted by the plaintiff is based on the premise that any 
transfer to the defendant should account for possible future income tax consequences. 
It shouldn't. Any tax consequences are deferred until assets are sold. This may or 
may not occur. There is no income tax on the division of a marital estate. 
The Court is not compelling a sale of the business. (Although the 
parties have the option to consider a sale.) The Court will allow the parties to present 
proposed buy-out plans. It is the Court's intention that the buy-out occur as soon as 
possible. 
Alimony 
This is a long term marriage. The parties have been married for almost 
22 years. Both parties are in their early forties. 
During the marriage, the defendant worked outside the home until she 
had her first child. She has not worked outside the home for the last 16 years. She 
has a high school education and has had no further courses or training. She has no 
intention of going back to either work or school. She wants to stay home and take 
care of the children. 
The plaintiff has spent the greater part of the marriage building the 
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business into an extremely successful enterprise. He has received local and national 
recognition for his business practices. There is no reason to believe he cannot 
continue to be successful, subject of course, to the uncertainties of the future and his 
eventual retirement. 
The plaintiff is extremely talented and successful. And, although he 
should not be punished economically for either his talent or success, the defendant has 
also made important contributions to the parties' financial well being. She too, should 
share in the economic success. Even though both parties will be awarded substantial 
material assets, plaintiffs assets are income producing and will continue to grow. On 
the other hand, the assets received by the defendant are less capable of producing 
substantial income. By awarding the plaintiff the business, his ability to produce 
income is enhanced. As such, the plaintiff is in a position to provide support to the 
defendant. 
Both parties submitted their monthly expenses. The plaintiffs expenses, 
with one or two exceptions are both reasonable and necessary. The expenses 
submitted by the defendant seem somewhat excessive, although the Court finds that she 
does have significant monthly expenses. To find that either side is in economic "need" 
of alimony, given their material assets, is difficult. However, to award the plaintiff 
the greater income producing property and then not equalize incomes to a certain 
extent seems extremely unfair. 
Finally, in looking at the ability of the defendant to provide support for 
herself, the Court must consider, among other factors, the standard of living the 
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parties acquired during their marriage. Even though both parties acquired substantial 
assets during the marriage, their divorce has divided those assets in half. Without 
assistance from the plaintiff, the defendant will not be able to maintain her same 
standard of living. The defendant is in some need of assistance. 
In order to equalize the income of the parties and to maintain the parties 
standard of living during the marriage, an award of alimony is appropriate. The Court 
awards $2,000 per month permanent alimony to the defendant. It is subject to 
termination upon the defendant's remarriage or co-habitation. It is subject to 
modification only upon a material change of circumstances by either party. 
Plaintiffs income 
Determining the amount of plaintiffs income for the purposes of 
computing child support was the most difficult issue. The Court received evidence 
that the plaintiff had a historical income of approximately $80,000 per year. In 
addition, the Court received evidence that the plaintiff was worth $140,000.00. The 
Court also heard evidence that the plaintiff could also be worth upwards of 
$250,000.00 a year. The best evidence upon which to base the child support 
calculation is to $80,000.00 a year income figure. It is consistent with the parties 
historical yearly income. Although the plaintiff could readily increase or decrease this 
amount, the evidence is consistent that the amount family income remained constant. 
Tax Exemptions 
Traditionally, income tax exemptions belong to the custodial parent. 
The Court can, under certain circumstances, order the custodial parent to release those 
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exemptions to the non-custodial parent. In this instance, the defendant is the custodial 
parent. However, the plaintiff or non-custodial parent meets all the criteria justifying 
a transfer of those exemptions. The plaintiff has a higher income. In addition, the 
plaintiff provides the majority of the support for the children. Although there are tax 
advantages to both parties, given the substantial difference in income and child support 
obligations, the Court finds that a release of the exemptions in this case would be in 
the best interest of the children and the parties. The plaintiff is awarded the tax 
exemptions for the children beginning in 1994. Needless to say, the plaintiff must be 
current on his child support payments to claim the exemptions. 
Attorney's Fees and Court Costs 
In examining attorney's fees, the Court looks at the parties' ability to 
pay attorney's fees, as well as their need to have their attorney's fees paid. The Court 
also looks at which party prevailed on any contested legal issues at trial. In making an 
award of attorney's fees, the Court look at the financial circumstances of both parties. 
In this instance, both parties have the assets, income and ability to pay their own 
attorney's fees. Neither party substantially prevailed on all or most of the contested 
legal issues. In fact, on the two major issues; valuation of the business and alimony, 
different parties prevailed. The plaintiff prevailed on the valuation issue and the 
defendant prevailed on the alimony issue. Each party is ordered to pay their own 
attorney's fees. 
With one exception, each party is to bear their own court costs. Since 
the plaintiff prevailed on the issue concerning evaluation of the parties' business, the 
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defendant is ordered to pay plaintiffs costs for hiring experts to determine the 
business' value. 
Plaintiffs counsel will please prepare findings of facts, conclusions of 
law and a divorce decree consistent with this ruling. Please submit to opposing 
counsel, for approval as to form, prior to submission to the Court for signature. 
One final note: the Court apologizes for the delay in getting this 
decision written. With the Annual Bar conference in Sun Valley, one week's vacation, 
Judge Johnson's retirement and Judge Baldwin's hospitalization, the Court has been 
swamped. 
Dated this j)ftA day of August, A.D., 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Ruling, postage prepaid on thej&d day of August, 1994, to the following: 
Ann Wassermann 
426 South 500 East 
SLC, UT 84102 
David Paul White 
5278 Pinemont Dr. 
Suite A200 
Murray, UT 84123 
Ronald C. Barker 
2870 South State 
SLC, UT 84115-3692 
Deputy Clerk 
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ANN L . WASSERMANN - A 3 3 9 5 ut-ur7V.Tr 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
DALE E. HOLT, : 
: FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v. : 
VICKIE L. HOLT, : 
Defendant. : Case No. 93470055 DA 
: Judge W. Brent West 
ooOoo 
This matter came on for trial on June 13, 14, and 15, 
1994, the Honorable W. Brent West presiding. Both parties appeared 
in person and were represented by counsel. The Court having heard 
the testimony of the witnesses, having examined the exhibits and 
all evidence, having issued its ruling, and having ruled on 
ancillary matters subsequent to the trial at a hearing held on 
November 5, 1994, and the Court being fully advised, now makes and 
enters the following Findings of Fact: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff was a resident of Davis County, State of 
Utah, for more than three months prior to the filing of the 
complaint in this action. 
2. Pursuant to Stipulation of the parties, this matter 
was bifurcated and a Decree dissolving the marital relationship 
between the parties was entered on or about June 13, 1994. All 
remaining issues were reserved for final determination. 
3. The parties are the parents of three minor children. 
It is reasonable that the parties be granted the joint legal 
custody of the three minor children. The Plaintiff should be 
designed the primary physical custodian of the oldest child, with 
the Defendant being designated the primary physical custodian of 
the two youngest children. 
4. The Court finds that the children should be able to 
spend as much time with both parents as possible. Each parent is 
entitled, at a minimum, to visitation with any child not in their 
primary physical care in accordance with the Utah statutory minimum 
schedule for visitation. The parties should cooperate in effecting 
visitation, although the children should be entitled to participate 
in decisions with regard to their activities and the visitation. 
Because of the work schedule and travel demands of the Plaintiff, 
the Defendant should be flexible in terms of designating a day 
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during the week for such visitation. The Plaintiff should, 
however, give some reasonable advance notification of the day 
during the week that he wishes to see the children so as to 
accommodate the schedules of the children and of the Defendant. 
The Plaintiff should also be allowed to rearrange weekend 
visitation so as to accommodate his travel schedule, but he should 
give the Defendant two weeks notice of any requests that weekends 
be traded. 
5. The physical custodian should give the non-physical 
custodian parent an opportunity to provide care for the children 
during any substantial periods of time that the physical custodian 
will be unable to provide care for the children. 
6. The parties are mutually restrained from 
threatening, harassing, or annoying each other, or from making 
disparaging remarks to the children about the other parent. The 
Plaintiff should specifically be allowed to pull into the driveway 
at the Defendant's residence in order to pick-up and deliver the 
children, and he should not be deemed to be in violation of any 
restraining or protective order for doing so. 
7. The Court finds, for the purpose of calculating 
child support, that the gross annual income of the Plaintiff is 
approximately $80,000 per year. This figure is consistent with the 
historical annual income of the parties. The Defendant is 
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unemployed. Based upon the current circumstances of the parties, 
the Plaintiff should pay child support to the Defendant, effective 
upon the entry of this Order, in the monthly amount of $997, which 
amount is reflective of the split custodial arrangement and the 
current incomes of the parties. 
8. The Court finds that there is good cause to award to 
the Plaintiff all of the income tax exemptions for the minor 
children. The justification for this finding includes, but is not 
limited, the fact that the Plaintiff has a higher income, provides 
a majority of support for the children, and can derive greater tax 
advantage from use of the exemptions. The Court further finds that 
an award of the exemptions to the Plaintiff would be in the best 
interests of the children. The Plaintiff, therefore, should be 
awarded the income tax exemptions for all of the minor children of 
the parties, provided, however, that the Plaintiff should not be 
entitled to take the exemptions for any year in which he is not 
current in all child support payments. 
9. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has been timely 
in his payment of temporary child support, and good cause exists 
for a waiver of the mandatory income withholding provisions of Utah 
law. In the event the Plaintiff becomes delinquent in the payment 
of child support, the Defendant should be entitled to an order of 
automatic income withholding. 
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10. The Plaintiff should be required to maintain a 
policy of health and medical insurance for the benefit of all the 
minor children. The parties should share equally the costs of such 
insurance, any deductibles, or any costs incurred not covered by 
such insurance. 
11. The Plaintiff should be required to maintain a 
policy of life insurance in a face amount sufficient to insure the 
payment of his child support obligation for the benefit of the 
minor children, with the Defendant as the trustee. Any life 
insurance coverage for the benefit of the minor children above and 
beyond such coverage should be at the sole option of the Plaintiff, 
and he should be entitled to designate as trustee any person whom 
he chooses. 
12. There are certain policies of life insurance on the 
life of the Defendant. To the extent that she wants to keep 
enforce such insurance coverage, she may assume the policies, but 
she should be responsible for payment of any premiums associated 
therewith. 
13. The Defendant made certain claims with respect to 
Willowcreek and Oakridge Country Club memberships. With respect to 
the Willowcreek membership, the Court finds that the membership has 
already been sold and the proceeds divided equally, and the 
Defendant has no existing claim to any additional compensation. 
5 
With regard to the Oakridge Country Club membership, that 
membership is owned by the Plaintiff's business, Codale Electric, 
Inc., and the value of the membership has been figured into the 
valuation of the business as set forth herein. The Court finds 
there is no basis to require the Plaintiff to purchase a membership 
for the benefit of the Defendant. 
14. During the course of the marriage the parties 
acquired various items of personal property. Several of the items 
have been divided by the parties, and each should be awarded those 
items in their possession, with the following exceptions. There 
are eight items in dispute, which should be divided equally between 
the parties. Counsel for the parties should arrange a mechanism 
whereby one or the other of the parties is entitled to the first 
choice, with the items being picked alternately by Plaintiff and 
Defendant. The items to be divided in this manner are as follows: 
Sony 27" TV, contents of wall unit, TV cabinet, encyclopedia, 
washer, dryer, lawn furniture, and snow blower. 
15. During the course of the marriage the Plaintiff 
acquired ownership of 97.6% of the outstanding stock in Codale 
Electric Supply, Inc. The Court considered extensive evidence 
regarding the value of the business. The Plaintiff's expert, Mr. 
Dave Dorton, testified that the value of one hundred percent of the 
stock of the business is $2.8 million dollars. The Defendant's 
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expert testified as to values ranging from a liquidation value of 
$2.8 million dollars to valuations of $11 million dollars. The 
Court finds convincing and persuasive the testimony of the expert 
for the Plaintiff. The experts appear to be in agreement that the 
value of the company without the services of Dale Holt, or in the 
absence of a long term employment contract or non-compete 
agreement, is $2.8 million dollars. The Court finds that the 
company, by itself, has basically no good-will, and that the good-
will of the business is attributable to Mr. Holt as an individual. 
The value of the 97.6% interest owned by the marital estate is 
$2,732,000. 
16. The Court does not find that it is reasonable, as 
Defendant has requested, to sell the business. Furthermore, it is 
not reasonable to allow the Defendant to retain one-half of the 
parties' stock in Codale, as the Court finds this would be 
detrimental to the conduct of the business. Accordingly, the Court 
finds that the parties, in conjunction with the business itself, 
should arrive at a plan to acquire the Defendant's one-half 
interest in the shares owned by the parties in a manner so as to 
minimize tax consequences as much as possible to the Defendant, but 
allow the business to function properly. 
17. During the course of the marriage, the parties have 
acquired various additional assets, the values of which have been 
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stipulated by the parties or of which are not in dispute. The 
Court finds that as of the date of the hearing in this matter these 
assets are as follows: personal residence located in Bountiful, 
Utah valued at $153,000; Codale Electric Supply, Inc., stock value 
$2,732,000; Holt Properties Partnership $360,488; Individual 
Retirement Account, $20,323; 401(k) retirement account $89,789; 
Retirement Plan $133,109; and Note payable $16,000. The only 
liability of the marital estate is the sum of $23,250, which 
represents the income taxes payable. The Court notes that the 
above values do not include the personal possessions of the 
parties, including household furnishings, jewelry, and automobiles. 
It is reasonable that the parties each receive one-half of the net 
value of the marital estate. 
18. After subtracting the income taxes payable in the 
amount of $23,250 from the marital estate (and the Court hereby 
finds that the Plaintiff should be responsible to insure that the 
income taxes are paid), each of the parties is entitled to assets 
totalling $1,740,639. The Court finds that the assets should be 
distributed as follows: 
To the Defendant: 
Personal Residence $ 153,000 
IRA Account 20,323 
401(k) Retirement Account 89,7 89 
Retirement Plan 133,1.09 
Buy Out of Codale Shares to Equalize 
Assets 1,344,509 
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To the Plaintiff: 
Codale Electric Supply, Inc. Stock 100% of stock 
owned by the 
parties 
Holt Properties Partnership 360,488 
Note Payable 16,000 
19. The Defendant's stock in Codale Electric Supply, 
Inc., should be redeemed by the corporation or purchased as 
follows: an initial payment of $500,000 should be made to the 
Defendant no later than 60 days from the entry of these Findings 
and Order. Within one year from the due date for the first 
payment, an additional amount in the amount of $422,254 shall be 
made, together with interest accrued thereon from the date the 
initial payment was due at the rate of 4% per annum. The final 
payment of $422,254 should be made no later than one year 
thereafter, together with interest on that installment at the rate 
of 4% per annum, said interest accruing from the date the first 
payment was made. 
20. The Court finds that it is reasonable that each 
party pay any income tax liability, including capital gains, 
resulting from a sale of any assets awarded to that party, 
specifically including funds paid to the Defendant for the purchase 
of her shares in Codale Electric Supply, Inc. With respect to the 
redemption of the shares of Codale, the Defendant is ordered to pay 
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any tax liability assessed, and to indemnify the Plaintiff and hold 
him harmless with regard to such tax consequences. 
21. The parties acquired a 1979 MGB automobile, which is 
currently held in storage. The automobile should be sold, with the 
parties sharing equally the proceeds. In addition, the Defendant 
has in her possession a 1988 Ford Bronco valued at $8,775 and a 
1987 BMW M6, valued at $19,250. Both of those automobiles are 
owned by Codale Electric Supply, Inc. The Defendant is hereby 
awarded the automobiles, subject to her obligation to reimburse the 
corporation for the value of the cars. The value of the cars may 
be deducted from the initial $500,000 payment, if the Defendant so 
desires. 
22. Any interest accrued in the IRA, Retirement account, 
or 401(k) account from the hearing in this matter through the date 
of distribution should be divided equally by the parties. 
23. As of the trial in this matter, the parties had been 
married almost 22 years. Both parties are in their early forties. 
The Defendant has not been employed outside of the home for the 
last sixteen years, and has stated an intention not to go to work 
or back to school. The Plaintiff has worked during the marriage 
and is a successful businessman. Although the Defendant has not 
worked in the business, she has contributed to the financial well-
being of the parties, and should share in the economic success. 
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Both parties will be awarded substantial assets in this matter. 
The Court finds the assets awarded to the Plaintiff may produce 
more income in the future than those awarded to the Defendant. 
24. Both parties have submitted statements of expenses. 
With one or two exceptions, the Plaintiff's expenses seem 
reasonable and necessary. The expenses alleged by the Defendant 
seem excessive. The Court finds that, during the marriage, the 
average monthly expenses of the family of five were in the range of 
$3,800 to $4,200 for the last three that the family lived together 
as a whole. During the period of the pendency of the temporary 
orders of this Court, the Defendant received total temporary 
support for herself and two of the minor children in the amount of 
$1,538 per month. During the period of the temporary orders, the 
Defendant did not incur any additional debt. 
25. The Court finds that, based upon current 
circumstances, the cash payments to the Defendant could earn tax 
free income at a rate of no less than six percent per annum. 
26. The Court finds that indefinite alimony is 
appropriate in this case. The Plaintiff should pay to Defendant 
alimony in the amount of $2,000 per month from the entry of this 
judgment. Said alimony should terminate upon the Defendant's 
cohabitation, remarriage, or death. 
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27. Both parties incurred substantial attorney's fees 
and expert witness fees. The Court finds that, with the 
distribution of assets, it is reasonable that each party pay their 
own attorney's fees and costs. Provided, however, that the 
Defendant should pay the expert witness fees incurred by Plaintiff 
in the approximate amount of $9,500. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes and enters its Conclusions of Law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. A final Order and Judgment should enter 
incorporating the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of the Court as 
set forth herein. 
DATED this *•* " day of Tftuu**-^  199S. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE W. BRENT WEST 
District Court Judge 
12 
CERTIFICATE 01 MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing, FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
I A! 7, I :h ] s I ^  < ia;ji 
Mr. Ronald C. Barker, Esq. 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorney for Defendant 
Mr. David Paul White 
5278 Pinemont Drive, #A2 
Murray, Utah 84123 
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ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3 3 95 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531 -0 4 3 5 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN MID '""• I IT" A HI 
DALE E. HOLT, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
VICKIE L, HOLT, 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Defendant. _ase No. 9J4 /UUbi> DA 
Judge W. Brent West 
This matter came on lor tr^i 1 on June 1 3, ] 4f and 15, 
1994, the Honorable W. Brent West presiding. Both par ties appeared 
in person and were represented by i 011ns* I The Cour 
II 1" : testimony of the witnesses, ha /inq examined th*- exhibit- a- .< 
a n evidence, having issued its ruling, and hav:nq rulea r 
ancillary matters subsequent to the trial at a he r: 
No veinbe ' ] 9 •* I I UM.' ' 1.1 J ' being fully advisee . , .., 
entered . ^ Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and good cause 
appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AD J I IDGED AND DECK EED 1 :I: 1 : 1 1 1 
1 
1. The parties are the parents of three minor children. 
The parties are granted the joint legal custody of the three minor 
children. The Plaintiff shall be designed the primary physical 
custodian of the oldest child, with the Defendant being designated 
the primary physical custodian of the two youngest children. 
2. The children shall be able to spend as much time 
with both parents as possible. Each parent is entitled, at a 
minimum, to visitation with any child not in their primary physical 
care in accordance with the Utah statutory minimum schedule for 
visitation. The parties shall cooperate in effecting visitation, 
although the children shall be entitled to participate in decisions 
with regard to their activities and the visitation. Because of the 
work schedule and travel demands of the Plaintiff, the Defendant 
shall be flexible in terms of designating a day during the week for 
such visitation. The Plaintiff shall, however, give some 
reasonable advance notification of the day during the week that he 
wishes to see the children so as to accommodate the schedules of 
the children and of the Defendant. The Plaintiff shall also be 
allowed to rearrange weekend visitation so as to accommodate his 
travel schedule, but he shall give the Defendant two weeks notice 
of any requests that weekends be traded. 
3. The physical custodian shall give the non-physical 
custodian parent an opportunity to provide care for the children 
2 
d u r i n g a n y s u b s t a n t i a l p e r i o d s o i L i m e lh.it I h»j physii .-ill n i s t i ui i a n 
; 7 :i ] ] b e a b 1 e t: o p r o v i d e care for t h P c h 1 1 d r e n. 
4. The parties are mutuaJ 1 y restrained from 
threatening . narassing, ui annoyi i lg e act • : 'thei ., :: 
(. . ^  ,:r ^q . .-: remark h^ ^hildrei i about the othe: parent-
Plaintift shal " specifically • '- a. ,*< : * \. \ ? *r- ^ . ewnv 
Defendant' residence in oiae: 
-* -.-..-» ii v* ' :i dePTnp. . : . * < * - - * \ 
r e s t r a i n i n c * p r o t e c t i v , :t*r t ;; i ng ^ , 
5 . B a s e d >;p w%r current circums 1 -r^ :« • : - * -, 
s u p p o r t t o t-hfa d e f e n d a n t , <-i;t- *-t 
-> Ordei ' :.- .i; f;tniy aire..' ' .:t S *c ~^ . ** i .v, 
'. ;PJ.JLL ^usLouiaj. arrangement ana tne 
u_^w* Liie --fit : y 
amount j ; t-1: ect j ve 
for a 11 
that the 
any year 
6. The Plaintiff s awarded the income tax exemptions 
* ::e minor ,:u , A: 
• 1 f i ; t 
temporary chila suppuii, ana 
niuiriddLo- ,come wi thhol di nn „: ov 
- parties j rovided v-v -»-" 
J ^  i i,..;a support payments* 
*. ^ :ne. * paymerr : 
.lio v*i ai. - .lie e v e n t 
the Plaintiff becomes delinquent in the payment of child support, 
3 
the Defendant shall be entitled to an order of automatic income 
withholding. 
8. The Plaintiff shall be required to maintain a policy 
of health and medical insurance for the benefit of all the minor 
children. The parties shall share equally the costs of such 
insurance, any deductibles, or any costs incurred not covered by 
such insurance. 
9. The Plaintiff shall be required to maintain a policy 
of life insurance in a face amount sufficient to insure the payment 
of his child support obligation for the benefit of the minor 
children, with the Defendant as the trustee. Any life insurance 
coverage for the benefit of the minor children above and beyond 
such coverage shall be at the sole option of the Plaintiff, and he 
shall be entitled to designate as trustee any person whom he 
chooses. 
10. There are certain policies of life insurance on the 
life of the Defendant. To the extent that she wants to keep 
enforce such insurance coverage, she may assume the policies, but 
she shall be responsible for payment of any premiums associated 
therewith. 
11. The Defendant made certain claims with respect to 
Willowcreek and Oakridge Country Club memberships. With respect to 
the Willowcreek membership, that the membership has already been 
4 
existinc - .  i. • - - . . uJ*t j mai compensate <« * \ , ^,. i : ,*. 
Oakridge Country »\v:, membership * .,i\ membership . <v, r oe 
] . . 01 tne 
membership <.~i- .a J*U ot - i-< ...-' ,; .*»QQ *Q 
SHT fortn hereir >» . ;*-.:. uas:,^ 1 ) require the Plaintiff 
] m e Defendant. 
] * j .; : . course ^ Tnarriaae the parties 
acquired various * * in: personal property Several ' ' h*» eiiis 
parties, ano biian ue awarded those 
items . , ossession, with th^ : .owing exceptions• 
are eight . Lenib n lispute, which shall :.• livided equal!y between 
I or Un"1 parties saaii arranqe a mechanism 
whereby one or the other ot t.he parties is entitled t o the f i rst 
choice, with the items beinq picked alternately by Plaintiff and 
f »of endatil "HUH i i ems tn ho ilivided in this manner are as follows: 
Sony 2 7' PV
 f contents ot wall unit, TY cabinet, encyclopedia, 
washer, dryer, lawn furniture, and snow blower. 
"I 1, The value of the 97.6% interest owned by the marital 
estate is $J,I U"f UO, 
1 4 . 'The p a r t i e s , in c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e b u s i n e s s 
i t s e l f , s h a l l a r r i v e a t a p l a n t o a c q u i r e t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s o n e - h a i r 
i n t e r e s t i n MM1 , ,<!idies MWIMO! by Uhu pji'l tv in i HMM'I 
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minimize tax consequences as much as possible to the Defendant, but 
allow the business to function properly. 
15. During the course of the marriage, the parties have 
acquired various additional assets, the values of which have been 
stipulated by the parties or of which are not in dispute. The 
Court finds that as of the date of the hearing in this matter these 
assets are as follows: personal residence located in Bountiful, 
Utah valued at $153,000; Codale Electric Supply, Inc., stock value 
$2,732,000; Holt Properties Partnership $360,488; Individual 
Retirement Account, $20,323; 401(k) retirement account $89,789; 
Retirement Plan $133,109; and Note payable $16,000. The only 
liability of the marital estate is the sum of $23,250, which 
represents the income taxes payable. The Court notes that the 
above values do not include the personal possessions of the 
parties, including household furnishings, jewelry, and automobiles. 
The parties shall each receive one-half of the net value of the 
marital estate. 
16. After subtracting the income taxes payable in the 
amount of $23,250 from the marital estate (and the Court hereby 
finds that the Plaintiff shall be responsible to insure that the 
income taxes are paid), each of the parties is entitled to assets 
totalling $1,740,639. The Court finds that the assets shall be 
distributed as follows: 
6 
To the Defendant: 
Personal Residence $ 153,000 
IRA Account 20,323 
401(k) Retirement Account 89,789 
Retirement Plan 13 3,109 
Buy Out of Codale Shares to Equalize 
Assets 1, 34 4 ,,509 
To i he PIa intiff ; 
Codale Electric Supply, Inc. Stock 100% of stock 
owned by the 
par ti es 
Holt Properties i:: ar tnersh i p 360,488 
Note Payable 16,000 
17. n », Defendant s stock in , — > i, 
Inc. , ^ H-i ue redeemed ":.v i ::e corporation ^: purchased as foi.ows: 
an in±LjLd-i oayment ui $JGQ,UV0 *>h.j -o r.a^ -. - ,.e Defendant no 
later thar- J ^ V S from the e:: n,:.. ;.> ..it-r. 
Within or--- y- - r L cm ! h<- ^ue c4.'.. • . • :ie first payment i 
additional amour f * ne amount of ? -1 2 I; . ;- v 4 --r.Hll r>e made, together 
with i nte] * ..-= • : .*•• .; = '.** : : u •• p aymei it \ tfas 
cine at the rate of 4% per annum. The final payment of $422,254 
shall be made no 3 at--' f'; « -f,^  ;> :hereafterjr together with 
i nterest :: n that i i ist * A(4 \ H i A iiniini, sci id 
interest accruing from - : t ..• ,- t.i:- : . r,a payment was made. 
] 8. Each, party .-hall : ay .v\ income tax liability, 
:i i l c 3 i l el i'« > "' < • a p :i t a 3 g a. :esuitincj n u , i * - - v assets 
awarded that par ty, specifically i ncluding * . : - :• 
Defendant for the purchase of her shares in Codale Electric Supply, 
7 
Inc. With respect to the redemption of the shares of Codale, the 
Defendant is ordered to pay any tax liability assessed, and to 
indemnify the Plaintiff and hold him harmless with regard to such 
tax consequences. 
19. The parties acquired a 1979 MGB automobile, which is 
currently held in storage. The automobile shall be sold, with the 
parties sharing equally the proceeds. In addition, the Defendant 
has in her possession a 1988 Ford Bronco valued at $8,775 and a 
1987 BMW M6, valued at $19,250. Both of those automobiles are 
owned by Codale Electric Supply, Inc. The Defendant is hereby 
awarded the automobiles, subject to her obligation to reimburse the 
corporation for the value of the cars. The value of the cars may 
be deducted from the initial $500,000 payment, if the Defendant so 
desires. 
20. Any interest accrued in the IRA, Retirement account, 
or 401(k) account from the hearing in this matter through the date 
of distribution shall be divided equally by the parties. 
21. Indefinite alimony is appropriate in this case and 
the Plaintiff shall pay to Defendant alimony in the amount of 
$2,000 per month from the entry of this judgment. Said alimony 
shall terminate upon the Defendant's cohabitation, remarriage, or 
death. 
8 
and expe:- witness fees. >r* 
distribution ...T assets, each party 
fees ai 
the exp = . ., witness fees incurred .* 
amount .-*. * $ }, \ • 
DATED f h i s H • 
a t t o r n e y ' ^ f e e ? 
• .:* * f i n d s t h a t * e 
s h a l l - *\ ! he : : - ! l t t r : ".ev s 
- ^v 
.aintiff i n the approximate 
r 
J>* m i < I_^_ ^ , ] 9 q g
 m 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE W. BRENT WEST 
District Court Judge 
9 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing, ORDER AND JUDGMENT, this ( Jc? day 
of December, 1994, to: 
Mr. Ronald C. Barker, Esq. 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorney for Defendant 
Mr. David Paul White 
5278 Pinemont Drive, #A200 
Murray, Utah 84123 
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ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3395 ~L>"I"-J"' • . :' ' 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
DALE P. HOLT, 
: ORDER ON POST TRIAL MOTIONS 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
VICKI L. HOLT, : 
Defendant. : Case No. 934700554 DA 
: Judge W. Brent West 
ooOoo 
This matter came on for hearing on November 4, 1994, the 
Honorable W. Brent West presiding. The Plaintiff appeared in 
person and was represented by counsel, Ann L. Wassermann, Esq. The 
Defendant appeared personally and was represented by counsel David 
Paul White, Esq. and Ronald C. Barker, Esq. Before the Court were 
various post-trial motions and requests for clarification filed on 
behalf of both parties. The Court having reviewed the pleadings 
submitted by the parties, having heard the arguments of counsel, 
and being fully advised, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1 
1. The MG automobile that is currently in storage 
should be sold, with the parties to share equally the proceeds. 
2. The parties are to share equally any earnings in the 
various retirement accounts accrued from the date of valuation as 
presented to the Court at trial to the date of distribution. 
3. The parties are to share equally the costs of making 
copies of the family photographs. 
4. The Plaintiffs proposal with regard to the 
purchase/redemption of the Defendant's interest in Codale Electric 
Supply, Inc., is hereby adopted by the Court. The Court finds that 
the time periods for payment to the Defendant as proposed by the 
Plaintiff are reasonable. 
5. The Defendant is responsible to pay any income tax 
consequences incurred as result of the redemption/purchase of her 
interest in Codale Electric Supply, Inc. She should indemnify and 
hold the Plaintiff harmless from any income tax liability for such 
purchase. 
6. The Defendant's request that she receive the real 
property owed by Holt Properties as a part of the distribution of 
the marital estate is denied. 
7. Any amounts owed by the Plaintiff to the Defendant 
with regard to the purchase of the Defendant's interest in Codale 
Electric Supply, Inc., sh.-.ll accrue interest at the rate of four 
2 
percent (4%) per annum, which shall accrue on unpaid amounts from 
the date of the first required payment (i.e. sixty days from the 
date of entry of the fina'. order in this matter) until paid in 
full. 
8. The request for both parties to reconsider the 
alimony award is hereby denied. 
9. The Court does specifically find that, during the 
period of time when the parties and their three children lived 
together, their reasonable monthly expenses ranged between $3,800 
and $4,200. 
10. The Court specifically finds that the cash assets 
awarded to the Defendant, and the cash payments for her interest in 
Codale Electric Supply, I^c, could reasonably be anticipated to 
generate tax free income at an annual rate of no less than six 
percent (6%). 
11. The motion to reconsider the Court's rulings with 
regard to attorney's fees and expert witnesses fees is denied. 
12. The Defendant has made certain claims for 
reimbursement of expenses pursuant to the temporary order in this 
matter, which expenses have accrued through the date of the 
hearing. With regard to these claims, the Plaintiff is ordered to 
reimburse the Defendant as follows: 
3 
a. $89.19 for prescriptions for the benefit of the 
minor children, 
b. One-half of the cost of past therapy for the 
minor children. Defendant is to bear the costs of her own therapy. 
Any further therapy foi the children shall be evaluated by both 
parties and a determination of the continued need and cost of 
therapy shall be agreed upon. In the absence of agreement, no 
further costs shall be incurred. 
c. $193.83 representing reimbursement for the 
repair of the water softener, water heater, and refrigerator 
repair. The Defendant is ordered to assume responsibility for the 
cost of lawn fertilizer, the purchase of yard plants and carpet 
cleaning. 
d. $281.34 for reimbursement for the cost of 
certain yard maintenance, including .deck stain, sprinkler parts, 
and the lawn mower blade. The Defendant is responsible for the 
remaining costs, including the hot tub repair. 
e. $204.84 representing care maintenance. The 
Defendant is ordered to pay the registration fees of $310.00 and 
the taxes on the BMW automobile. 
f. The Defendant is ordered to pay the property 
taxes of $892. 
4 
g. Orthodontic expense is to be divided equally. 
The parties should endeavor to obtain a contract with the 
orthodontist, and should also explore insurance coverage. The 
parties should pay equally any costs not covered by insurance, 
including any deductible or uninsured amounts. 
13. The Defendant's motion for an award of child support 
for the month of August, 1994 is denied. 
DATED this 2QL day of SftiOUyW 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge 
te§r 
5 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing, ORDER ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS, this 
1 fr day of January, 1995, to: 
Mr. David Paul White, Esq. 
7434 South State, #102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Mr. Ronald C. Barker, Esq. 
2870 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorneys for Defendant 
al\holt.ord 
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Tab 8 
David Paul White, #3441 
Attorney for Defendant 
7434 South State St. #102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone (801) 566-8188 
Ronald C. Barker, #0208 
Co-Counsel for Defendant 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone (801) 486-9636 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
) DEFENDANT'S URCP 59 MOTION 
TO ALTER OR AMEND FINDINGS, 
) CONCLUSIONS, ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT, ORDER ON POST 
) TRIAL MOTIONS, TO DISTRIBUTE 
ADDITIONAL ASSETS OR FOR A NEW 
) TRIAL 
) Civil No. 934700554 DA 
) Judge W. Brent West 
ooOoo 
I 
Defendant's additional Motions 
Defendant also moves the Court for orders as follows. 
A 
Motion For a New Trial 
1. New trial - For a new trial based upon each of the 
following grounds: 
FEB o 2 ^z Fii '3 
DALE P . HOLT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VICKIE L. HOLT, 
Defendant. 
1 
(a) Accident or surprise - Pursuant to URCP 59(a) (3) . 
Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(b) Newlv discovered evidence - Pursuant to URCP 59(a) (4) 
Newly discovered material evidence which defendant could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. 
(c) Inadequate damages - Pursuant to URCP 59(a)(5). 
Inadequate damages. 
(d) Insufficiency of evidence - Pursuant to URCP 59(a)(6) 
Insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision and/or because 
the decision is against law, and/or 
(e) Error in law - Pursuant to URCP 59(a) (7). Error in law. 
B 
Motion to Alter or Amend 
2. To alter or amend judgment and orders - Defendant also 
moved the Court pursuant to URCP 59(e) for an order altering or 
amending said Findings, Conclusions, Order and/or Judgment and 
Order on Post Trial Motions and other applicable judgments and/or 
orders. 
2 
£ 
3. Incorporation of prior motions bv reference - Defendant 
also hereby incorporates herein and re-alleges the contents of her 
Motions and Memorandum entitled "Defendants Memorandum re Motion to 
Correct ruling and to Distribute Additional Assets or For a New 
Trial" dated 11/3/94," which was entered herein on January 10, 
1995, together with the exhibits and affidavits thereto,1 a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Ex. #1. Although said motions 
addressed the Court's Ruling, and were prepared prior to entry of 
the Court's Findings, Conclusions, Order and Judgment, Order on 
Post Trial Motions, etc., since there was little change from the 
Court's Ruling, the matters argued therein also apply to the 
Court's Findings, Conclusions, Order and Judgment, Order on Post 
Trial Motions, etc. mentioned above. Reference thereon to the 
Court's Ruling is hereby amended to refer to the Court's Findings, 
Conclusions, Order and Judgment, Order on Post Trial Motions, etc. 
4. Order on Post Trial Motions purports to deny defendant's 
11/3/94 motions which were reserved by the Court - At the 11/4/94 
hearing, the Court declined to consider oral argument raised by 
defendant's 11/3/94 motion, and invited defendant to bring those 
matters before the Court after entry of the Findings, Conclusions 
1
 A copy of defendant's 11/3/94 memorandum is attached 
hereto as Ex. #1. 
3 
and Order. To the extent that the "Order on Post Trial Motions'' 
purports to deny defendant's motions contained therein, defendant 
moves the Court for an order vacating said order and permitting 
oral argument of the matters asserted in defendant's 11/3/94 
motion, Exhibit #1 hereto. 
Si 
Supporting Affidavits, Exhibits, Memorandum, etc. 
5. Supporting documents - The above-mentioned motions are 
supported by this Memorandum of Authorities and by the affidavits 
of defendant (below), of Paul Shields,2 of Robert Hunted and by 
exhibits thereto, together with testimony and exhibits received in 
evidence at the trial of this matter. 
I 
Matters to which Defendant's Motions pertain 
6. Findings, Conclusions, Judgment & Orders, Order on Post 
Trial Motions, etc. to which defendant's motions pertain -
Defendant's motions pertain to the Court's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment entered in the above-
entitled matter about 1/10/95; also to the Court's Order on Post 
Trial Motions entered herein about 1/25/95/ and generally to all 
2
 A copy of which is filed herewith as Exhibit #2. 
3
 A copy of which is filed herewith as Exhibit #3. 
4 
of the Courts orders and decisions with respect to distribution of 
assets, payment of income taxes which may be incurred as a result 
of the Court's decision, the award of alimony and child support, 
payment of expert witness fees, attorney fees and costs, life 
insurance, mandatory income withholding, and to other orders which 
pertain to financial matters. 
Dated February 6, 1995. 
DAVID PAUL WHITE and RONALD C. BARKER 
Attorneys for defendant 
Ronald C. Barker 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, of the Affidavits of Paul Shields and Robert Hunter, and 
of exhibits thereto to be mailed, postage prepaid, and/or to be 
hand delivered the 6th day of February, 1995 to Ann L. Wasserman, 
Esq., LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON, 426 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, and/or to be transmitted via FAX #(801) 575-7834. 
Ronald C. Barker 
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David Paul White, #3441 
Attorney for Defendant 
7434 South State St. #102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone (801) 566-8188 
Ronald C. Barker, #0208 
Co-Counsel for Defendant 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone (801) 486-9636 
Attorneys for defendant 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS.COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—ooOoo— 
DALE P. HOLT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VICKI L. HOLT, 
Defendant. 
ORDER IN RE: DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO CORRECT JUDGMENT, 
FOR A NEW TRIAL, ETC. 
Case No. 934700554 DA 
Judge W. Brent West 
—ooOoo— 
This matter came on for hearing on February 14, 1995. The 
hearing was conducted by conference call, the Honorable W. Brent 
West presiding. Participants in the call were the Court, Ann L. 
Wassermann, counsel for Plaintiff, Ronald L. Barker and David Paul 
White, counsel for Defendant. The Court having reviewed the Motion 
of the Defendant to correct judgment, for a new trial, etc., having 
reviewed the Memorandum, and the two errata to the 
Memorandum, and the Court having considered the comments of 
1 
counsel, and being fully advised, now makes and enters the 
following Findings and Order: 
1. The Court finds that some of the matters raised by the 
Defendant were previously considered and heard by the Court on 
November 4, 1994 and that the additional matters presented by 
defendant's motion have not persuaded the Court to change its prior 
ruling. Accordingly, the Order on post-trial motions previously 
entered by the Court should stand as, entered except as modified in 
f 3 below* 
2. The Court finds that the Defendant has failed to produce 
any new evidence with regard to assets of the parties, 
3. Each of the parties is awarded ownership of h of the 
cemetery lots. 
4. Defendant's motion for a new trial is hereby denied. 
DATED this 1\- day of .Eabrtisry, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE W. BRENT WEST 
District Court Judge 
A©" 
2 
CERTIFICATE QF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing revised proposed ORDER IN RE: 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CORRECT JUDGMENT, FOR A NEW TRIAL, ETC., this 
24th day of February, 1995, to: 
ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3395 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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E. PAUL WOOD - 35 37 
ANN L. WASSERMAN - A3395 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
Attorneys for Dale P. Holt, 
Appellee and Cross Appellant 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
DALE P. HOLT, : MOTION TO STRIKE PORTION 
: OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff, Appellee : 
and Cross Appellant, : 
v. : 
VICKIE L. HOLT, : 
Defendant, Appellant : Case No, 950169-CA 
and Cross Appellee : Judge 
ooOoo 
Appellee and Cross Appellant, Dale P. Holt, by and 
through his undersigned attorneys of record, moves this court 
pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to 
strike portions of Appellant Vickie Holt's Brief. A list of the 
specific texts of the Brief which Mr. Holt moves to be stricken is 
attached as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference. A 
significant portion of Mrs. Holt's Brief contains references to 
evidence submitted post-trial and not considered by the Court when 
making its ruling. All references to the post-trial evidence, the 
post-trial evidence itself and arguments based upon the post-trial 
evidence should be stricken. 
The factual background for this Motion is: 
1. On April 16, 1993, Dale P. Holt ("Mr. Holt") filed 
a Complaint for Divorce against his wife, Vickie L. Holt ("Mrs. 
Holt"). 
2. On May 13, 1993, Mrs. Holt filed a Verified Answer 
and Counterclaim for Divorce. 
3. Trial on the Complaint and Counterclaim was held 
before the Honorable W. Brent West, Second District Court Judge 
presiding June 13 to June 15, 1994. 
4. On June 15, 1994, the Court ruled on custody and 
visitation issues and reserved all economic issues for further 
ruling. 
5. On August 3, 1994, the Court entered its ruling 
awarding alimony, dividing the marital estate and awarding tax 
exemption and fees and requesting the parties to present proposed 
buy-out plans. 
6. On November 4, 1994, Mr. Holt filed a Motion to 
Clarify Supplement and/or Reconsider Findings and submitted a Plan 
for redeeming Mrs. Holt's stock. 
7. On November 4, 1994, Mrs. Holt filed a Motion to 
Correct Ruling and to Distribute Additional Assets or for a New 
Trial. 
2 
8. Both Motions were heard November 5, 1994. 
9. On January 4, 1995, the Court entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgment, on the June 
13-15, 1994 Trial and November 5, 1994 Hearing on Post-Trial 
Motions• 
10. On January 20, 1995, the Court entered an additional 
Order on Post-Trial Motions. 
11. On February 2, 1995, Mrs. Holt filed a voluminous 
(over 100 pages) Rule 59 Motion to Alter Amend Findings, 
Conclusions, Order and Judgment, Order on Post-Trial Motions, to 
Distribute Additional Assets or for a New Trial, a copy of which is 
attached as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by reference. 
Attached to the Memorandum of Points and Authorities are Affidavits 
of Paul Shields and Robert H. Hunter, Certified Public Accountants 
which contain evidence, summaries, charts and other matters not 
considered by the Court either in its June 13-15, 1994 Trial or in 
the November 5, 1994 Hearing. 
12. Additionally, several corrections to the supporting 
Memorandum and Affidavits were subsequently added by Mrs. Holt. 
13. On March 7, 1995, Mrs. Holt filed Notice of Appeal. 
14. On March 21, 1995, the trial court entered its Order 
3 
on Post-Trial Motions, denying all relief requested by Mrs. Holt, 
a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein 
by reference. 
15. On January 17, 1996, Mrs. Holt filed her Appellant's 
Brief with this Court. 
16,. On February 7, 1996, Mrs. Holt filed her Corrected 
Appellant's Brief with this Court. 
17. Mrs. Holt's Corrected Appellant's Brief contains 
numerous citations to the Affidavit of Paul Shields and Robert 
Hunter attached to the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of the Rule 59 Motion and several arguments based thereon. 
The trial court did not have before it any of this evidence during 
the June 13-15, 1994 Trial or during the November 5, 1994 Hearing 
on the Post-Trial Motion. 
DATED this fat0" day of May, 1996. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
By:/ E. Pail!"Wood, Esq. 
Attorneys for Dale P. Holt 
Appellee and Cross Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true copy 
of the foregoing, Motion to Strike Portion of Appellant's Brief, 
this _££/^day of May, 1996, to: 
RONALD C. BARKER 
287 0 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692 
DAVID PAUL WHITE 
5278 Pinemont Drive, #A-200 
Murray, Utah 8412 3 
a*t(lbfl$ 
w5\holt.mot 
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EXHIBIT MAM 
Appellant Vickie L. Holt's Corrected Brief of Appellant 
filed February 7, 1996 contains references to the Affidavits of 
Paul Shield and Robert^Hunter, and attachments to their respective 
Affidavits and contention based on Paul Shield's and Robert 
Hunter's Affidavits in the text of the Brief; 
All references to the "Record ("R") after record page 400 
are outside the scope of evidence heard at trial or in the November 
5, 1994 Hearing. 
Page of Appellant's Brief 
Appendix B 
Appendix C 
Appendix D 
Appendix E 
Appendix F 
Appendix G 
Appendix H 
Appendix I 
Appendix O 
P. 1, para. 1, 
para. 1(b) 
para. 1(c) 
P. 2, para. 1(d) 
P. 4, para. 2(a) 
P. 5, top of page 
para. 5 
P. 6, 
P. 9-10, subpara. (f) 
P. 13, subpara. (b)(1) 
P. 15, subpara. (e) 
P. 16, 
Reference to Post-Trial Evidence 
Paul Shield's Affidavit 
26 U.S.C.S. §01041 
1994 Commerce Clearing House 
Income Taxes 
26 U.S.C.S. §301 
§301 Distribution of Property 
Technical Advice Memorandum 
July 20, 1990 
Article, Journal of Corporate 
Taxation 
Affidavit of Robert H. Hunter 
Attachment to Paul Shield's 
Affidavit 
Argument, Footnote 6 
Footnote 8 
Footnote 9 
Footnote 10 
Footnote 16 
Footnote 20 
Appendix B,C,D,E,F,G,H,I. 
Footnote 39 
Footnote 62 
Footnote 75, 76 and 77 
Footnote 7 8 
P. 21, subpara. (d) 
P. 24, portion of subpara. 
P. 25, para. 13, 
P. 33-34, subpara. (i) 
P. 42, subpara. (b) 
P. 43, entire page 
P. 44, top of page 
P. 45, para. 21 
Footnote 86 
f) Footnote 99 and 102 
Footnote 105 
Footnote 138, 139, 140, 141, 142 
Footnote 175 and 176 
Footnote 178 and 179 
Footnote 181 
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EXHIBIT "B 
David Paul White, #344 1 
Attorney for Defendant 
7434 South State St. #102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone (801) 566-8188 
Ronald c. Barker, #0208 
Co-Counsel for Defendant 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone (801) 486-9636 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
) DEFENDANT'S URCp 59 MOTION 
TO ALTER OR AMEND FINDINGS, 
) CONCLUSIONS, ORDER AND -*. 
JUDGMENT, ORDER ON POST ._ i~ 
) TRIAL MOTIONS, TO DISTRIBUTE 
ADDITIONAL ASSETS OR FOR A NEW 
Civil Nc. 9347GQ554 DA 
Judge v;. Brent West 
I 
Defendant's additional Motions 
Defendant also moves the Court :cr orders as follows. 
A 
Motion For a New Trial 
New trial - For a new -.rial rased upon each of the 
follcwina grounds: 
FE3 o 
DALE P. HOLT, 
Plaintiff, 
VICKIE L. H:LT, 
Defendant. 
1 
(a; Accident or surprise - Pursuant to URC? 59(a) (3) . 
Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(b) Newly discovered evidence - Pursuant to URCP 59(a) (4) 
Newly discovered material evidence which defendant could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. 
(c) Inadequate damages - Pursuant to URCP 59(a) (5) . 
Inadequate damages. 
(d) Insufficiency of evidence - Pursuant to URCP 59(a) (6) 
Insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision and/or because 
the decision is against law, and/or 
(e) Error in law - Pursuant tc URCP 59(a) (7) . Error in law. 
S 
Motion to Alter or Amend 
2. To alter or amend judgment and orders - Defendant: also 
moved the Court pursuant to URCP 59(e) for an order altering or 
amending said Findings, Conclusions, Order and/or Judgment and 
Order on Post Trial Motions ar.d other applicable judgments and/or 
orders. 
2 
c 
3. Incorporation of prior motions by reference - Defendant 
also hereby incorporates herein and re-alleges the contents of her 
Motions and Memorandum entitled "Defendants Memorandum re Motion to 
Correct ruling and to Distribute Additional Assets or For a New 
Trial" dated 11/3/94," which was entered herein on January 10, 
1995, together with the exhibits and affidavits thereto,1 a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Ex. #1/ Although said motions 
addressed the Court's Ruling, and were prepared prior to entry of 
the Court's Findings, Conclusions, Order and Judgment, Order_oji 
Post Trial Motions, etc., since there was little change from the 
Court's Ruling, the matters argued therein also apply to the 
Court's Findings, Conclusions, Order and Judgment, Order en Post 
Trial Motions, etc. mentioned above. Reference thereon to trie 
Court's Ruling is hereby amended to refer to the Court's Findings, 
Conclusions, Order and Judgment, Order on Post Trial Motions, etc. 
4. Order on Post Trial Motions purports to deny defendant's 
11/3/94 motions which were reserved by the Court - At tr.e 11/4/?-. 
heanng, the Court declined to consider oral argument raised c_ 
defendant's 11/3/94 motion, and invited defendant to bring those 
matters before the Court after entry of the Findings, Ccr.cl-sirs 
1
 A copy of defendant's 11/3/94 memorandum is attached 
hereto as Ex. #1. 
3 
and Order. To the extent that the NNOrder on Post Trial Motions 
purports to deny defendant's motions contained therein, defendant 
moves the Court for an order vacating said order and permitting 
oral argument of the matters asserted in defendant's 11/3/94 
motion, Exhibit #1 hereto. 
D 
Supporting Affidavits, Exhibits, Memorandum, etc. 
5. Supporting documents - The above-mentioned motions are 
supported by this Memorandum of Authorities and by the affidavits 
of defendant (below), of Paul Shields,2 of Robert Hunter* and_c.V 
exhibits thereto, together with testimony and exhibits received ih 
evidence at the trial of this matter. 
E 
Matters to which Defendant's Motions pertain 
6. Findings, Conclusions, Judgment & Orders, Order on Post 
Trial Motions, etc. to which defendant's motions pertain 
Defendant's motions pertain to the Court's Findings of Fac", 
Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment entered in the abcve-
entitled matter about 1/10/95; also to the Court's Order en Pest: 
Trial Motions entered herein about 1/25/95/ and generally to all 
A copy of which is filed herewith as Exhibit #2. 
A copy of which is filed herewith as Exhibit #3-
4 
of the Courts orders and decisions with respect to distribution or 
assets, payment of income raxes which may be incurred as a result 
of the Court's decision, the award of alimony and child support, 
payment of expert witness fees, attorney fees and costs, life 
insurance, mandatory income withholding, and to other orders which 
pertain to financial matters. 
Dated February 6, 1995. 
DAVID PAUL WHITE and RONALD C. BARKER 
Attorneys for defendant 
BV; (fi~s^a £ £ ^ X ; 
Ronald C Barker 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, of the Affidavits of Paul Shields and Robert Hunter, and 
of exhibits thereto to be mailed, postage prepaid, and/or to be 
hand delivered the 6th day of February, 1995 to Ann L. Wasserman, 
Esq., LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON, 426 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, and/or to be transmitted via FAX #(801) 575-7834. 
ftonald C. Barker 
D 
EXHIBIT "C 
David Paul White, #3441 
Attorney for Defendant 
7434 South State St. #102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone (801) 566-8188 
Ronald C. Barker, #0208 
Co-Counsel for Defendant 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone (801) 486-9636 
Attorneys for defendant 
Ul? :i il 54 i 
BY 
1
 11 J J 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—ooOoo— 
DALE P. HOLT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VICKI L. HOLT, 
Defendant. 
ORDER IN RE: DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO CORRECT JUDGMENT, 
FOR A NEW TRIAL, ETC. 
Case No. 934700554 DA 
Judge W. Brent West 
--00O00--
This matter came on for hearing on February 14, 1995. The 
hearing was conducted by conference call, the Honorable W. Brent 
West presiding. Participants in the call were the Court, Ann L. 
Wassermann, counsel for Plaintiff, Ronald L. Barker and David Paul 
White, counsel for Defendant. The Court having reviewed the Motion 
of the Defendant to correct judgment, for a new trial, etc., having 
reviewed the Memorandum, and the two errata to the 
Memorandum, and the Court having considered the comments of 
1 
counsel, and being fully "advised, now makes and enters the 
following Findings and Order: 
1. The Court finds that some of the matters raised by the 
Defendant were previously considered and heard by the Court on 
November 4, 1994 and that the additional matters presented by 
defendant's motion have not persuaded the Court to change its prior 
ruling. Accordingly, the Order on post-trial motions previously 
entered by the Court should stand as, entered except as modified in 
5 3 below. 
2. The Court finds that the Defendant has failed to produce 
any new evidence with regard to assets of the parties. 
3. Each of the parties is awarded ownership of h of the 
cemetery lots. 
4. Defendant's motion for a new trial is hereby denied. 
DATED this 2\- day of ^ abrtnsry-, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE W. BRENT WEST 
District Court Judge 
ASS 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing revised proposed ORDER IN RE: 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CORRECT JUDGMENT, FOR A NEW TRIAL, ETC., this 
24th day of February, 1995, to: 
ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3395 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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E. PAUL WOOD - 3537 
ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3395 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
Attorneys for Dale P. Holt, 
Appellee and Cross Appellant 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
DALE P. HOLT, 
Plaintiff, Appellee 
and Cross Appellant, 
v, 
VICKIE L. HOLT, 
Defendant, Appellant 
and Cross Appellee 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
APPELLEE'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
Case No. 950169-CA 
Judge 
ooOoo 
Appellee/Cross Appellant, . Dale P. Holt, by and through 
his undersigned attorneys of record, submits this Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of his Motion to Strike portion's 
of Appellant Mrs. Holt's Brief. This Memorandum shall show that 
Mrs. Holt has included evidence in her Brief which was not 
considered by the trial court in its rulings, which under Utah law 
should not be considered on appeal. 
MRS. HOLT'S APPEAL BRIEF CONTAINING EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN 
CONNECTION WITH A RULE 59 MOTION AFTER TRIAL SHOULD BE STRICKEN 
Significant portions of both text, footnotes and 
appendices of Mrs. Holt's Brief on Appeal contain evidence which 
was not before the trial court at the time of its ruling. The 
evidence was submitted in connection with Mrs. Holt's Rule 59 
Motion one month after the court entered its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment. Trial in the matter was 
held June 13-15, 1994 and Post-Trial Motions to clarify the records 
were submitted November 4, 1994 with a Hearing on the Motions held 
November 5, 1994. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and 
Judgment on the trial and hearing were entered by the court January 
4, 1995. A subsequent Order on Post-Trial Motions was entered by 
the Court January 20, 1995. Mrs. Holt filed a Rule 59 Motion to 
Alter or Amend Pleadings and for a New Trial February 2, 1995. The 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted in support thereof 
contains Affidavits of Paul Shields and Robert H. Hunter with 
numerous exhibits. On March 21, 1995, the trial court denied Mrs. 
Holt's Motion. Mrs. Holt appealed the trial court's Judgment and 
Order. Mrs. Holt Appeal Brief contained numerous citations and 
references to the Memorandum of Points and Authorities and attached 
exhibits submitted with the Rule 59 Motion February 2, 1995, which 
were not before the court at trial. 
2 
Both this court and the Utah Supreme Court have on 
several occasions held that evidence submitted in a Brief on Appeal 
which was not before the trier of fact must be excluded from 
consideration in the appeal process. In Mauqhn v. Mauqhn, 770 P. 2d 
156 (Utah App. 1989), the Plaintiff/Appellant husband included 
projected income losses in his Reply Brief which had not been 
previously admitted into evidence at trial. The Court of Appeal 
granted the Appellee's Motion to Strike the entire Brief. In 
Territorial Savings & Loan Association v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452 (Utah 
App. 1989), the parties filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 
and the trial court granted the Mortgagor's Motion. The Mortgagee 
appealed. At the trial court level, prior to consideration of the 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the Mortgagee failed to submit the 
deposition of a witness named John Baird and moved to supplement 
the record on appeal prior to oral argument. The Utah Court of 
Appeals held: 
Thus, the trial court did not have John 
Baird's deposition before it when it granted 
the Trustee's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Evidence not available to the trial judge 
cannot be added to the record on Appeal, 
Conder v. A.L. Williams & Associates, Inc., 
739 P.2d 634, 635-36 (Utah App. 1987), and 
thus we deny [the mortgagee's] Motion to 
Supplement. Accordingly, we consider only 
facts properly before the trial court, 
notwithstanding that both parties to this 
action repeatedly cite to Baird's Deposition 
in their Appellant Briefs. Territorial 
Savings & Loan Association v. Baird at 455-56. 
3 
Also see Chapman v. Chapman, 728 P.2d 121, 123 
(Utah 1986); Govert Copier Painting v. Van 
Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 170 (Utah App. 1990); 
Jackson v. Remington Park, Inc./ 874 P.2d 814, 
815 (Okla App. 1994) . 
CONCLUSION 
Since the trial court did not have before it the argument 
or evidence contained in Mrs. Holt's Rule 59 Motion when making 
decisions on the merits of the case, this Court should strike those 
portions of Mrs. Holt's Appeal Brief making reference to the 
argument or evidence contained in the Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities and attachments submitted with the Rule 59 Motion. 
DATED this 7-tf 'day of May, 1996. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
By:TE. Paiil Wood, Esq. 
Attorneys for Dale P. Holt 
Appellee and Cross Appellant 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true copy 
of the foregoing, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
of Motion to Strike, this pt^-M day of May, 1996, to: 
RONALD C. BARKER 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692 
DAVID PAUL WHITE 
5278 Pinemont Drive, #A-200 
Murray, Utah 84123 
w5\holt.mem 
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Appendix F 
APPENDIX "F" 
A copy of Wife' "Reply Brief of Appellant" is attached hereto as Appendix "F" 
APPENDIX "F 
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A 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant-Appellant Vickie L. Holt ("WIFE") replies to Plaintiff-
Appellee Dale P. Holt's ("HUSBAND") Brief of Appellee filed in 
response to Wife's Brief of Appellant, and Husband's Brief on Cross-
Appeal as follows: 
B 
MATTERS CHALLENGED ON APPEAL & CROSS-APPEAL 
The financial matters challenged in Wife's appeal and Husband's 
cross-appeal are summarized as follows: 
1. Wife's appeal. Wife's appeal challenges the fairness of the 
Court's financial rulings, specifically with regard to the items 
specified in the footnote.1 
1
 Referring to § IV, % 7(a) - 7(m), pp. 8-11 of Wife's Brief, Wife challenges the Court's ruling in the 
following areas: 
(a) Alimony & child support amounts. The insufficiency of the alimony and child support: 
(b) Failure to award income producing assets to Wife. The giving of all income-producing property to 
Husband, including specifically the business building; 
(c) Refusal to permit Wife to share in Codale's goodwill and going concern value. Ruling that Codale's 
goodwill is not a marital asset and denying Wife the right to a share of Codale's goodwill and going concern value; 
(d) The Disproportionate division of assets. The disproportionate division of assets, including the value 
attributed to Codale: 
(e) Whether third-party sale discounts should be charged to Wife where there is no sale. Whether 
discounts should be applied to valuing Codale as if it were being sold to an independent third-party, which it is not; 
(f) Failure to minimize income tax consequences. Failure to distribute assets so as to minimize income 
taxes; 
(g) Imposing entire tax burden on Wife. Imposing all income tax liability which resulted from the Court's 
distribution of assets on the Wife; 
(h) Ordering wife to pay husband's income tax on asset distribution. Ordering Wife to indemnify 
Husband against income taxes which he may incur as a result of the Court's asset distribution: 
(i) Ordering wife to pay Husband's expert witness fees. Requiring Wife to pay Husband's expert witness 
fees; 
(j) Failure to order Husband to pay Wife's expert witness fees & attorney fees. Failure to require Husband 
to pay Wife's expert witness fee and attorney fees; 
(k) Requiring Wife to pay Codale for family vehicles. Requiring Wife to purchase family vehicles from 
Codale; 
(1) Failure to give Wife a compensating benefit for tax exemptions awarded to Husband. Awarding 
children's income tax exemptions to Husband with no compensating benefit to Wife, and; 
(m) Failure to give Wife a compensating benefit for condominium and country club membership 
awarded to Husband. Court's refusal to award Wife a compensating benefit for Husband's condominium and 
country-club membership which were not considered by the Court in the asset distribution. 
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2. Husband's cross-appeal- Husband's appeal challenges the 
$2,000 per month alimony to Wife, alleging Wife has sufficient assets 
and income, and therefor no need for alimony.2 Wife's response to 
Husband's cross-appeal is included in SI 18-20, III".3 
3. Husband's reply to Wife's Brief. Husband's Brief4 asserts 
generally : 
(a) That Wife's share of Codale should be based on liquidation 
values. Because he could destroy Codale's goodwill and going concern 
value by opening a competing business which would appropriate most of 
Codale's major suppliers and customers, Husband asserts that Wife's 
share of Codale should be based on liquidation values; 
(b) That Codale's goodwill & going concern value are not marital 
assets. That because he could destroy its value, Codale's goodwill 
and going concern value are personal to him, and are not marital 
asset; 
(c) That Wife should pay entire $440,000 income tax liability 
incurred in divorce. That because he might sell his Codale stock, and 
may incur tax in connection with such a sale, all of the tax currently 
incurred in connection with his acquisition of Wife's share of Codale 
should be paid by Wife; 
(d) That Court's distribution should be affirmed because it was 
within the range of testimony. That said orders by the trial court 
should be affirmed as appropriate exercise of discretion by the trial 
court, since they are within the range of the evidence; 
(e) That Court's discretion permitted it to base alimony, child 
2
 See Points I & II, pages 8-10 of Husband's brief. 
3
 See pages 18-21 below. 
4
 See Summary of Argument, page 10-12 of Husband's Brief. 
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support on W-2 income, ignoring Husband's enormous Codale income. 
Husband alleges that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
basing alimony and child support on Husband's $80 Thousand W-2 income, 
even though this ignored the facts that: (1) Husband could increase 
his salary at will,5 (2) that a salary of about $250,000 was imputed 
by experts to Husband and was deducted by them from Codale's value,6 
and (3) ignored the fact that Codale (97.6% of which was owned by 
Husband) earned an average of $921,000 during the years 1991 through 
1994,7 earned over $1 Million in 19938 and would have earned about $1 
Million in 1994 but for its move to the new building9 in order to 
further expand its business; 
(f) That Court's rulings were not "clearly erroneous." That 
the appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of the 
trial court on factual issues unless they are clearly erroneous, which 
Husband alleges they were not; 
(g) That Court did not abuse its discretion requiring only ^ the 
interest rate Husband paid to commercial lenders. That a 4% interest 
rate on amounts due Wife was allegedly fair, even though Codale was 
paying 8% to 9% on money that it borrowed;10 
5
 T. 89. Husband testified that he could set his salary any place he wanted, within reason. 
6
 If the imputed salary is to be deducted in arriving at the value of Codale, then the same imputed salary 
should be used to fix the amount of alimony and child support. The Court erred in reducing Codale's value 
without giving Wife the corresponding benefit of increased alimony and child support. 
7
 Earnings for those five years would have been $800,000 higher if the appraiser had not imputed higher 
salaries to Husband (T. 133). After tax earnings for each of the 5 years from 1990 through 1994 were about $504.9 
Thousand. 
8
 In Woodward v. Woodward (Utah 1982) 656 P.2d 431 at 432 the Utah Supreme Court cited with 
approval a statement in Kikkert v. Kikkert (NJ 1981) 427 A.2d 76 at 78 that "the right to receive monies in the 
future is unquestionably... an economic resource subject to equitable division in a dissolution proceeding." 
9
 T. 120. 
10
 T.203. 
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(h) That Alimony should be denied because Wife lacked economic 
need. That no alimony should be allowed, since assets awarded to Wife 
were allegedly sufficient to support herself in the standard enjoyed 
during the marriage; and 
(i) That Attorney fees and expert witness fees should be denied 
because Wife lacked economic need. That Wife was not entitled to be 
awarded attorney fees and expert witness fees because she allegedly 
has no economic need. 
£ 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Both briefs contain Statements of Fact, which are summarized as 
follows: 
1. Wife's Statement of Facts. Wife's Brief includes a 
statement of "Relevant Facts," including those listed in the 
footnote.11 
2 • Response to Husband's Statement of Facts. Husband's 
"Statement of the Facts"12 contains several incorrect or misleading 
statements. Wife disagrees with many of those statements, and 
responds to some of the statements as follows: 
(a) Shields' fine-tuning of his valuation. Shields' testimony 
that Codale's value was $5.4 Million did not change. Husband's 
assertion in 5 8 that as the result of an error, after Shields 
reviewed Dorton's13 report he discovered a $500,000 valuation error, 
11
 As listed in K 10, P. 12-16, relevant facts include: (a) that the parties are in their early forties, were 
married for over twenty-two (22) years, joint custody of children with Wife as primary custodian of the 10 and 14 
year old and Husband as primary custodian of the 16 year old; (b) identification of marital assets; (c) undervalua-
tion of Codale and depriving Wife of right to share in its goodwill and going concern values; (d) undervaluing 
Codale by discounting values as if being sold to a third-party; (e) incorrect computation re alleged award Vi of 
marital estate to Wife; (f) Court recognized need to equalize income of parties, but failed to do so. 
12
 f 1-13, P. 3-7. 
13
 David L. Dorton was Husband's valuation expert. 
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is incorrect and misleading.14 
(b) Shields' opinion re impact on value if Husband left Codale. 
Wife disagrees with Husband's claim that the value of Codale would be 
seriously impacted if Husband ceased to be employed by Codale, and if 
he did not compete. Although Shields' $5.4 Million valuation assumed 
Husband's continued association (T. 387, 409), if Husband left it 
would be appropriate to hire someone to replace him and to make a 
transition over a reasonable period of time (T. 393-394, 410) with 
only a minor effect on valuation.15 A transition to new management is 
vastly different from Husband appropriating Codale's suppliers and 
customers by Husband by establishing a competing business. 
(c) Shields' opinion re impact on value if Husband competed with 
Codale- Husband's brief (5 8) assumes that the effect on Codale would 
be similar whether Husband merely ceased to be employed by Codale, or 
if he opened a competitive business. Shields agreed that if Husband 
competed he could destroy Codale's goodwill and thereby significantly 
decrease its value. Shields also testified that Husband's ability to 
destroy goodwill did not mean that the goodwill did not exist (T. 387-
388) . 
(d) Shields' $3.3 Million book value. Shields testified that 
the book value of Codale was about $3.3 Million. Contrary to 
Husband's assertion that the amount realized from inventory would be 
below its $2.3 Million book value (1 8), because Codale's book value 
used the lower historical last-in, first-out valuation method 
14
 An earlier report Shields had valued Codale about $500,000 higher than his final $5.4 Million value. 
The change was a result of obtaining later financial data on comparable companies, as well as additional 
information from review of financial literature relative to discounts likely to apply to smaller companies, and was 
not from reviewing Dorton's report. [T. 33, L. 3-8 & T. 386]. 
15
 Contrary to Husband's assertion fl[ 8), Shields estimated the portion of Codale's goodwill as being 
attributed to Husband at 49% (T. 386-387). 
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("LIFO"),16 Codale's inventory book value was undervalued $514, 600,17 
and could probably be liquidated at or above book value (T. 19 & 399) . 
Husband's expert testified that even after a 15% deduction for 
liquidation loss, he still valued the inventory at $2.4 Million,18 
which was almost $100,000 more than book value.19 
(e) Dorton's $2.8 Million liquidation value. The Court 
adopted Dorton's $2.8 liquidation value, which is a net of $486 
Thousand20 less than book value.21 
(f) Shields does not agree with Dorton's salvage value 
conclusions. Shields' testimony is mis-characterized in SI 10 of 
Husband's Brief. As discussed in 1 2(b) and 2(c) above, Husband could 
16
 IRS regulations permit a business to use the LIFO method to value inventory. Where (as here) 
merchandise prices have increased, Codale's use of the LIFO inventory method has resulted in lowering its taxable 
income and income taxes, and in reducing Codale's book value. 
17
 See K (3) of Ex. 9 to Husbands trial Ex. 21, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix P. Even 
after deducting 15% for possible shrinkage, Husband's expert's opinion was that after the LIFO adjustment, the 
inventory had a liquidation value of $417,700 more than its book value, as follows: 
(in th<M%mfls) 
Inventory book value $2,270.0 
Add: LIFO adjustment 514.6 
Inventory value based on current costs 2,784.6 
Less: 15% est. loss on liquidation sale 417.7 
INVENTORY VALUE PER HUSBAND $2366.9 
18
 See Line 3 "Inventory", right column in Appendix P hereto. 
19
 Liquidation value of inventory per Husband $2,366.9 
Book value of inventory 2.270.0 
NET INVENTORY UNDERSTATEMENT $ 96.9 
20
 Unadjusted book value (Col. 1 on Ex. 9 to Appendix P hereto) $9,125.7 
Adjusted " " " 2 " " " " " ) 8.639.8 
DORTON'S BOOK VALUE WRITE DOWN $ 485.9 
21
 Dorton computed liquidation value as follows (Ex. 9 to Appendix P hereto): 
Book Value $3,2 93.7 
Net increase in inventory value (FN 19 above) 96.9 
Total adjusted book value 3,390.6 
Less: devalue accounts receivable $ 235.6 
write off intangible assets 347.2 
Total flgyalpatiQn Of frwk valyg 582.8 
Dorton's liquidation value $2,807.5 
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be replaced with other employees with minimal damage to Codale,22 but 
that Codale's value could be seriously damaged if Husband were to 
compete with Codale. Shields testified he believed Husband's threat 
to destroy Codale by competing was not genuine, that Codale would 
likely continue to operate as before, and that devaluation based upon 
speculation that Husband could harm Codale was not appropriate.23 
(g) Offer to purchase Codale for $3.4 Million. The alleged 
offer to purchase Codale for $3.3 Million if Husband left, or for $3.4 
Million if he stayed with Codale (St 11 of Husband's Brief, trial Ex. 
14 & T. 74), has little probative value because it was a preliminary 
negotiation, was subject to many contingencies,24 and Husband was not 
interested in that price as shown by his failure to follow up with 
negotiations.25 However, that offer is significant in that the 
prospective buyer valued Husband's personal goodwill at only 
$300,000.26 Dorton valued Codale's goodwill at $1 Million. Therefore 
Codale's business goodwill (without Husband) is $700,000. Wife is 
entitled to H or to an additional $350,000 using Dorton's valuation, 
or to an additional $1.1 Million based upon Wife's expert's goodwill 
valuation of $2.6 Million.27 
(h) Unnecessary income taxes resulted from Court's asset 
division. Under IRS § 1041, transfer of assets between spouses or 
22
 T. 34. 
23
 T. 409-411. 
24
 See trial Ex. 14 and T. 74-75. 
25
 Evidence of the purchase offer was received over Wife's objections. (T. 74 & 629). 
26
 $3.4 Million minus $3.1 Million = $300,000. 
27
 See discussion in H 15(e), page 29 of Wife's Brief. 
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former spouses incident to a divorce is not taxable.28 Instead of 
dividing the marital estate as a tax-free transfer under § 1041, or 
at least awarding the business building to Wife at a $410,000 tax 
savings, the Court ordered redemption of Wife's Codale stock, 
triggering a $440,000 taxable event (1 12 of Husband's Brief). The 
Court imposed the entire $440,000 of the resulting income tax burden 
upon Wife.29 The tax consequence could have been reduced to only 
$30,000 had the court merely awarded the business building to Wife.30 
The Court erred in not selecting an asset distribution method which 
would minimize resulting income taxes. 
(i) Court should disregard Husband's speculative argument that 
he might incur taxes if in the future he sold Codale. Husband argues 
that since he might someday sell his Codale stock, that Wife should 
pay all of the income tax incurred now in connection with the Court-
ordered redemption of her stock (I 12 of Husband's Brief). Shields 
testified that Husband can transfer Codale to his children without 
incurring income tax by simple estate planning, and that is unlikely 
he will ever incur income tax as a result of his receipt of the Codale 
stock.31 In similar circumstances, in Howell32 this Court approved the 
trial court's refusal to speculate about hypothetical future tax 
consequences from a property division made pursuant to a divorce 
28
 T. 313. 
29
 See discussion in K 15(i), P. 33-34 of Wife's Brief. 
30
 See discussion in Wife's Brief 115(i), page 33-34; f7(f) & footnote 39, page 9; % 10(e) & footnote 77, 
page 15; Robert Hunter's ("HUNTER") summary in Appendix I thereto; and 116, footnote 147, page 36 and 
Hunter's testimony (T. 313). 
31
 See Hunter's testimony (T. 314). It is speculative and uncertain whether Husband will ever incur 
income tax on his Codale stock, and if so, when and in what amount. Also see Alexander v. Alexander (Utah 
1987) where the Utah Supreme Court refused to reduce the present value of a profit sharing plan by hypothetical 
future tax consequences. 
32
 Howell v. Howell (Utah App. 1991) 806 P.2d 1209 at 1213-14. 
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decree. However, there is no speculation about the $430,000 of 
capital gains taxes which must be paid by wife as a result of the 
Court ordered redemption of her Codale Stock.33 The Court erred in 
imposing the entire tax burden on Wife, 
£ 
HUSBAND'S ARGUMENT 
3. Court denied Husband's Motion to Strike reference in Wife's 
Brief to URCP 59 Motion. Husband's Motion to Strike references in 
Wife's Brief to her post-trial URCP 59 Motion34 is attached to his 
Brief as Ex. #10. A copy of Wife's response thereto is attached 
hereto as Appendix #Q, Husband's reply is attached hereto as Appendix 
R; and a copy of this Court's Order denying that motion is attached 
hereto as Appendix S. Since that issue has been resolved, no further 
argument thereon will be made herein. 
I 
4. Wife's Brief Marshaled the Evidence. Without pointing out any 
specific deficiency in the Marshaling of Evidence section of Wife's 
Brief, Husband alleges generally that Wife's Brief fails to meet the 
"Marshaling of Evidence" requirement by "examine(ing) the evidence 
presented at trial by Husband" and alleges it "fails to demonstrate 
the trial Court's error." To the contrary, Wife has carefully 
Marshaled the evidence adduced by Husband, and has shown that the 
Court's rulings are against the clear weight of the evidence and are 
clearly erroneous.35 
33
 See discussion in ^ 2(h) above and in footnote 30 above. 
34
 Husband's Motion to Strike is discussed on page 12 of Husband's Brief. 
35
 See page 13. Wife's Brief P.20-24 "Marshaling of Evidence" & Footnote 83, page 20 also shows that 
"Other portions of the brief also Marshall and discuss the evidence adduced in support of the Court's Findings." 
Appellant's (Wife) Reply Brief - Holt v. Holt - 9 
II 
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
A 
Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness 
5. Fair and equitable overall results are required. Most of 
Husband's Brief is devoted to his argument that the property 
distribution, alimony and child support should be affirmed because 
they are allegedly within the trial court's broad discretion, are not 
"clearly erroneous,'' the "value is within the ranges established by 
expert testimony", that the marital assets were distributed in a "fair 
and equitable" manner,36 and that Wife's appeal is allegedly an 
improper request that the appellate court redetermine a disputed 
factual issue.37 While the trial judge has broad discretion with 
respect to issues of fact, it must "exercises its discretion in 
accordance with the standards set by this court",38 its decision will 
be reversed if it "abuses its discretion," if the decision is "clearly 
erroneous",39 if it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if 
the appellate court "reaches a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made."40 The bottom line is that to pass muster the 
decision must be fair and there must be an overall equitable result.41 
36
 1f 8, page 24 of Husband's Brief 
37
 Husband's Brief pages 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 & 34. 
38
 Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1987). 
39
 URCP 52(a). A finding is clearly erroneous if it is against the great weight of the evidence, or if the 
court is otherwise definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 
193 (Utah 1987) 
40
 State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); Weston 
v. Weston, 113 P.2d 408 (Utah App. 1989). 
41
 There is an unavoidable and intricate connection between property division and alimony. To adjust one 
may necessitate the adjustment of another. Burt v. Burt ,799 P.2d. 1166 at 1172, footnote 10 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990); A clear abuse of discretion is shown where such a serious inequity has resulted. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421 at 
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Wife has appealed because, as demonstrated in her opening Brief, the 
property distribution, alimony and child support were grossly unfair 
and the overall result was not equitable.42 It would be difficult to 
imagine a case where the overall result was so highly inequitable. 
Husband's conclusionary argument that the court "fairly and equitably 
divides(ed) the marital estate" is a gross Histortion.43 
6. Few disputed facts. Wife gave Husband the benefit of the 
doubt by using Husband's expert's testimony to support the facts 
stated in her appeal.44 Wife's challenge is to the trial court's 
failure to properly apply the facts, which resulted in erroneous 
conclusions of law by the trial court and in disproportionate,45 
unfair, inequitable46 asset and income distribution. 
7. Correction-of-error standard applies to the Court' conclusions 
of law. Where as here, the pivotal questions are questions of law, 
the court of appeals applies a correction-of-error standard with no 
particular deference to the trial court's construction.47 Most if not 
all of the pivotal issues involved this appeal are issues of law. For 
example each of the following decisions by the trial court is a 
424; Martinez v. Martinez. 754 P.2d 69 at 76. Findings of value are necessary to permit the appellate court to 
determine "whether the trial court distributed the property equitably." Peck v. Peek, 738 P.2d 1050 (Utah App. 
1987) citing Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Utah 1985). 
42
 See 111, page 17-19; Tf 13-24, pages 25-48 of Wife's opening Brief herein. 
43
 P. 14-15. 
44
 110, pages 12-16; 111, pages 17-19; \ 12,13,14,15 & 16, pages 20-40 of Wife's opening Brief. 
45
 Ebbertv. Ebberty 744P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah App. 1987) 
46
 Hamilton v. Hamilton, 562 P.2d 235 (Utah 1977) [disposition of property should be fair, equitable and 
necessary for the welfare of the parties]; Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980); Newmeyer v. 
Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 at 1278. For example the court may even average conflicting values so long as it arrives 
at an "equitable solution." 
47
 T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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conclusion of law based upon undisputed facts:48 (a) the trial court's 
conclusion that Codale's had no business goodwill or going concern 
value because Husband threatened to mis-appropriate Codale's 
suppliers, customers, key employees, etc. by opening a competitive 
business; (b) the trial court's determination that Codale's goodwill 
was not a marital asset, and the resulting valuation of Codale at 
asset salvage value instead of going concern value - which resulted 
in valuing some assets at very low values, such as $341,300 of 
intangible assets at zero;49 (c) the trial court's decision to ignore 
Codale's enormous income,50 and to base alimony and child support on 
Husband's modest discretionary $80,00051 salary, even though his own 
expert testified that he valued Husband's services at about $250,000 
in valuing Codale; (d) the trial court having adopted a distribution 
method which unnecessarily triggered a $440,000 tax liability; (e) 
the Court's requiring wife to pay the entire $440,000 tax based upon 
speculation that Husband might at some time in the future incur some 
income tax if he sold Codale; (f) refusal to award the business 
building to Wife and award of all income-producing assets to husband; 
(g) required Wife to pay husband's expert witness fees, and refused 
her request for attorney fees and expert witnesses fees; (h) refusal 
to give Wife a compensating asset award to offset value of the 
condominium, country club membership, income tax exemptions and other 
assets awarded to Husband without a compensating benefit to Wife; and 
48
 See 17, pages 8-11; 1 10, pages 16; 111, pages 17-20; 1 13-24, pages 25-47 of Wife's Brief. 
49
 See Ex. 9 to plaintiffs trial Ex. 21, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix P. A related issue 
is whether the value of Codale should be discounted 40% as if it were being sold to an independent third-party, or 
whether it should have been valued at investment value since Codale was not being sold. 
50
 See discussion in 115(c), page 28; 116(d) & 16(e), pages 38-40; 117(b), pages 42-44 of Wife's 
opening Brief herein. 
51
 The fact that Husband can increase his salary is illustrated by his 1990 salary increase $340,000 and to 
$309,000 in 1992, with which he purchased land. See discussion on 127 of Husband's Brief herein. 
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(i) requiring Wife to pay Codale the market value of family vehicles; 
etc. Since each of said decisions by the trial court constitute 
conclusions of law based upon undisputed facts, they should be 
reviewed by the Court of appeals for correctness, giving little 
deference to the trial court's conclusions. The asset and income 
distribution was unfair and inequitable, should be vacated, and Wife 
should be awarded a fair share of the marital assets and income. 
B 
Abuse of discretion standard 
8. Definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. 
To the extent that said decision by the trial court may constitute an 
exercise of discretion, said findings are without evidentiary 
foundation because they were induced by the trial court's erroneous 
view of the applicable law.52 See discussion in Wife's Brief herein.53 
£ 
Assets were unfairly divided 
9. Assets were not evenly divided. Although the trial court 
stated that it was giving each party ^  of what it determined to be the 
salvage value of the marital assets, the net assets distributed to 
Wife was substantially less than the assets distributed to Husband.54 
Husband's computation [P. 14], which purports to demonstrate that each 
received H of the assets, shows that Wife received only about 36% of 
the assets, or about $1,368,000 less than Husband. The purported 
52
 Western Capital & Sees., Inc. v. Knudavig, 768 P.2d 989 (Utah Ct. App.), Cert, denied 779 P.2d 688 
(Utah 1989). 
53
 Tf 11, pages 17-19; 1(13-24, pages 25-47 of Wife's Opening Brief herein. 
54
 See U15(j), page 34 of Wife's Opening Brief herein. Primarily as a result of the Court requiring Wife to 
pay all of the income tax incurred under its asset distribution order, the net value of assets distributed to Husband 
was $1,740,729 and the net value of assets distributed to Wife was $1,304,848, a shortage of $435,881. Also see 
balance sheets and bar chart which compares parties assets after divorce. (Appendix B, R. 485). 
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value of the Codale stock is $1,374,151. (which was conveniently 
omitted from the computation) .55 If we substitute in the computation 
the $2,732,000 value of the Codale stock as found by the Court, and 
deduct the $430,000 of income tax imposed on Wife by the Court, then 
Husband's computation shows that he received about $1,798,00056 more 
in assets than Wife. Not only did the Court substantially undervalue 
the marital assets, its error was compounded by not giving Wife H of 
even that reduced value as the Court said it was doing. The overall 
result was unfair and should be corrected. 
10. Value of Codale stock. Codale is the major marital asset. 
The parties lived modestly, plowed their earnings back into the 
business, and were very successful in accumulating a business with a 
net worth of over $3.3 Million, an appraised value of from $3.8 
Million to $5.4 million, even after reducing the value by about 40% 
as if the business were being sold to a third-party.57 Codale earned 
over $1 Million after taxes in 1993 and Husband's expert 
conservatively projected that Codale will have over $1258 Million 
dollars in after-tax earnings in the 10 years from 1995 through 2004, 
even if anticipated additional income is not realized as a result of 
the move to its new building, built to permit expansion and even 
55
 The Court valued the Codale stock at $2,732,000 [Finding 15, Ex. 5, R. 360], but Husband's 
computation [Page 14 of Husbands Brief] only charges Husband $1,364,151 for that stock, an undercharges of 
$1,367,849 [$2,732,000 - $1,364,151 = $1,367,849]. 
56
 Codale stock to husband $2,732,000 
Other assets to husband 376.488 
Total assets to husband 3,108,488 
Assets to wife (per Husband's computation) L740.639 
Excess assets to Husband 1,367,849 
Add: Income tax imposed on wife 430.000 
TOTAL EXCESS ASSETS TO HUSBAND $1.797.849 
57
 See 115(d), page 29 of Wife's Opening Brief herein. 
58
 See Appendix "O" to Wife's Opening Brief herein. 
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higher earnings.50 The Court erred by giving husband 100% of Codale 
and its new building, with its valuable assets and enormous earning 
capacity, while giving Wife only a fraction of the asset salvage value 
and none of its unusually large earning capacity. Husband's argument 
[P. 17] that Wife's appeal is "nothing more than a request that the 
Court of Appeals re-determine a factual issue heard by the trial 
Court" is without merit. 
11. Codale's goodwill. Husband's expert valued Codale's goodwill 
at $1 Million, but valued the goodwill at zero because Husband 
threatened to loot Codale's suppliers, customers and key employees by 
organizing a competitive business. Wife's expert valued Codale's 
goodwill at $2.8 Million, a difference of $1.6 Million.60 Husband 
properly defines goodwill [P. 19], and cites Jackson and Stevens fP. 
19] for the proposition that a business has no goodwill if its 
existence would vanish were the individual who conducts the enterprise 
to die, retire or quit work. Based upon that definition, Codale has 
goodwill since, if Husband were to die, retire or quit, others could 
be hired to take his place, and Codale's 100+ other employees could 
continue to perform their functions. Like Gardner, where the court 
found that the goodwill of the Ogden clinic, which employed 23 
physicians, did not rest on the reputation of any one person as it 
does in the case of a sole practitioner,61 the goodwill of Codale with 
its 100+ employees does not rest on Husband. Possible destruction of 
Codale's goodwill by Husband's threatened misconduct does not mean 
that Codale does not possess goodwill, or that Wife is not entitled 
to her share of that goodwill. The goodwill value of a business is 
59
 See f 15(c), page 28; and f 17(b), page 42 of Wife's Opening Brief herein. 
60
 See 115(e), page 29-30 of Wife's Opening Brief herein. 
61
 Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988). 
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subject to equitable d i s t r ibu t ion . 6 2 The Court erred in not giving 
Wife a compensating benefi t when i t awarded Codale's goodwill to 
Husband. 
12. Payout to Wife was an abuse of discretion. Husband's 
argument begs the question. His argument i s , in effect , tha t since 
the t r i a l court has "broad la t i tude" to "fashion a var ie ty of methods 
for dividing a s s e t s , " and that j o in t ownership of a business by 
divorced pa r t i e s i s undesirable because i t may foster future 
conf l i c t s , the asset d i s t r ibu t ion plan selected by the t r i a l court 
somehow must be "in accordance with the standards set by t h i s cou r t . " 
The facts are not in d ispute . The rules are c l ea r . The t r i a l ' s 
Cour t ' s incorrec t appl icat ion of those rules to those facts i s "not 
in accordance with the standards set by the appellate court and should 
be vacated and remanded with i n s t r u c t i o n s . " As discussed above and 
in Wife's Opening Brief, i t i s clear that the decision i s against the 
c lear weight of the evidence, and tha t a mistake has been made which 
should be corrected.6 3 
13. Family automobiles. One of the major reasons the monthly 
family expenses were so modest was because of the cost of owning and 
operating family automobiles, as well as many other perks, were paid 
for by Codale. For income tax reasons, t i t l e to the family 
automobiles was in Codale. I t was an abuse of d i sc re t ion to not only 
cut off those perks, but to at the same time require Wife to purchase 
the family automobiles for ful l market value from Codale.64 See 
62
 Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076,1080, n. 1 (Utah 1988). 
63
 State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988). 
64
 Since tax laws permit rapid depreciation of automobiles, the book value was probably substantially less 
than the amount Wife was required to pay. Where, as here, the corporation is almost wholly owned by the parties, 
the corporate form should be disregarded and the true fact enforce, that the automobiles were family automobiles 
which should be have been distributed as separate assets in the divorce. 
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discussion re automobiles in Wife's Opening Brief.65 
14. Wife should receive a compensating benefit for omitted 
assets• Husband incorrectly argues that the condominium, secretly 
owned by Husband, was not a marital asset, and that it was allegedly 
purchased after the divorce.66 After filing Husband's Brief herein, 
counsel for Husband advised counsel for Wife that they had erred, and 
that the condominium was actually owned at the time of the marriage. 
The Oakridge Country Club Membership was omitted in valuing the 
assets.67 A compensating benefit should be given to Wife to offset 
those omitted marital assets. 
15. No interest, then 4% interest rate was abuse of discretion. 
The trial court made no finding to justify requiring Wife to loan 
Husband, interest-free for 10 months, followed by a 4% two year loan, 
when Husband was paying 8% on business loans. This is not a 
financially difficult case which necessitates a $25,000 reduction in 
interest. Remand is required to make findings.68 
16. Husband should be required to pay for intangible assets he 
received. Husband does not dispute that he received Codale's $347,200 
of "intangible assets," or that Wife's *s share of those assets is 
$173,6700. Instead, Husband again hides behind the abuse of discretion 
argument discussed above* Wife should be paid her *s or $174, 000.69 
17. Disproportionate asset division. In Carr, the Idaho Court 
65
 See 17(k), page 10; 110(b)(5) & FN 68, page 14; and f 15(m), page 35 of Wife's Opening Brief. 
66
 See discussion in % 7(m), page 11; fl0(b)(6) & FN 70, page 14 of Wife's Opening Brief herein. 
67
 11(a), page 2 & FN 7, page 2 of Wife's Opening Brief herein. 
68
 See 11(c) & FN 12, P. 3 of Wife's Opening Brief. Remand to make findings is appropriate. Haumont 
v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
69
 See discussion in K 15(1), page 35 of Wife's Opening Brief herein. 
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of Appeals resolved a similar threat by a husband to open a competing 
truck stop by affirming an order which required that the business be 
sold, required the husband to execute a reasonable non-competition 
agreement, and on remand directed the trial court to consider awarding 
husband a larger share of the marital assets to compensate for the 
limitations imposed by the non-competition agreement.70 In Dunn/1 the 
Utah Court of Appeals approved a 76% - 24% property division in a 
second marriage where (unlike our case) the wife had done little to 
contribute toward her husband's success as an orthopedic surgeon. On 
remand, the Court should consider directing the trial court to 
apportion a greater part of the business goodwill and going concern 
to Husband in exchange for a revised valuation based upon his 
execution of a reasonable non-compete agreement. 
Ill 
COMPENSATING ADJUSTMENT THROUGH ALIMONY 
18. Wife is not about to become a public charge. The essence 
of Husband's cross-appeal, and response to Wife's alimony and child 
support appeal, is his argument that no alimony should be paid because 
Wife has sufficient financial resources to' maintain the very frugal 
lifestyle,72 and to not become a public charge.73 Husband's argument 
misses the point. Even though most of the family income was plowed 
back into Codale for working capital and expansion to increase its 
earnings, Codale's $1 Million-plus earning capacity is the major 
70
 Can v. Can, 701 P.2d 304 (Idaho App. 1985). A copy of Can is attached hereto as Appendix " F . 
71
 Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct App. 1990). 
72
 Husband's argument that the family lived on from $3,800 to $4,200 per month [P.8-10, 26,-29] 
ignores the automobiles, family expenses and perks paid by Codale. [See [^11(a), P. 17 of Wife's Brief). 
73
 Husband's Cross-Appeal pages 5, 8-10; and Husband's reply to Wife's Brief, pages, 5,12 & 24-32. 
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marital asset.74 Wife does not claim poverty, but does ask for a fair 
share of that income as non-terminable alimony and reasonable child 
support.75 
19. Conclusion that alimony & child support should be based on 
Husband's $80,000 discretionary income is not supported by the 
evidence. The trial court's conclusion that alimony and child support 
should be based upon Husband's modest $80,000 salary, without 
considering the $250,000 value of Husband's services, Codale's $1 
Million dollar per year income capacity, and Holt Property's income, 
is not supported by the evidence, fails to meet the fairness test and 
is an abuse of discretion.76 In view of Codale's huge earnings and 
available cash, Husband could have substantially increased his salary. 
The trial court's conclusion that Alimony and child support should be 
based upon Husband's $80,000 discretionary salary instead of being 
based on the overall marital income, is not supported by the findings 
of fact,77 or by the evidence, and is an abuse of discretion. The 
same $250,000 Husband's income should be used for alimony and child 
support as was used by Husband's expert to value Codale.78 The trial 
court's conclusion should be reviewed by the Court of Appeals on a 
correction-of-error standard, without any special deference to the 
74
 The right to receive monies in the future is unquestionably...an economic resources subject to equitable 
distribution based upon proper computation of its present dollar value. Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 
(Utah 1982), citing Kikkert v. Kikkert, 427 A.2d 76, 78 (New Jersey 1981) [involved pension rights]. 
75
 Sec 17(a), P. 8; 110(f), P. 16; 111(d), P. 18; 112, P. 24; 115(a), P. 27; 116, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 & 
22, P. 36-46 of Wife's Opening Brief. 
76
 See discussion in 116, 17 and 18, pages 36-46 of Wife's Opening Brief herein. 
77
 Without specific findings the appellate court is unable to determine whether the trial court distributed 
property (or income) equitably. Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050 (Utah App. 1987), citing Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
1072, 1074 (Utah 1985). 
78
 See discussion in 121, page 45 of Wife's Opening Brief herein. 
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trial court.79 Husband's argument [P. 30] that Wife didn't make an 
"underemployment" argument to the trial court is without merit. 
Wife's argument that husband could raise his salary at-will is a 
classic "underemployment" argument. 
20. If Husband's expertise is akin to an advanced degree, he 
must assume burdens. The trial court accepted Husband novel (and 
unreasonable) argument that Codale's goodwill, which results from its 
huge earning capacity, is personal to Husband, that it was not a 
marital asset subject to distribution, and gave Codale's business, 
goodwill and going concern to Husband, without a compensating benefit 
to Wife. Husband now argues that the Court's decision is akin to a 
finding that Codale's unusually large earning ability is akin to an 
advanced decree,80 and that, like an advanced degree, it is not 
marital property subject to division between the parties. If for 
purposes of argument we assume Husband's argument is correct, then 
under Utah cases, and the trial court's finding that Wife's efforts 
contributed to the value of Codale, the court should have "made a 
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding 
alimony."81 The trial court did neither. In Martinez, supra at 542 
the Utah Supreme Court ruled that a spouse is entitled to a 
"compensating adjustment" in alimony where earning capacity of the 
other spouse has been greatly enhanced through their collective 
79
 Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987); 
T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Bailey v. Call, 161 P.2d 138 (Utah Ct. App.), Cert Den. 773 
P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). 
80
 It should be kept in mind that Codale has 100+ employees who sell electrical equipment. To argue that 
Husband's services to Codale are the sole source of its earning capacity is unreasonable. Without Husband Codale 
would continue to operate through its other employees. Husband's threat to destroy Codale by looting its suppliers, 
customers and key employees by forming a competitive company does not somehow make Codale's earning 
capacity asking to husband possessing a professional degree. 
81
 Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1991). Also see discussion in «f 16(b) & (c), P. 37-38 
of Wife's Opening Memorandum. 
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efforts: 
In some circumstances, it may be appropriate to try to 
equalize the spouses' respective standards of living 
(citations omitted) . When a marriage of long duration 
dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the 
income of one of the spouses due to the collective 
efforts of both that change, unless unrelated to the 
efforts put forward by the spouses during the 
marriage, should be given some weight in fashioning 
the support award (citations omitted). This, if one 
spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced 
through the efforts of both spouses during the 
marriage, it may be appropriate for the trial court to 
make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital 
property and awarding alimony. (Emphasis added). 
Cases cited by Husband hold that Wife's investment in husband and 
disparity in income due to a professional license should be reflected 
and addressed by a greater property settlement and higher alimony.82 
If husband's earning capacity is akin to a degree, he then, like a 
professional, must also assume the duty of paying higher alimony 
because of the disparity in income. 
21. The alimony should be non-terminable. Where, as here, 
alimony is used to make a "compensating adjustment" for Codale's huge 
income, the alimony should be permanent, and it should not be affected 
by Wife's marital status. Husband's argument that UC 30-3-5(8) should 
be ignored because it was effective until shortly after entry of the 
divorce decree is without merit, because that statute merely codified 
existing case law,83 including Martinez, quoted in I 18 above. The 
reason alimony terminates upon remarriage, co-habitation, etc., is 
because someone else is receiving the benefit of wife's services, has 
82
 Cases cited on page 33 Husband's Brief hold that wife is entitled to higher alimony because of wife's 
investment in Husband and to address the disparity in income due to a professional license. See Gardner v. 
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988) and Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1987). 
83
 See discussion in 116(f), page 40 of Wife's Opening Brief herein. 
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assumed the role of husband, has assumed the duty of support, and 
therefore the ex-husband should no longer be required to support her. 
The Court has authority to carve out an exception where, as here, the 
purpose of alimony is to permit wife to share in earning capacity of 
husband through enhanced alimony amounts. Under those circumstances 
it would make little sense to terminate Wife's alimony simply because 
she remarries. Husband should not be entitled to receive a windfall, 
and to appropriate to himself all the enormous Codale income acquired 
during the marriage, merely because his former wife remarries. Public 
policy encourages remarriage. No public policy or purpose is advanced 
by requiring Wife to remain celibate. It ought to be kept in mind the 
purpose behind the rule, and should not apply it in circumstances 
which do not accomplish that purpose. As is true with a professional 
degree, since Husband acquired the enhanced earning capacity during 
marriage, Wife and children are entitled to share in that enhanced 
income through higher than usual alimony and child support. 
JY 
ATTORNEY FEES 
22. Wife has a "need" for attorney & witness fees. Utah Code 
30-3-3, which allows the award of attorney fees in divorce cases, 
states in part: 
". . . the court may order a party to pay the 
costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including 
expert witness fees, of the other party to enable 
the other party to prosecute or defend the 
action. (Emphasis added). 
"Need" is not limited to poverty situations, but should consider 
Wife's financial circumstances, and the comparative "needs" of both 
parties. Husband sued, and she had a "need" to defend. Substantially 
all of the financial information was readily available to Husband 
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through his accountants, while Wife was required to employ attorneys, 
accountants and business appraisal experts, at great expense, to 
fulfill her "need" to defend, and her efforts to obtain a fair share 
of the marital assets and income.84 Husband's concealment of assets, 
such as the condominium, his refusal to share the goodwill and going 
concern value of the family business or its unusually large income, 
have substantially increased the difficulty and expense incurred in 
defending Husband's lawsuit. In like circumstances, in Morgan, supra, 
the court affirmed the award of attorney fees to a wife, even though 
she had been awarded substantial assets: 
Because the income to [wife] from the Bel-Aire 
[Apartments] is uncertain and because [wife] has 
no other source of income and because [husband] 
has received a larger portion of the marital 
estate than [wife], the court f inHs that [wife] 
is without reasonable ability to pay her own 
legal fees and that [husband] does have such 
ability and finds that [husband] should pay to 
[wife] the sum of $67,567.35 toward her attorney 
fees incurred in this action. 
The Court abused its discretion by requiring Wife to further 
deplete her modest share of the marital assets by refusing to require 
Husband to pay her attorney fees, expert witnesses fees, as well as 
Husband's expert witness fees, particularly in view of the depletion 
that resulted from requiring wife to pay $440,000 of marital income 
taxes imposed as a result of the Court's asset distribution order. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should grant a new trial, and/or should reverse and 
remand with instructions as requested in Wife's Brief, including 
84
 Under like circumstances, in Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559 (Utah App. 1993) the court approved 
the award of $67,500 of attorney fees where she incurred substantial expense in obtaining financial information 
which was in the possession of husband, even though she was awarded substantial assets in the divorce. 
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instructions to award Wife H of Codale's marital going concern value, 
including goodwill, without reductions for size, marketability, 
awarding reasonable alimony, child support, etc., including the relief 
requested in Wife's February, 1996 Brief. 
Dated August 21, 199 6.//fj 
Ronald C. Barker, co-counsel for Wife, 
Vickie Holt 
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Book Liquidation 
ASSETS Value Value 
CASH(1) 
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE (2) 
INVENTORIES (3) 
OTHER CURRENT ASSETS (4) 
PROPERTY & EQUIPMENT (5) 
OTHER ASSETS (6) 
INTANGIBLE ASSETS (7) 
TOTAL ASSETS 
TOTAL ESTIMATED REALIZABLE 
VALUE OF ASSETS 
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY 
CURRENT LIABILITIES (8) 
LONG-TERM LIABILITIES (8) 
STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY 
TOTAL LIABILITIES & 
STOCKHOLDERS" EQUITY 
TOTAL ESTIMATED REALIZABLE 
VALUE OF LIABILITIES 
ESTIMATED LIQUIDATION VALUE 2.807.5 
326.4 
4,711.6 
2,270.0 
325.8 
906.6 
238.1 
347.2 
9,125.7 
5,230.3 
602.0 
3,293.4 
9,125.7 
326.4 
4,476.0 
2,366.9 
325.8 
906.6 
238.1 
0.0 
8,639.8 
5,230.3 
602.0 
0.0 
5,832.3 
Notes: See following page 
TabQ 
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PER CURIAM. 
In August 1983, Rod Peterson, a motor 
home dealer, loaned a pickup truck to Ivan 
Perry Decker. Decker failed to return it. 
He was subsequently charged with grand 
theft, I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), 18-2407(1). After 
a jury trial, he was convicted. He now 
appeals, challenging only the sufficiency of 
the evidence to sustain the conviction. 
Specifically, he contends the evidence was 
insufficient to prove that he "intended to 
permanently deprive the victim of the use 
(or] benefit of the vehicle."J We affirm. 
II] Appellate review of the sufficiency 
of the evidence is limited in scope. A judg-
ment of conviction, entered upon a jury 
verdict, will not be set aside where there is 
substantial evidence upon which any ration-
al trier of fact could have found the essen-
tial elements of the crime beyond a reason-
able doubt Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 
307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); 
State v. Filson, 101 Idaho 381, 386, 613 
P.2d 938, 943 (1980). "[W]e are precluded 
from substituting our judgment for that of 
the jury as to the credibility of witnesses, 
the weight of the testimony, and the rea-
sonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence." State v. Campbell, 104 Idaho 
705, 718-19, 662 P.2d 1149, 1162-63 <Ct. 
App.1983). Furthermore, we view the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the 
respondent. State v. Fenley, 103 Idaho 
199, 203, 646 P.2d 441, 445 (Ct.App.1982). 
[2] We have reviewed the evidence un-
der these standards. The state's evidence 
shows that Decker wanted to purchase a 
•motor home from Peterson but that a prob-
lem arose concerning credit approval from 
the bank. The problem -could not be re-
solved until the next day. -Because Decker 
-was on foot, Peterson loaned him a pickup 
truck to be used overnight. Rather than 
returning the vehicle the next day, Decker 
-drove it to Durango, Colorado, where he 
was eventually arrested. The jury reason-
ably could infer that Decker*intended to 
deprive Peterson of the pickup. 
I. Decker's argument, in so far as it presumes 
that theft requires intent to deprive the owner of 
his property "permanently," fails to take ac-
The judgment of conviction is, therefore; 
affirmed. 
w f«tm««tfir$WfM> 
Elizabeth Mary CARR, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
Terry Arthur CARR, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 15177. 
Court of Appeals of Idaho. 
May 31, 1985. 
In divorce proceeding, magistrate or-
dered sale of community-owned business 
and ordered proceeds divided between par-
ties, and husband appealed. The District 
Court, First Judicial District, Kootenai 
County, Watt E. Prather, J., affirmed, and 
husband appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Walters, C.J., held that: (1) trial court 
could order husband to agree to noncom-
petition clause in sales agreement, thereby 
including goodwill in sale of business; <2) 
truck stop, including its goodwill, was com-
munity asset which should have been val-
ued and distributed by magistrate; and (3) 
trial court was required to determine value 
received for -goodwill of business and to 
determine whether unequal division of 
amount received for goodwill was appropri-
ate. 
Vacated and remanded. 
Swanstrom, J., dissented in part and 
filed opinion. 
count of the modern language of I.C. § 18-2403. 
Decker was prosecuted under the modern stat-
ute. 
CARR v 
Cite as 701 V2A 304 
1. Divorce <s=»286(l) 
Issue of whether trial court could or-
der husband to agree to noncompetition 
clause in sales agreement when family 
business was sold to facilitate property dis-
tribution in divorce proceeding did not be-
come moot when husband signed noncom-
pete provision, as husband agreed to sign 
such provision only to avoid further con-
tempt orders. 
2. Divorce~«s=>252.3(2) 
Unless there are compelling reasons to 
divide community assets unequally, division 
of community property in divorce proceed-
ing should be substantially equal. I.C. 
§ 32-712. 
3. Divorce <S=*252.3(2) 
Method by which community property 
is distributed in divorce proceeding is left 
to discretion of trial court, but ordinarily 
trial court should divide community proper-
ty in such way as to give each spouse the 
sole and immediate control of his or her 
share of property. I.C. § 32-712. 
4. Divorce <fc=»252.3(5) 
To give each spouse the immediate 
control of his or her share of community 
property distributed in divorce proceeding, 
trial court may provide for sale of commu-
nity property so long as sale order does not 
amount to waste of community asset or 
provide that property be sold for less than 
it is worth. 
5. Divorce *=»269(2) 
Trial court in divorce proceeding may 
enforce its orders regarding property, dis-
tribution with contempt proceedings. 
6. Divorce <&»269(9) 
Trial court is not precluded from issu-. 
ing orders to effectuate property disposi-
tion -decree where order, which might be 
enforced with contempt proceedings, does 
not direct payment of debt. Const. Art 1, 
§ 15. 
7. Divorce *=»252.3(5) 
In ordering sale of community busi-
ness .to effectuate property disposition in 
. CARR Idaho 3 0 5 
(Idaho App. 1985) 
divorce action, trial court may require busi-
ness' goodwill to be included in the sale. 
8. Good Will G=>4 
Goodwill is property that can be sold 
9. Husband and Wife e=>249(2) 
Goodwill of business owned by spouse 
may be community property, separate prop-
erty or part community property and part 
separate property, depending on circum-
stances. I.C. § 32-903. 
10. Divorce <&=>252.3(1) 
Husband and Wife <s=248'/2, 249(1), 
250, 251 
"Separate property" is all property 
owned by either spouse before marriage, 
and property acquired afterward by gift, 
bequest, devise, or descent; "community 
property" is all other property acquired 
after marriage by either spouse. I.C. 
§§ 32-903, 32-906. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
11. Husband and Wife «=>249(2) 
To extent it is acquired through efforts 
of • spouse during marriage, goodwill of 
community-owned business is community 
property. I.C. § 32-906. 
12. Husband and Wife *=249(2) 
Where spouses did not have interest in 
truck stop until after they were married 
and all their labor on behalf of business 
occurred during coverture, any goodwill 
value of business was community property 
which should have been valued and distrib-
uted upon divorce. I.C. §§ 32-903, 32-906. 
13. Divorce «=»252.3(5) 
In ordering sale of community busi-
ness truck stop to effectuate property dis-
position in divorce action, magistrate did 
•not err by ordering husband to execute 
-reasonable noncompetition agreement, 
thereby including the goodwill in 6ale of 
truck stop. 
J 4 . Good Will <&=>4 
Goodwill of business is sold when sell-
er ^agrees to noncompetition provision in 
sales agreement. 
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15. Divorce <S=»252.3(5) 
When family owned business is sold to 
facilitate property division in divorce, trial 
court must consider unique character of 
goodwill along with statutory factors to 
determine whether goodwill asset should 
be divided equally; unique nature of good-
will, its sale by means of noncompetition 
clause, its varying importance to separate 
individuals of marital community, and ef-
fect of its sale on statutory factors may 
constitute compelling reasons to divide val-
ue received for goodwill unequally. I.C. 
§ 32-712. 
16. Divorce <&=>252.3(5) 
In ordering sale of community busi-
ness to effectuate property disposition in 
divorce action, trial court must determine 
value received for goodwill of business and 
must carefully consider statutory factors 
to determine whether unequal division of 
amount received for goodwill is appropri-
ate, and court should also consider tax con-
sequences to spouses resulting from differ-
ing treatment, for tax purposes, of good-
will and of covenants not to compete. I.C. 
§ 32-712. 
17. Divorce «=>286(1) 
Where court order requiring husband 
to remove sign from adjacent property was 
effective only while sale of community-
owned business was pending, and sale had 
6ince been completed, propriety of removal 
order was moot. 
18. Constitutional Law <$=>69 
Court of Appeals would not issue ad-
visory opinions. 
CJ. Hamilton (argued), Hamilton & 
Hamilton, Steve F. Bell, Coeur d'Alene, for 
defendant-appellant. 
Sue S. Flammia (argued), Flammia & Sol-
omon," Scott W. Reed, Coeur d'Alene, for 
plaintiff-respondent. 
WALTERS, Chief Judge. 
This appeal involves the -disposition of 
property following a divorce decree. The 
issues concern the sale of a family business 
ordered by the magistrate in the action? 
the parties do not contest the division ol 
distribution of any other assets. To jrej 
solve the parties' interests in the family 
business, the magistrate ordered a sale io^ 
the business and the proceeds divided be^ 
tween the parties. Orders by the magis-
trate, directing the husband to executes 
sales agreement containing a Covenant not 
to compete and to remove a sign on proper-
ty adjacent to the business, were appealed 
by the husband to the district rourt. TheJ 
district court affirmed. The husband ar> 
peals from the district court decision. "We 
vacate the district court's decision in part 
and remand for redetermination of the val-
ue and the distribution of the business 
goodwill. 
The issues presented on appeal may be 
6tated as follows: (1) when a family busi-
ness is sold to facilitate property distribu-
tion in a divorce, can a trial court order a 
spouse to agree to a noncompete clause in 
a sales agreement? (2) If so, can the trial 
court's order be enforced with .a contempt 
proceeding? (3) What consideration should 
be given to the goodwill -of a business 
ordered sold in a divorce action? • (4) Can a 
trial court order a sign advertising a com-
peting business to be removed from a for-
mer spouse's separate property until after 
the family business is sold? (5) Should 
either party to this appeal receive an award 
of attorney fees? 
The background of this case is as fol-
lows. - Elizabeth and Terry Carr were mar-
ried in California in 1963. In 1975, the 
Carrs moved to Post Falls, Idaho, and pur-
chased a one-half interest in the Husky 
Port IVuck Stop located near Post Falls. 
They became sole owners of the truck stop 
in 1978. The business prospered under the 
Carrs' management; the physical plant was 
expanded and modernized, a shop to sell 
and service CB radios was added, tire and 
fuel sales increased, restaurant sales flour-
ished. Terry Carr was manager of the 
entire operation except the restaurant, 
which was handled by Elizabeth. -He 
worked twelve to fourteen hours a day at 
the business and was on call twenty-four 
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4iours a day. In 1979, Elizabeth Carr filed 
for divorce. Terry Carr counterclaimed 
and the cause was tried before a magis-
trate. 
Evidence was submitted concerning the 
value of the assets and the amount of 
outstanding liabilities of the truck stop. 
From this evidence, the magistrate deter-
mined the business had a net worth of 
$761,309. The magistrate assigned no val-
ue to "goodwill," concluding that "no credi-
ble evidence was presented atJtrial to sup-
port a finding that the business possesses 
any good will upon which a value can be 
placed." Terry Carr was given sixty days 
to purchase Elizabeth Carr's community in-
terest in the truck stop, measured by one-
half its fair market value. For this pur-
pose~,' the magistrate treated the net worth 
of the business, $761,309, as its fair market 
value. In the event Terry Carr did not 
purchase his ex-wife's interest, the magis-
trate ordered the property to be sold and 
the proceeds divided. Subsequently, Terry 
Carr did not purchase his ex-wife's interest 
in the truck stop, and efforts to sell the 
business to a third party commenced. 
11] Prospective purchasers insisted on a 
provision in the sales agreement limiting 
Terry Carr's ability to open a competing 
business. One typical -noncompete -clause 
prohibited the Carrs for five years from 
opening a competing business within ten 
miles of Husky Port Truck Stop. Because 
Terry Carr owned property adjafeent to the 
truck stop, he was opposed to a noncom-
pete clause in any sales agreement, which 
would interfere with his planned use of the 
adjacent property. The magistrate ordered 
Terry Carr to execute a specific earnest 
money agreement containing a covenant to ' 
not compete and, when he declined to do so, 
the magistrate held Terry Carr in contempt 
of court. To prevent further contempt or-
ders, Terry Carr did subsequently sign an 
earnest money agreement which contained 
a noncompete provision.1 The magistrate 
I. Elizabeth Carr contends the issues regarding 
the noncompetition clause became moot when 
'Terry Carr executed the sales agreement. It is 
clear Terry Carr agreed to the noncompete pro-
vision only to avoid further contempt orders. 
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also -ordered Terry Carr to remove a sign 
announcing a new truck stop business to 
open on the property adjacent to Husky 
Port Truck Stop. On appeal, the magis-
trate's orders were affirmed by the district 
court. 
The district court, finding the noncom-
pete covenant to be reasonable, upheld the 
covenant and concluded that it was within 
the magistrate's discretion to enter an or-
der directing Terry Carr to agree to the 
noncompete provision. The district court 
declined to award additional compensation 
to Terry Carr for his agreement to not 
compete, by alteration of the magistrate's 
distribution of property or-its proceeds. 
The district court viewed the magistrate's 
order to remove the sign as effective only 
while the sale of Husky Port was pending. 
The district court observed that, once the 
sale was completed, Terry Carr was free to 
replace the sign although replacement of 
the sign could generate an action to en-
force the covenant not to compete. The 
magistrate's order regarding the sign was 
therefore upheld. The district court also 
upheld the magistrate's authority to en-
force its orders by contempt proceedings. 
[2] We turn first to the issues concern-
ing the sale of the truck stop. Unless 
there are compelling reasons to divide com-
munity assets unequally, the division of 
community property in a divorce proceed-
ing should be substantially equal. I.C. 
§ 32-712. Here the magistrate found 
there were compelling reasons to make an 
unequal division of the community property 
t>wned by the parties. We have not been 
asked to review the propriety of that deter-
mination. In regard to the truck stop, the 
magistrate ordered that Elizabeth Carr 
should receive the first $4,846 from the 
proceeds of the sale of the business and the 
balance divided equally. 
In those circumstances, we hold the authority of 
the magistrate to order execution of the limiting 
clause and the subsequent finding of contempt 
should not bar appellate review of the issues 
raised herein. 
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[3-6] The method by which the proper-
ty is distributed is left to the discretion of 
the trial court, Koontz v. Koontz, 101 Ida-
ho 51, 607 P.2d 1325 (1980), but ordinarily 
the trial court should divide the community 
property in such a way as to give.each 
spouse the sole and immediate control of 
his or her share of the property. Parker v. 
Parker, 95 Idaho 676, 522 P.2d 788 (1974) 
Thus, to give each spouse the immediate 
control of his or her share of the property, 
the trial court may provide for the sale of 
community property so hng as the sale 
order does not amount to waste of a com-
munity asset or provide that the property 
be sold for less than it is worth. Id. The 
trial rourt in a divorce proceeding may 
enforce its -orders regarding property dis-
tribution with contempt proceedings. See 
Phillips v. District Court of the Fifth 
Judicial District, 95 Idaho 404, 609 P.2d 
1325 (1973).* 
(7] In this case,'6ie trial court ordered 
Terry Carr to execute an earnest money 
agreement containing a covenant to not 
compete tor'five years and within ten miles 
of Husky Port. Terry Carr .subsequently 
was held in contempt of court for failing to 
Lsign the-earnest money agreement.3 As 
noted, when the jnagistrate made findings 
of .the values of the various properties 
owned by.the parties, the magistrate was 
not able, because .of a lack of credible evi-
dence, to assign any value to the goodwill 
component of the truck stop. See Saviers 
v. Soviets, 92 Idaho 117, 438 P.2d 268 
^1968); Loveland v. Xoveland, 91 Idaho 
400, 422 P.2d 67 (1967) (no error where trial 
court failed to divide value of goodwill of 
community business in divorce actions 
when the evidence was insufficient to es-
2. - Terry Carr cites Phillips for a broad proposi-
t i o n thai ihc trial court may not issue any post-
divorce orders unrelated to a former spouse's 
'nduty to support his wife or children The prop-
"OsHion is erroneous. rPMMips*Jie)d the trial 
court's order of contempt did not violate an 1, 
§ 15 of the Idaho Constitution. That section 
_ prohibits imprisonment for debt. Phillips held 
j * n order otconlempt, and subsequent imprison-
- rnent, for failure to satisfy a property settlement 
*-<iebt does not violate art. 1, § 15 if the debt was 
-related to the former Spouse's obligation to sup-
vport -his wife or children. Phillips does not 
tablish value of goodwill). Subsequent^ 
however, because of the demands byjffera 
chasers for a covenant not to compele,<Jfcj 
believe the existence of the goodra 
achieved a much greater significance i.irj 
determining an appropriate division of ?thc 
parties' property interests. l a effect, *b£ 
ordering Terry Carr to execute the noncom 
petition clause, the magistrate was requiri 
ing that the goodwill x>f the truck stop 
business be sold along with (be tangible 
assets and the accounts receivable. • _~ 
In instances where a party sells his 
business, and, in connection with such 
sale, agrees that he will not engage In 
the same or similar business in the same 
area for a particular and reasonable 
length of time, it is obviously the inten; 
tion on the seller's part to sell the good 
will of the business, even though the 
contract, as in this instance, fails to ex-
pressly mention good will. [Citations 
omitted.] 
Vancil v. Anderson, 11 Idaho 95,101, 227 
P.2d 74, 77 41951). Given the trial court's 
authority in a divorce action to-order the 
sale of a community business to effectuate' 
property .disposition, the issue is whether a 
trial court may require a business's good-
will to be Included in the sale. We hold 
that it may. 
{8] Our Supreme Court long ago recog-
nized that the goodwill of a -business "is a 
species of property subject To sale by the 
proprietor, and which may be sold by order 
of court " Harshbarger v. Ehy, 28 Ida-
ho 753, 761, 156 P. 319, 621 (1916), quoting 
Smock v. Pierson, €8 lnd 405p34 Am.Rep. 
269 (1879). Goodwill is an intangible busi-
ness asset not easily defined. 
preclude a trial court from issuing orders to 
effectuate a property disposition decree where 
the order, which might be •enforced -with con-
'tempt proceedings, does not direct payment of a 
«iebt. 
3. The earnest money agreement signed by Terry 
—Carr-which eventually resulted in a sale of the 
^business contained a covenant not to compete 
for five ^rears within five miles of the Husky 
Port Truck Stop. 
CARR v. 
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The "good will" value of any business 
enterprise is that value which results 
from the probability that old customers 
will continue to trade or deal with mem-
bers of an established concern It is the 
probability that old customers will resort 
to the old place or seek old friends, and 
the likelihood of new customers being 
attracted to well-advertised and favor-
ably known services or goods. 
Good will is the advantage or benefit 
which is acquired by an establishment, 
beyond the mere \'alue of the capital, 
stocks, funds or property employed 
therein, in consequences of the general 
patronage and encouragement which it 
receives from constant or habitual cus-
tomers on account of its location, or local 
position or reputation for quality, skill, 
integrity or punctuality It is something 
in business which gives reasonable ex-
pectancy of preference in the race of 
competition. 
Good will is property, so recognized 
and protected by law. As such it is 
subject to bargain and sale [Footnotes 
omitted.] 
Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 415 
P.2d 667, 670 (1966). However it is de-
fined, goodwill clearly is property that can 
be sold. 
[9-13] Further, goodwill of a business 
owned by a spouse may be community 
property, separate property or part commu-
nity property and part separate property, 
depending on the circumstances. Separate 
property is all property owned by either 
spouse before marriage, and the property 
acquired afterward by gift, bequest, devise, 
or descent. I.C. § 32-903 Community 
property is all other property acquired af-
ter marriage by either spouse. I.C. § 32-
906. Thus, to the extent it is acquired 
through the efforts of a spouse during 
4. There appears to be a split of authority as to 
whether the goodwill of a professional practice 
- is a divisible or awardable asset in a divorce 
action See ANNOT., 52 ALR-3d 1344 (1973) 
Because the case before us does not involve a 
professional practice we do not decide that 
question today. 
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marriage, the goodwill of a community 
owned business is community property. In 
this case, the Carrs did not have an interest 
in- the truck stop until after they were 
married. All their labor on behalf of the 
business occurred during coverture. Ac-
cordingly, any goodwill value of the busi-
ness was community property which should 
have been valued and distributed upon di-
vorce.4 See Mueller v. Mueller, 144 CaL 
App 2d 245, 301 P.2d 90 (1956); Hurley v. 
Hurley, 94 N.M 641, 615 P.2d 256 (1980); 
Matter of Marriage of Fleege, 91 Wash.2d 
324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979). The magistrate 
did not err by ordering Terry Carr to exe-
cute a reasonable noncompetition agree-
ment, thereby including the goodwill in the 
sale of the truck stop.' See Lord v. Lord, 
454 A.2d 830 (Me.1983) (trial court could 
order the wife to execute a reasonable non-
competition clause to protect the goodwill 
of a business awarded to the husband). 
114] The magistrate had initially con-
cluded the value of Husky Port Truck Stop 
contained no component of goodwill. The 
business had not yet been sold and the 
proceeds divided in accordance with the 
magistrate's plan for distribution of the 
community assets, when the noncompete 
agreement became an issue in the divorce. 
As Vancil v. Anderson, supra indicates, 
the goodwill of a business is sold when the 
seller agrees to a noncompetition provision 
in the sales agreement It is clear the 
purchasers here were interested in ac-
quiring more than the real property, equip-
ment, inventory, and accounts receivable ol 
Husky Port Truck Stop. The* purchasers 
also sought .to purchase the business'* 
goodwill, as is evident by their jnsistenc* 
upon a noncompetition -clause in the Bale* 
.agreement On the record,before us, w< 
conclude that goodwill comprised a portioi 
of the value of the truck stop and that th< 
5. Terry Carr does not argue on appeal the dfc 
tance and duration restrictions of the noocom 
petition clause are more than necessary to pro 
tect the truck stop's goodwill, making the ciaus 
unreasonable and thus invalid. See Sdpp 1 
Wallace Plating, inc., 96 Idaho 5, 523 P-2d 82 
(1974) 
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communttyK)wned business* including- its* 
goodwill was' a community" asset1 which 
should have been-valued and distributed by 
the magistrates 
[15,16] It remains to be determined 
whether,the value received for goodwill 
should be divided equally. As already not-
&d,~ the'"division of community property 
should be* substantially equal unless there 
ire compelling reasons to divide it unequal 
ly» Terry Carr insists that he is entitled to 
compensation for his agreement to not 
:ompete with the Husky Port Truck Stop. 
We agree that there may be compelling 
•easons in this case to justify an unequal 
livision of the proceeds from the sale of 
he truck stop. It is clear Terry Carr was 
ess willing than Elizabeth Carr to be re-
itricted from opening another truck stop 
msiness. Terry Carr owned property suit-
ibte for another truck stop and he an* 
lounced his intention to open a new busi* 
less at the earliest opportunity. His sale 
>f the-goodwill of Husky Port Truck. Stop 
nay have significantly affected his occupa-
ion, amount and source of income, use of 
ocational skills, employability, and present 
nd potential earning-capability, all factors 
o be considered in determining whether a 
ommunity property division should be 
qual. See I.C. § 32-712. When *family-
wned business is sold to facilitate a prop-
rty division in a divorce, we believe the 
rial court must consider the unique charae-
er of goodwill along with the factors in 
C. § 32-712 to determine whether the 
oodwill asset should be divided equally. 
he unique nature of goodwill, its sale by 
leans of a noncompetition clause, its vary-
ig importance to the separate individuals 
f the marital community, and the effect of 
s sale on the section 32-712 factors may 
institute compelling reasons to divide the 
ilue received for goodwill unequally. Be-
luse the magistrate did not consider the 
oodwill of Husky Port Truck Stop after 
le property was sold subject to the non-
»mpete agreement, we vacate the proper-
r distribution decree regarding the truck 
op. On remand, the trial court must de-
rmine the value received for the goodwill 
' the business, and must carefully consid-
er the- factors listed in IC. § 32-712 to 
determine whether an unequal division of 
the amount received for the goodwill is 
appropriate. The court should also consid-
er the tax consequences (if any) to the 
Carrs, vis-a-vis each other and vis-a-vis the 
buyer of the truck stop, resulting from 
differing treatment, for tax purposes, of 
goodwill and of covenants not to compete. 
[17,18] We decline to determine Terry 
Carr's contention that the magistrate erred 
by ordering the removal of the sign from 
property adjacent to the truck stop. Re-
moval of the sign was ordered to avoid 
discouraging prospective vendees from 
making offers to purchase the truck stop 
Because the removal order was effective 
only while the sale of Husky Port Truck 
Slop was pending, and the sale has since 
been completed, the propriety of the remov-
al order is moot; although, as noted by the 
district court, replacement of the sign may 
be viewed as a breach of the noncompete 
agreement Thus, our discussion of the 
issue would resolve no actual controversy. 
We decline to issue advisory opinions. See 
Radermacher v. Eckert, 63 Idaha 531, 123 
P.2d 426 (1942). 
Both parties seek an award of attorney 
fees on appeal. The award of attorney 
fees in a divorce action is controlled by I C. 
§ 32-704. Because of the remand to deter-
mine the disposition of the goodwill compo-
nent of the Husky Port Truck Stop we are 
faced with an incomplete record upon 
which we can consider the factors required 
under I.C. § 32-704 in order to award at-
torney fees. Therefore, we instruct the 
trial c6urt on remand to determine whether 
an award of attorney fees, for this appeal, 
should be made to either party. See, e.g., 
Donndelinger v. Donndelmger, 107 Idaho 
431, 690 P 2d 366 (Ct.App.1984). 
The district court's order affirming the 
magistrate's distribution of Husky Port 
Truck Stop proceeds is vacated. The cause 
is remanded to ascertain the proceeds at-
tributable to the goodwill of the business 
and to determine an appropriate division of 
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those proceeds. Costs to appellant,.Terry much—if indeed he would purchase at 
Carr. under such circumstances. 
f BURNETT, J., concurs. 
5; SWANSTROM, J., dissenting in part 
I would affirm the district court's order 
in. total. The majority remands for the 
trial court to redetermine the value of 
goodwill. However, there is no real equa-
tion which the trial court can apply to re-
late the value of goodwill to the amount, if 
any, the husband should be paid for his 
agreement not to compete. That is be-
cause, as the majority opinion correctly 
shows, goodwill is comprised of many vari-
able components. There is no definite rela-
tionship between goodwill and * covenant 
not to compete unless the parties to a 
transaction agree both as to the value of 
"the goodwill and the value of the covenant 
-This determination is not made without the 
"participation of the buyer, as well as the 
•sellers. Here, the sale has been completed; 
[the purchase price fully paid 
p*-The husband contends in the trial court 
that the goodwill of the business had no 
^separate value. From evidence already 
presented once, the magistrate was unable 
[to assign any separate value to goodwill. I 
see little to be gained by a remand on this 
'point The fact remains that after the trial 
court has made its new determination of 
the value of the goodwill,, whether it is $1 
.or $100,000, there will be no additional dol-
lars available for distribution from the sale 
.of the community business. This is not a 
case where an asset was omitted from the 
distribution or not considered. 
% Finally, the husband's contention that he 
is* entitled to a greater share of the sale 
proceeds because of his agreement not to 
compete is not convincing in light of his 
previous conduct First, he took the unten-
able position of trying to sell the business,, 
yn'th the expectation of obtaining the best 
{(rice, while advertising to the world his 
intention to open a competing business on 
adjoining property. Regardless of whether 
the business to be sold has any ascertain-
able goodwill value, a reasonable and pru-
dent purchaser would not agree to pay as 
Had the husband here wanted to contin-
ue in the operation of this type of business-, 
at the same location he could have done so. 
The trial court allowed hinrevery reason-
able opportunity to purchase the wife's in-
terest in the business. This included at-
least one opportunity to meet the bona fide-
offer of a prospective purchaser. The hua* 
band first said that he would and later he' 
declined. Now, he wants to be compensat-
ed for not being able to compete in close* 
proximity to the business he left I am not 
persuaded that there is any legal or eq-
uitable grounds for a remand. 
(O fUYNUMN 
Douglas S. CLARK and Pamela J. 
Clark, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
George ENNEKING, 
Defendant-Respondent-
No. 15149. 
Court of Appeals of Idaha 
May 31, 1985. 
Homeowners brought suit against con-
tractor seeking recovery for damages al-
legedly sustained when contractor disrupt* 
ed homeowners' sewer service. The Dis-
trict Court, Second Judicial District, Idaho* 
County, George R. Reinhardt II, J., af-
firmed magistrate division judgment in fa-
vor of contractor, and homeowners appeal-
ed. The Court of Appeals, Walters, CJ., 
held that substantia] competent evidence 
supported jury's verdict in favor of contrac-
tor. 
Affirmed. 
Burnett J , concurred in the result. 
